The Security Dilemma

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Buchanan
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Security Dilemma ◽  
Strong Linkage ◽  
Intelligence Collection ◽  
Tight Linkage ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter traces the arc of the security dilemma through time. It begins with Thucydides and, stretching through the formal articulation with John Herz, Herbert Butterfield, and Robert Jervis, and continuing through the Cold War. It makes the link to intelligence work, a connection first made by Michael Herman. In particular, it shows how the security dilemma is most potent when there is a strong linkage between intelligence collection and attack, as is the case in cyber operations. This tight linkage makes collection activity more threatening, and is more likely to lead to a response by the involved nations.

Minimizing the Danger of Nuclear Weapons

2018 ◽  
pp. 45-50
Author(s):  
Steven P. Lee
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Disarmament ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Security Dilemma ◽  
The World ◽  
Nuclear Attack ◽  
Global Peace ◽  
The Cold War

Many of those concerned about global peace advocate a policy of nuclear disarmament in order to eliminate the danger posed by these weapons. The logic is that eliminating the weapons would eliminate the danger they pose. But I argue that these are separate goals, that eliminating the weapons would not eliminate the danger, and in fact might make it worse. After the cold war, many thought that it was finally possible to rid the world of nuclear weapons, but since 1991, the world has not moved substantially towards this goal. The reason is that nuclear weapons create a security dilemma in which efforts to use them to make societies safer, through the practice of nuclear deterrence, end up making them less safe. This is because efforts (through minimum deterrence) to use them to avoid a deliberate nuclear attack create risk of nuclear war by escalation, and efforts (through counterforce deterrence) to minimize the risk of nuclear war by escalation, create the risk of deliberate nuclear attack. The way out of this dilemma is through delegitimization of nuclear weapons.

The Homeland Security Dilemma: Imagination, Failure and the Escalating Costs of Perfecting Security

2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank P. Harvey
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Homeland Security ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
War On Terrorism ◽  
Security Dilemma ◽  
Public Expectations ◽  
Financial Costs ◽  
Defence Spending ◽  
Central Argument ◽  
The Cold War

Abstract. Besieged by insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq and gripped by mounting pressure to enhance security and public safety at home, officials in Washington and Ottawa are now confronted with a serious homeland security dilemma: the greater the financial costs, public sacrifice and political capital invested in security, the higher the public's expectations and corresponding standards for measuring performance, the more significant the public's sense of insecurity after each failure, and, paradoxically, the higher the pressure on governments and citizens to sacrifice even more to achieve perfect security. The paradox of security dilemmas at the international level (Jervis, 1976, 1978) explains why perfectly rational decisions to enhance power actually diminish security by promoting unstable spirals in competitive defence spending—a common account of escalating military budgets throughout much of the Cold War. The homeland security dilemma represents the post-9/11 equivalent for domestic politics in the war on terrorism. The paper's central argument can be summed up by the following counterintuitive thesis: the more security you have, the more security you will need, not because enhancing security makes terrorism more likely (although the incentive for terrorists to attack may increase as extremists feel duty bound to demonstrate their ongoing relevance), but because enormous investments in security inevitably raise public expectations and amplify public outrage after subsequent failures.Résumé. Assaillies par des insurrections en Afghanistan et en Irak et bousculées par la pression de plus en plus grande d'améliorer le système de sécurité publique à l'intérieur du pays, les autorités de Washington et d'Ottawa se trouvent confrontées à un sérieux dilemme en ce qui concerne la sécurité intérieure : plus les coûts financiers, les sacrifices publics et le capital politique investis dans la sécurité sont importants, plus les attentes du public et les standards de mesure du rendement correspondants sont élevés, plus le sentiment général d'insécurité augmente après chaque échec, et, paradoxalement, plus la pression sur les gouvernements et les citoyens de faire des sacrifices encore plus lourds pour parvenir à une parfaite sécurité s'intensifie. Le paradoxe du dilemme sécuritaire au niveau international (Jervis, 1976, 1978) explique pourquoi des décisions parfaitement rationnelles prises pour renforcer le pouvoir réduisent en fait la sécurité en encourageant des spirales instables de dépenses militaires concurrentielles—voir l'escalade des budgets militaires pendant la guerre froide. Le dilemme de la sécurité intérieure en est l'équivalent en politique nationale, depuis le 11 septembre, dans le contexte de la guerre contre le terrorisme. L'argument principal de cet article peut se résumer par la thèse contre-intuitive qui suit : plus on a de sécurité, plus il en faut. Pas parce que le renforcement de la sécurité rend le terrorisme plus probable (bien que la motivation des terroristes risque de s'exaspérer quand les extrémistes se sentent obligés de démontrer que leur pertinence perdure), mais parce que des investissements massifs dans la sécurité augmentent inévitablement les attentes et que l'opinion se scandalise encore davantage de tout échec subséquent.

scholarly journals Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?

2001 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Jervis
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Social Systems ◽  
The Other ◽  
Security Dilemma ◽  
The World ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
The Cold War

Under the security dilemma, tensions and conflicts can arise between states even when they do not intend them. Some analysts have argued that the Cold War was a classic example of a security dilemma. This article disputes that notion. Although the Cold War contained elements of a deep security dilemma, it was not purely a case in which tensions and arms increased as each side defensively reacted to the other. The root of the conflict was a clash of social systems and of ideological preferences for ordering the world. Mutual security in those circumstances was largely unachievable. A true end to the Cold War was impossible until fundamental changes occurred in Soviet foreign policy.

The New Security Dilemma: divisibility, defection and disorder in the global era

2000 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 623-646 ◽  
Author(s):  
PHILIP G. CERNY
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
World Economy ◽  
International System ◽  
Security Dilemma ◽  
Sources Of Uncertainty ◽  
Global Era ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Globalizing World ◽  
Nineteenth And Twentieth Centuries ◽  
The Cold War

Traditionally, the central problematic of the Westphalian states system has been how to counteract the so-called ‘security dilemma’, the tendency for states in a context of uncertainty to defect from cooperative arrangements if they perceive other states' security preparations as threatening (misperception; arms racing). As the states system became more centralized and the number of major players declined in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the nondivisibility of benefits—the dangers of potential defection (world wars; nuclear annihilation)—grew while states' incentives to defect increasingly necessitated control from the centre. The end of the Cold War, however, has reflected not a further centralization (nondivisibility) of benefits in the international system but (1) an increasing divisibility of benefits in a globalizing world economy and (2) the declining effectiveness of interstate mechanisms at preventing defection not only by states (‘defection from above’) but also by non-state, sub-state and trans-state actors (‘defection from below’). In this ‘new security dilemma’, the range of incentives grows for the latter to defect from the states system itself—unless coopted through the increased availability of divisible benefits. Furthermore, attempts to impose security from above (intervention) can create backlashes which interact with complex globalization processes to create new sources of uncertainty: overlapping and competing cross-border networks of power, shifting loyalties and identities, and new sources of endemic low-level conflict. In this context, emerging mechanisms of stabilization will be uneven, characterized by structural tensions and suboptimal performance.

scholarly journals Cooperation as an (un)expected effect of energy security dilemma: The case study of Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia

2019 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-243
Author(s):  
Vladimir Trapara ◽  
Nevena Sekaric
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Energy Security ◽  
Positive Outcomes ◽  
Security Dilemma ◽  
Energy Infrastructure ◽  
Expected Effect ◽  
Central Hypothesis ◽  
Balkan Countries ◽  
The Cold War

The paper analyzes the significance of energy infrastructure for the concept of energy security, the basis of energy security dilemma concept that relied on the need for the protection and strengthening energy infrastructure and the effects of such a dilemma as well. The central hypothesis refers to the positive outcomes of the energy security dilemma, i.e., the assumption that, unlike the classical security dilemma, the energy security dilemma encourages states to cooperate instead of refraining them from doing so. Hence, the focus of authors? attention contains the analysis of three Balkan countries? energy arrangements - Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia - undertaken in order to strengthen their own energy security. The period of research covers the end of the 19th and the entire 20th century highlighting the Cold War period. Comparative historical approach to this topic implies observing the envisaged subject of research in a given historical and political context, especially due to the fact that these countries have changed their borders and status several times throughout history. In that sense, it is necessary to highlight key historical, political and economic characteristics of the countries that marked the appropriate period and made (im)possible undertakings in the field of energy security. The conclusion reached by the authors suggests that the main initiator of the development of energy infrastructure was the increased need of these countries for energy in order to meet their own needs due to accelerated industrialization and urbanization. In addition, within the analyzed case study of Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia, conclusion remarks refer to the fact that energy infrastructure, as well as the need for its protection and strengthening, can contribute to the connection of states, both physically and institutionally, despite their political classification during the Cold War.

scholarly journals Cold War North Korea and United States naval intelligence

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-409
Author(s):  
Hunter Hollins
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Sea Of Japan ◽  
North Korea ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Sea Of Japan ◽  
The North ◽  
Intelligence Collection ◽  
The Cold War

On 23 January 1968, the North Korean Navy attacked and captured the USS Pueblo, a United States naval intelligence collection ship in international waters off the coast of North Korea. The USS Pueblo was one of a group of AGER ships created to provide intelligence from the Sea of Japan during the Cold War. This article discusses the growing hostilities of North Korea during the Cold War and uses recently declassified documents to illustrate the naval intelligence efforts of the United States to monitor the North Korean threat.

The long peace, the end of the cold war, and the failure of realism

1994 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Ned Lebow
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
International Relations ◽  
International System ◽  
Security Dilemma ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Security Community ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Post Facto ◽  
The Cold War

Three of the more important international developments of the last half century are the “long peace” between the superpowers, the Soviet Union's renunciation of its empire and leading role as a superpower, and the post-cold war transformation of the international system. Realist theories at the international level address the first and third of these developments, and realist theories at the unit level have made an ex post facto attempt to account for the second. The conceptual and empirical weaknesses of these explanations raise serious problems for existing realist theories. Realists contend that the anarchy of the international system shapes interstate behavior. Postwar international relations indicates that international structure is not determining. Fear of anarchy and its consequences encouraged key international actors to modify their behavior with the avowed goal of changing that structure. The pluralist security community that has developed among the democratic industrial powers is in part the result of this process. This community and the end of the cold war provide evidence that states can escape from the security dilemma.

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