Democratic Deficit in the European Union

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Neuhold
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
State Level ◽  
Representative Democracy ◽  
Democratic Deficit ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Modes Of Representation ◽  
The Eu

The debate on whether or not the European Union (EU) is suffering from a democratic deficit is “crowded territory.” The debate is not only far-reaching but has evolved along with the transformation of the system of European governance. In the 1990s the “standard version of the democratic deficit” was developed. This drives on the observation that EU member states have transferred powers to the supranational construction of the EU and as such these powers escape national parliamentary control. The fact that the European Parliament was a rather weak institution is seen as to further aggravate the situation. While this is, since the early 2000s, no longer seen as an adequate standard of comparison and indicator for the democratic quality of the EU, the EU democratic system is still seen to fall short on different accounts, for example when it comes both to participatory and representative democracy. This might come as a surprise, as the EU has undertaken a number of reforms especially since and by way of the Maastricht Treaty to make the EU more “democratic.” For example, the (indirect) involvement of national parliaments into EU policymaking was strengthened or the tool of the European Citizen Initiative (ECI) was introduced. As such, the debate on the democratic deficit is not only academic but takes place within the political arena. It is consequential by being mirrored in treaty changes and thus also functional. Overall these tools are seen to fall short however, at least so far. One reason seems to be expectation management. The terms used seem to be very “loaded”. For example, the notion is evoked that the Union is a representative democracy. Moreover piecemeal reform leads to different modes of representation. While some of these objectives have been achieved, for example, by providing access of certain groups to decision-making process, others are excluded, which can in fact exacerbate the democratic deficit. Overall the “traditional” debate on the democratic deficit has taken on a new quality: the context of emergence of the so-called illiberal democracies at the member state level. It has been stated already almost 20 years ago that the EU will have to invent new forms of citizenship, representation, and decision-making if it is ever to democratize itself. It seems that the EU has tried to do so partially, but the use of far-reaching and normative notions and concepts is bound to fall short in a system that is in constant flux and very heterogeneous.

The Democratic Deficit of the European Union: Towards Closer Cooperation between the European Parliament and the National Parliaments

1994 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karlheinz Neunreither
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
Democratic Deficit ◽  
Central Authority ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
National Governments ◽  
Democratic Norms ◽  
The Eu

During Recent Years, The Notion of The Democratic deficit has become, together with subsidiarity, or transparency, one of the most popdar subjects for conferences on European Union. While almost everyone seems to agree that a democratic deficit exists, it is far from certain that there is a general understanding of what is meant by it.The most radical meaning would be that the European Union (EU) as such is undemocratic and that its decision-making does not correspond to democratic norms. Quite often when national governments have to explain unpopular decisions of the EU, responsibility for these uncomfortable situations is attributed to a faceless monster, the ‘Brussels bureaucracy’. The assumption is that a very strong central authority exists which embodies the power of decision-making and that democratic accountability of this central authority either does not exist or at least is not sufficiently guaranteed. In other words, the EU institutional system does not comply with democratic norms. This is by far the most extreme definition of a democratic deficit.

scholarly journals The political system of European Union after European Parliament Election of 2019

2019 ◽  
pp. 15-30
Author(s):  
Andrii Martynov
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Political System ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
The Political ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
The Eu

The politics of the European Union are different from other organizations and states due to the unique nature of the EU. The common institutions mix the intergovernmental and supranational aspects of the EU. The EU treaties declare the EU to be based on representative democracy and direct elections take place to the European Parliament. The Parliament, together with the European Council, works for the legislative arm of the EU. The Council is composed of national governments thus representing the intergovernmental nature of the European Union. The central theme of this research is the influence of the European Union Political system the Results of May 2019 European Parliament Election. The EU supranational legislature plays an important role as a producer of legal norms in the process of European integration and parliamentary scrutiny of the activities of the EU executive. The European Parliament, as a representative institution of the European Union, helps to overcome the stereotypical notions of a “Brussels bureaucracy” that limits the sovereignty of EU member states. The European Parliament is a political field of interaction between European optimists and European skeptics. The new composition of the European Parliament presents political forces focused on a different vision of the strategy and tactics of the European integration process. European federalists in the “European People’s Party” and “European Socialists and Democrats” consider the strategic prospect of creating a confederate “United States of Europe”. The Brexit withdrawal from the EU could help the federalists win over European skeptics. Critics of the supranational project of European integration do not have a majority in the new composition of the European Parliament. But they are widely represented in many national parliaments of EU Member States. The conflicting interaction between European liberals and far-right populists is the political backdrop for much debate in the European Parliament. The result of this process is the medium term development vector of the European Union.

scholarly journals THE PROBLEM OF THE "DEFICIT OF DEMOCRACY" AND ITS OVERCOMING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (87) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sofiia Vovk ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
National Level ◽  
Lisbon Treaty ◽  
Democratic Deficit ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Citizenship ◽  
Legislative Proposals ◽  
Institutional System ◽  
The Eu

The article analyzes the approaches to the interpretation of the term "democracy deficit", which takes place in the modern European discourse of integration. It is concluded that in the framework of the first approach, the "deficit of democracy" is linked to the problem of the legitimacy of decisions taken by the "pan-European center". As part of the second with a number of distortions that are prone to a democratic form of government in developed democracies. The causes and conditions of the "democracy deficit" are considered. The peculiarities of legal instruments of citizens' influence on the functioning of the European Union and the problem of the "democracy deficit" at the present stage of its development are considered. The reasons and conditions of "deficit of democracy" emerged, ways of solving this problem were analyzed. The particularities of legal instruments of citizens’ influence on the functioning of European Union and the problem of «democratic deficit» at the modern stage of its development. It is emphasized in the article, that the problem of «democratic deficit» remains a key problem of the EU institutional system and EU decision-making. Legal amendments of the EU founding treaties were provided to minimize the problem of «democratic deficit». The most important changes were determined with the Lisbon Treaty, which fixed several effective legal remedies. For instance, the legislative power of the European Parliament as the unique legitimist institution elected directly by citizens was increased. Changes included the change in calculating such a majority to a new double majority based on in the principle of representation of citizens in the Council of Ministers. The Treaty of Lisbon expanded the role of Member States’ parliaments in the legislative processes of the EU by giving them a prior scrutiny of legislative proposals before the Council and the Parliament can take a position and some control powers. One of the major innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and aims at involving citizens more closely in agenda-setting at EU level is the European citizens’ initiative. The specific character of the EU institutional system and lack of some legal mechanisms of citizens’ participation in the process of EU decision-making, similar to those of national level, demonstrates the existence of the problem of «democratic deficit». Nevertheless modern legislation of EU proves that there is no ground to make a conclusion about weakness of political scope of the European citizenship.

6. The European Parliament: The power of democratic ideas

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Shackleton
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Lisbon Treaty ◽  
Democratic Deficit ◽  
Historical Evolution ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Direct Elections ◽  
National Governments ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines how the power of the democratic idea drives change in the European Parliament’s (EP) powers. The EP, the only directly elected institution of the European Union, derives its authority from national electorates rather than national governments and is therefore a transnational institution. Since the first direct elections in 1979, the EP’s powers and status have grown dramatically, culminating in the changes agreed under the 2007 Lisbon Treaty. Nevertheless, the EU is perceived to be suffering from a ‘democratic deficit’. This chapter first traces the historical evolution of the EP before discussing its decision-making. It then considers how the EP aggregates interests, what influence it exercises, and what kind of body it is becoming. It concludes by assessing various perspectives about the EU’s democratic deficit. The chapter stresses the importance of consensus mechanisms within the EP as well as those that link it to other EU institutions.

scholarly journals Can Science Tame Politics: The Collapse of the New GMO Regime in the EU

2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vesco Paskalev
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
State Level ◽  
Growing Season ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Current Regulation ◽  
The Eu

On 2 March 2010 the European Commission authorised the cultivation of a BASF's genetically modified potato “Amflora” throughout the European Union. This came after a tortuous process commenced in 1996 and so far it is the only authorisation of a GMO for cultivation in EU since the current regulation was established. On 3 March 2010, President Barroso announced that the Commission intends to propose amendments to the current regulation to allow the Member States to prohibit the cultivation of GMO authorised for cultivation in the EU and it did so on June 13, 2010. This is one of the very few cases where decision-making power is effectively devolved back from Union to state level; it is even more impressive that this is happening on the initiative of the Commission and despite the obvious negative consequences for the internal market. In the meantime BASF botched the 2011 growing season for Amflora in Sweden and in 2012 announced that it withdraws its GM crops from the EU. This article follows the saga purports to find the reasons why it entailed an immediate change.

24. Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stijn Smismans
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
Maastricht Treaty ◽  
First Century ◽  
Democratic Deficit ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Treaty ◽  
Current Economic Crisis ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines the extent to which decision-making in the European Union can be considered democratic and legitimate. It first considers the ‘permissive consensus’ on which the initial stages of European integration were based before discussing how the European democratic deficit emerged as an important issue of debate during the 1990s after the Maastricht Treaty had transferred considerable powers to the EU. It shows that the main solution to the democratic deficit has been inspired by the parliamentary model of democracy and involves strengthening the European Parliament. The chapter also explores how the governance debate at the start of the twenty-first century broadened the conceptual understanding of democracy in the EU. It concludes by assessing the impact of the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty on EU democracy and suggesting that the current economic crisis is likely to exacerbate the EU's legitimacy problems.

The Role of National Parliaments in Governing the European Union

2015 ◽  
pp. 52-62
Author(s):  
M. Strezhneva
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
National Level ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Lisbon Treaty ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Subsidiarity Principle ◽  
The Eu

Institutional structures and decision-making processes, which have been established in the European Union, fall beyond the scope of national rules for the functioning of parliamentary government. National parliaments of the EU member states have not succeeded in acquiring solid positions in the multilevel constellation within the Union. Yet nowadays they are assigned an important mission in their efforts to overcome, alongside the European Parliament (EP), the growing democratic deficit at both the European and national levels. The article is meant to assess the potential of national parliaments in capitalizing on the Lisbon Treaty provisions and on new forms of their engagement with supranational institutions (the European Council, the European Commission and the EP in particular), aimed at enhancing their legitimizing influence. General paradigm for the analysis is determined by the multilevel governance concept (MLG). It allows for a picture of European decision-making, which is shared by actors placed at different levels of the governance structure. National parliaments are supposed to be provided with multiple access points to the political process in the European Union as well. But the MLG vision doesn't contradict the fact that the key role within the EU belongs to those who occupy the highest executive power positions at the national level. Three directions for the national parliaments to intensify their involvement are put into spotlight: parliamentary control over national executives; control of compliance with the subsidiarity principle in European legislative proposals and supranational decisions; political dialogue with the European Commission and interparliamentary cooperation. The analysis proves that conditions are ripe for more active stance of national parliaments in the EU affairs. The “system of early warning” of the subsidiarity principle violations, provided for in the Lisbon Treaty, seems most promising. But national parliaments themselves will still have to demonstrate more persistence when using new instruments. Acknowledgment. The article has been supported by a grant of the Russian Foundation for Humanities (RFH). Project № 14-07-00050.

9. Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union

2019 ◽  
pp. 127-140
Author(s):  
Stijn Smismans
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Democratic Deficit ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Treaty ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Economic Migration ◽  
Modes Of Governance ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Eu

This chapter discusses the extent to which decision-making in the European Union can be considered democratic and legitimate. The chapter clarifies the concepts ‘democracy’ and ‘legitimacy’, and describes how, although initially the legitimacy of the European polity was not perceived as a problem, it became more problematic as the EU gained more competences. The European democratic deficit became an important issue of debate only during the 1990s after the Maastricht Treaty had transferred considerable powers to the EU. The main solution to the democratic deficit has been inspired by the parliamentary model of democracy and involves strengthening the European Parliament (EP), while also paying attention to the role of national parliaments and regional and local authorities. The chapter also shows how the governance debate at the start of the twenty-first century broadened the conceptual understanding of democracy in the EU by addressing the complexity of European governance (see also Chapter 7). By looking at different stages of policy-making and different modes of governance, while dealing with issues such as transparency and the role of civil society, the chapter discusses a wider range of issues associated with the democracy and legitimacy of the Union. It assesses the impact on EU democracy of the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. The chapter concludes by warning that three main crises, namely the economic, migration, and security crises, have revived nationalist and populist movements exacerbating the challenges to the EU’s legitimacy.

German Participation in EU Decision-Making after the Lisbon Case: A Comparative View on Domestic Parliamentary Clearance Procedures

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 1287-1296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philipp Kiiver
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Strategic Decisions ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Member States ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
National Legislature ◽  
The Eu

When the German Federal Constitutional Court pronounced itself on the constitutionality of the Treaty of Lisbon, its general reasoning on the character of the European Union sounded familiar. In its judgment, the Court recalls that the German Basic Law is a Europe-friendly constitution: its Preamble and its Article 23, regarding European integration, allow, and in fact prescribe, Germany's participation in the establishment of a united Europe. However, the Court also stresses the paramount position of the member states, their peoples, and their national parliaments in the institutional architecture of the EU. Already in its Maastricht Case, the Court had put an emphasis on institutional guarantees regarding the conditions under which sovereign competences may be conferred upon the EU from its constituent member states. The Lisbon Case builds upon the Maastricht doctrine, but now adds concrete instructions to the German legislature: whenever the EU institutions wish to apply certain strategic decisions under the Treaty of Lisbon, the German government may agree to them only after the two national legislative chambers, the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) and the German Federal Council of States (Bundesrat), have given their prior approval. The national statute that regulates this must (and will) be changed accordingly before Germany may ratify the Treaty of Lisbon. The strategic decisions in question mainly concern what the Court considers to be, or at least potentially to be, de facto treaty amendment procedures by which EU institutions may dynamically expand their competences or change decision-making rules without having to resort to the regular ratification procedure for new treaties. The most prominent example is the so-called passerelle (or simplified treaty revision procedure), allowing the European Council unanimously, and with the European Parliament's assent, to introduce qualified majority voting and co-decision in areas where this does not yet apply. National parliaments are informed six months in advance and each of them may cast a binding veto, but ordinary positive ratification in all member states is not required. Also for the application of the flexibility clause, allowing for EU action to attain EU goals in the absence of a specific legal basis, the German Constitutional Court requires prior bicameral approval by the national legislature. The Court rejects the idea of future treaty amendment by tacit consent, because that would undermine the prerogatives of the national legislature and, essentially, German sovereign statehood. At the risk of sounding corny, we may therefore dub the Lisbon Case “Solange III,” after the two previous Solange Cases, and summarize it as follows: As long as (or, solange, in German) the European Union is not a federal state but comprises constituent member states, the people, through the national legislature, must consciously legitimize European integration step by step. The partially enhanced flexibility of future treaty reforms envisaged under the Treaty of Lisbon is, as far as Germany is concerned, undone. But what about the other member states? Where does the Lisbon case put Germany on the European map of parliamentary democracy? How do the ratification procedures on which the German Court insists compare with the procedures of national parliamentary oversight as they exist in the rest of the Union? The present article shall put the envisaged German procedures in a comparative perspective. But first it shall reflect on some of the main features of the judgment itself.

Political aspects of security of the European Union Member States

2020 ◽  
pp. 97-105
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Kusztykiewicz-Fedurek
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Political Security ◽  
New Institutions ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Key Aspects ◽  
The Eu

Political security is very often considered through the prism of individual states. In the scholar literature in-depth analyses of this kind of security are rarely encountered in the context of international entities that these countries integrate. The purpose of this article is to draw attention to key aspects of political security in the European Union (EU) Member States. The EU as a supranational organisation, gathering Member States first, ensures the stability of the EU as a whole, and secondly, it ensures that Member States respect common values and principles. Additionally, the EU institutions focus on ensuring the proper functioning of the Eurozone (also called officially “euro area” in EU regulations). Actions that may have a negative impact on the level of the EU’s political security include the boycott of establishing new institutions conducive to the peaceful coexistence and development of states. These threats seem to have a significant impact on the situation in the EU in the face of the proposed (and not accepted by Member States not belonging to the Eurogroup) Eurozone reforms concerning, inter alia, appointment of the Minister of Economy and Finance and the creation of a new institution - the European Monetary Fund.

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