Toleration and Political Philosophy

Author(s):  
Sune Lægaard

Toleration is a classic category of Western political theory. Liberalism can be said to have evolved as a generalization of debates on religious toleration from the 17th century onward. Many debates in political theory about matters of current concern, ranging from debates about free speech and hate-speech legislation, over attitudes to practices of minority groups, to the legitimate extent of state interference in particular areas of social life, are framed as debates on toleration. Finally, some of the most prominent theories within political philosophy view toleration as a central concept, for example, Rawls’s political liberalism. This continuous presence of the notion of toleration within political philosophy has resulted in a standard definition of toleration and a set of standard debates about toleration. Toleration is standardly understood as requiring disapproval or dislike, the power to interfere, and to consist in the abstention from this interference. This has given rise to debates about which kinds of disapproval or dislike are required, whether the condition of power is in itself problematic, and whether noninterference only counts as toleration if motivated by certain kinds of reasons. Nevertheless, this standard concept of toleration curiously fails to capture some of the prominent debates that are often framed in terms of toleration. It is for instance not at all clear whether and how the standard concept applies to states and to individuals regulated by state laws. It is also often unclear whether toleration as defined is a normative ideal or merely a descriptive concept and what the point of using the concept is in either case. Finally, there is surprising little reflection on what the significance is of the space of toleration between interference and lack of disapproval or dislike, and how changes in this space of toleration can be understood.

2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-279
Author(s):  
Jakub Łakomy

The present article deals with the political nature of the interpretation theory, using poststructuralism as a source of reflection. The analysis is conducted by using poststructuralist epistemology and poststructuralist political theory. The thesis of this article, which is metatheoretical in nature, is that the poststructuralist concepts of legal interpretation can be used only after simultaneously adopting the assumptions of the political philosophy which originated in poststructuralism. Chantal Mouffe’s concept of the political is very much tied to considerations about agonistic democracy and agonistic pluralism, which gives us original answers to the questions of how society, the political system, and the legal system can help us prevent the emergence and flourishing of authoritarianism. The first part of the text presents the poststructuralist definition of the political and politics as well as shows its importance for the analysis of the contemporary legal interpretation concepts. In the next part, the author discusses the topic of poststructuralism in jurisprudence and its most important features for a change in the discourse of philosophy of interpretation. The third part of the article examines poststructuralist anti-essentialism using the example of one from among the most famous neopragmatist and poststructuralist philosophers — Stanley Fish. In the fourth and last part of the considerations, the thesis about the necessity of joint use of poststructuralist epistemology and political theory for research on legal interpretation is verified and metatheoretical conclusions are drawn from it.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ardian Kastrati

Many scholars think that because of its ambiguous nature the definition of the civil society concept sometimes is meaningless. Civil society belongs to a group of sociological and political theory concepts such as freedom, justice, equality and democracy that are not clearly demarcated. At least two specific dimensions of the civil society concept are distinguishable: the theoretical and the normative role. In the context of theoretical role the concept of civil society analyzes dimensions of social life and social values, with citizens and civil organizations as key actors. The normative role serves to motivate and mobilize citizens and other social actors for the establishment and development of various contents and forms of civil activities. The normative function is mostly manifested during periods of transition from less to more democratic societies. Both dimensions of the civil society concept have played significant roles, especially in countries where the position of civil society has traditionally played a marginal role. Discussing the concept of civil society is quite fashionable today. Civil society is a popular term with politicians, academics and international agencies. We frequently hear politicians talk about the needs of the state and the market for a civil society. As a result, a number of authors and social and political theorists have stressed its critical importance in the processes of democratic change. The concept of civil society has been defended in various ways by a variety of political and social theorists. Today’s content of civil society does not result with a commonly accepted definition of the term, but focuses on whether the term should be a normative or non-normative tool of social science, and whether economic, religious and family relations should be considered as part of it. This paper will focus on the various meanings of civil society; a tentative definition on civil society will be introduced as well as various existing discourses of civil society.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1 (Spring 2019)) ◽  
pp. 19-28
Author(s):  
Bernard Harrison

Recent senior legal opinion in Britain has inclined to the view that all criticism of Israel falls into the category of legitimate political opinion deserving the protection of laws guar- anteeing freedom of speech. Argument for this view, from Sir Stephen Sedley and others, is defective in that it ignores an evident distinction between antisemitism considered as an emotional disposition, and antisemitism considered as a deranged pseudo-explanatory political theory. Israel has become of late years the main focus for theoretical antisemitism of this latter kind. “Criticism” of this type is antisemitic, not because it manifests “hate speech” targeted at individual Jews qua Jews, but rather because it defames the Jewish community, falsely imagined by antisemites of this type to be unanimous, uncritical, and politically isolated in its support for Israel. The kinds of “criticism” of Israel characterized as antisemitic by the IHRA Definition of antisemitism are all of this type; and the Definition therefore poses, contrary to opinion widely expressed in recent debate on both sides of the Atlantic, no threat whatsoever to freedom of speech. Keywords: IHRA Definition, Sir Stephen Sedley, Social vs. Political Antisemitism, Labour Party


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Vanessa Haggie

<p>Hate speech legislation involves a fundamental conflict with the right to freedom of expression. However, it is a conflict that can be justified in a constitutional framework in which free speech is not paramount and can be balanced against other rights and freedoms. This paper discusses the concept of “hate speech” legislation, the conflict between freedom of expression and hate speech censorship, and ways in which these seemingly-incompatible concepts might be harmonised. It considers, drawing on legislation and case law from other jurisdictions, and in light of the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013, the possibility of extending such legislation to protect gender and sexual minorities in New Zealand, and suggests a potential framework for such legislative change. Any provision concerning hate speech must avoid overreaching into the realm of free expression. As a result, ‘hate speech’ should be clearly defined and narrowly focussed in scope, as words or matter which “exposes or tends to expose to hatred or contempt” the minority group at which the protection is aimed. In New Zealand’s constitutional/rights framework, this limitation on freedom of expression can be justified as reasonable and appropriate. While hate speech legislation does create a conflict with freedom of expression, to protect hate speech at the risk of perpetuating harm, discrimination, marginalisation and silencing is not appropriate. It sends the message that the voice of hate speakers is worth more than that of minorities, and undervalues the dignity and social assurance of those minority groups as valued members of society.</p>


Author(s):  
Andrew Walton ◽  
William Abel ◽  
Elizabeth Kahn ◽  
Tom Parr

Should the state permit euthanasia? Should it prohibit recreational drug use? Should it ban hate speech? Should it grant members of minority groups exemptions from otherwise universal laws? When, if ever, should it intervene in the affairs of other states to prevent human rights abuses? All of these questions have been prominent in political debate over the last fifty years, and there remains plenty of dispute about them at the start of the 2020s. Political arguments about public policy are an apt subject of philosophical analysis—or, in other words, they present a prime opportunity to do some political philosophy. This book provides an introduction to political philosophy by theorizing about public policy. Each of the chapters draws on the tools of political philosophy to explore a distinct area of public policy. Each case identifies some of the moral threads that run through the public policy debate; explains the philosophical positions taken by the various sides; introduces the academic literature that supports these positions; and examines the strengths and weaknesses of the competing views.


2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 45-67
Author(s):  
Igor Zivanovic

Throughout this paper the author questions Machiavelli?s Machiavellism, i.e. the position that Machiavelli?s political theory takes stance of immoralism. The first part of the paper compares Plato?s and Machiavelli?s political philosophy, analyzing differences as well as similarities between these two philosophers. Author finds Plato?s views on politics and political community more malignant than Machiavelli?s. Machiavelli?s views on politics, state, laws and liberty are in fact closer to the basic principles of liberalism then to the tenets of tyranny or totalitarianism. The second part of the paper deals with the concept of the autonomy of politics and the use of cruelties and evils as the instruments of rule in Machiavelli?s work. In this part of the paper, author denies that Machiavelli was the philosopher of evil or the proponent of political gangsterism.


Author(s):  
Ruhtan Yalçıner

Theoretical debates for a better definition of nationalism have played a key role in understanding the core issues of history, sociology, and political sciences. Classical modernist theories of nationalism mainly synthesized former sociological and historical approaches with a political science perspective. Within the classical modernist perspective, the necessity and importance of transformation from traditional culture and society to a horizontal one in the agenda of modernization was characterized as a universal consequence of industrialization. Some of the foremost complexities and problems involved in the classical and contemporary studies of nation and nationalism include the logic of dualization; the definition of nationalism with reference to its substantive and paradigmatic nature; and whether it is possible to concretely construct a universal theory of nationalism. Both classical and contemporary theories of nations and nationalism can be postulated with reference to two major theoretical sides. Universalist theories of nations and nationalism focus on the categorical structure of nationalism in conceptual grounds while being associated with (neo)positivistic methodological points of departure. On the other hand, particularist theories of nationalism underline the immanent characteristics of nations and nationalism by going through nominalism and relativism in methodological grounds. Considering the conceptual, epistemological, and theoretical contributions of “postclassical approach to nationalism” in the 1990s, three major contributions in contemporary nationalism studies can be marked: the increasing research on gender, sexuality, and feminist social theory; the framework of “new social theory” or “critical social theory”; and the discussions derived from political philosophy and normative political theory.


Author(s):  
Charles Larmore

What is political philosophy? What are its fundamental problems? And how should it be distinguished from moral philosophy? This book redefines the distinctive aims of political philosophy, reformulating in this light the basis of a liberal understanding of politics. Because political life is characterized by deep and enduring conflict between rival interests and differing moral ideals, the core problems of political philosophy are the regulation of conflict and the conditions under which the members of society may thus be made subject to political authority. We cannot assume that reason will lead to unanimity about these matters because individuals hold different moral convictions. The book therefore analyzes the concept of reasonable disagreement and investigates the ways we can adjudicate conflicts among people who reasonably disagree about the nature of the human good and the proper basis of political society. Challenging both the classical liberalism of Locke, Kant, and Mill, and more recent theories of political realism proposed by Bernard Williams and others, the book argues for a version of political liberalism that is centered on political legitimacy rather than on social justice, and that aims to be well suited to our times rather than universally valid. It proposes a new definition of political philosophy and demonstrates the profound implications of that definition. The result is a compelling and distinctive intervention from a major political philosopher.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Vanessa Haggie

<p>Hate speech legislation involves a fundamental conflict with the right to freedom of expression. However, it is a conflict that can be justified in a constitutional framework in which free speech is not paramount and can be balanced against other rights and freedoms. This paper discusses the concept of “hate speech” legislation, the conflict between freedom of expression and hate speech censorship, and ways in which these seemingly-incompatible concepts might be harmonised. It considers, drawing on legislation and case law from other jurisdictions, and in light of the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013, the possibility of extending such legislation to protect gender and sexual minorities in New Zealand, and suggests a potential framework for such legislative change. Any provision concerning hate speech must avoid overreaching into the realm of free expression. As a result, ‘hate speech’ should be clearly defined and narrowly focussed in scope, as words or matter which “exposes or tends to expose to hatred or contempt” the minority group at which the protection is aimed. In New Zealand’s constitutional/rights framework, this limitation on freedom of expression can be justified as reasonable and appropriate. While hate speech legislation does create a conflict with freedom of expression, to protect hate speech at the risk of perpetuating harm, discrimination, marginalisation and silencing is not appropriate. It sends the message that the voice of hate speakers is worth more than that of minorities, and undervalues the dignity and social assurance of those minority groups as valued members of society.</p>


Author(s):  
Daniel A. Dombrowski

In this work two key theses are defended: political liberalism is a processual (rather than a static) view and process thinkers should be political liberals. Three major figures are considered (Rawls, Whitehead, Hartshorne) in the effort to show the superiority of political liberalism to its illiberal alternatives on the political right and left. Further, a politically liberal stance regarding nonhuman animals and the environment is articulated. It is typical for debates in political philosophy to be adrift regarding the concept of method, but from start to finish this book relies on the processual method of reflective equilibrium or dialectic at its best. This is the first extended effort to argue for both political liberalism as a process-oriented view and process philosophy/theology as a politically liberal view. It is also a timely defense of political liberalism against illiberal tendencies on both the right and the left.


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