South Korea: The Journey Toward Civilian and Democratic Control Over the Military

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl J. Saxer
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
External Pressure ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
Intelligence Services ◽  
Democratic Control ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
Chun Doo Hwan

Many have seen the establishment of civilian and democratic control over the military as a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the consolidation of a nascent democracy. The establishment of civilian and democratic control over the military in South Korea was a long and, some would argue, uncompleted process. A coup in 1961 led by Park Chung-hee, a major-general, led to the establishment of an authoritarian regime that, while going civilian, was based on the control of the military and the intelligence services. Park was assassinated by the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in October 1979; however, the hopes of moving in the direction of democracy were soon squashed when Chun Doo-hwan, and his comrades in arms from the secret Hanahoe (One Mind) club of Korean Military Academy graduates, first took power over the military through an internal coup, and then took control over the government. Under significant internal, and external, pressure Chun Doo-hwan agreed to step down from the presidency in 1987 and allow the writing of a new constitution that led to free elections to the presidency in December 1987. The opposition lost the 1987 election due to its inability to agree upon a united candidate. The winner was Roh Tae-woo, a participant in the 1979–1990 coup, who would during his presidency take important steps when it came to establishing civilian control over the military. However, it was first with the inauguration of the Kim Young-sam in 1993 that the establishment of firm civilian control was achieved. He engaged in a significant reorganization of, and moved against the power of the secret societies within, the army. He also promoted the idea of a politically neutral military. This most likely played a significant role when Kim Dae-jung, the first opposition candidate, won the presidency in December 1997, as the military remained neutral and accepted the outcome of the electoral process. There has since been a strengthening of civilian control over the military in South Korea. However, there are a number of important issues that need to be dealt with in order to ensure full democratic control over the military and the intelligence services. While the military, as an institution, has stayed neutral in politics, military and intelligence resources have been used in attempts at influencing public opinion in the lead-up to elections. In addition, comprehensive oversight by the legislature continues to be weak and the National Security Law remains on the books.

Predatory politics and personalization of power: The abuses and misuses of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) in Somalia

2020 ◽  
Vol 119 (475) ◽  
pp. 251-274
Author(s):  
Mohamed Haji Ingiriis
Keyword(s):  
Military Regime ◽  
Dirty War ◽  
Security Sector ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
The Public ◽  
Anthropology Of The State ◽  
Intelligence Services ◽  
The Government ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The Military

Abstract This article investigates the security sector in Somalia, with a focus on the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), a government security unit, involved in the fight against the Al-Shabaab insurgency. This article argues that the historically traumatic legacy of autocratic oppression of the former military regime gives the Somali intelligence agency an infamous reputation that survives today and plays a significant role in the operations of the intelligence agency. Intelligence agents employ tactics from the late Cold War era military regime’s intelligence services, suggesting striking historical continuities of the military regime in practice and performance. The empirical data also shows that NISA is enmeshed in the ‘dirty war’ between the federal government and Al-Shabaab. Not only does the intelligence agency normalize extrajudicial activities to serve the agenda of political authorities and to suppress their critics, but it also financially benefits from arrests without trials. NISA agents harass the public and political opposition groups daily and brutally suppress mass media and freedom of speech, especially in the government-controlled areas in Mogadishu. As the first empirical academic investigation into NISA, the article contributes to broader debates on intelligence, the anthropology of the state, security studies, and institution- and state-building in violent environments.

The Postwar Intelligence Debate and the CIA

2019 ◽  
pp. 13-41
Author(s):  
David P. Hadley
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
Covert Action ◽  
Federal Bureau Of Investigation ◽  
Intelligence Services ◽  
The Press ◽  
Office Of Strategic Services ◽  
The Military ◽  
Unrealistic Expectations

This chapter examines the dissolution of the World War II–era U.S. intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services. Facing competition from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military intelligence services, and without a strong political patron, the OSS was not maintained after the war as many of its members wished. Beyond desiring that the OSS continue to function, many of its members articulated a clear ideology of intelligence, calling for a centralized, activist agency that could both gather secret intelligence and conduct covert warfare. This model was at odds with the collection and coordination focus of the early Central Intelligence Agency. While initially unsuccessful, the OSS vision ultimately triumphed in part because of the cultivation of key members of the press. The press was especially important owing to its criticism of the CIA for failures of prediction while remaining silent on covert operations; thus, failed operations did not impede advocates for covert action, while advocates for an agency focused on collection and analysis labored under unrealistic expectations.

scholarly journals The soviet school system in Central Intelligence Agency estimates at the initial stage of the Cold War

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 192-197
Author(s):  
Zaur Imalverdi oglu Mamedov
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
School System ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
Soviet School ◽  
Initial Stage ◽  
Comprehensive Knowledge ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The Military

The paper is devoted to the analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency of the USSR school system. The US was in dire need of information about its new adversary. The situation was aggravated by the closed nature of the Soviet state and the absence of a long continuous tradition of intelligence activities of American intelligence. The president and other government bodies wanted to have comprehensive knowledge of any processes and phenomena in the world. US intelligence should have been able to solve this problem. In this regard, the first stage of the Cold War for the CIA was largely due to an analysis of official and semi-official sources, as well as the development of various strategies. In order to find out about various areas of the life in the USSR, analysts extracted information from Soviet scientific literature, press, radio, legislation and interrogations of former German prisoners. The National Assessment Bureau, led by William Langer and Sherman Kent, compiled reports on Soviet military capabilities, industry, agriculture, the political system, etc. The Soviet school system was considered by American intelligence specialists in the framework of the military and economic potential of the enemy, as well as the strategy of psychological warfare. The paper analyzes the reports concerning the educational system in the USSR in the aspect of school education, its strengths and weaknesses. The results allow us to conclude that the information about the Soviet school system contributed to the formation of the foreign policy and domestic policy of the United States.

The Information-Industrial Complex

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shawn M. Powers ◽  
Michael Jablonski
Keyword(s):  
The United States ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Industrial Complex ◽  
Digital Information ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
Military Industrial Complex ◽  
Information And Communication ◽  
History Of ◽  
History Of Information ◽  
The Military

This chapter examines the emergence of an Information-Industrial Complex in the United States, tracking the rise of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and the modern knowledge economy. It first outlines the origins and history of Information-Industrial Complex's antecedent, the Military-Industrial Complex, before turning to the beginnings of the Information-Industrial Complex itself. It then considers how the U.S. government has cultivated a close and codependent relationship with companies involved in information production, storage, processing, and distribution, referred to as the “information industries.” It also looks at In-Q-Tel, a corporation that would “ensure that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) remains at the cutting edge of information technology advances and capabilities,” along with the rise of information assurance after 9/11. The chapter concludes by highlighting the commodification of digital information in the post-9/11 environment through its securitization.

Ethiopia's government will enforce order

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
External Pressure ◽  
Amhara Region ◽  
Front Line ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Past ◽  
Initial Wave ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Town ◽  
Important Shift

Subject Implications of recent protests. Significance The past two weeks have seen a significant increase in protests against the government. Residents in towns across the Oromiya region have demonstrated sporadically since late 2015 after an initial wave of dissent in early 2014. Protests in the Amhara region, including in the town of Gondar, appear to signal an important shift in dynamics. The protests are the most significant challenge the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has confronted since the death of former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in 2012. Impacts External pressure is unlikely to influence the behaviour of the government, despite its reliance on aid. Attacks on ethnic Tigrayans and the ethnic characterisation of the protests as 'Oromo' or 'Amhara' will deepen polarisation in society. The military may take a more front-line role in politics if its leaders perceive politicians as being unable to maintain order.

From Fujimori to Toledo: The 2001 Elections and the Vicissitudes of Democratic Government in Peru

2005 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 565-596 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lewis Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Authoritarian Regime ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Electoral Fraud ◽  
Democratic Government ◽  
Security Services ◽  
Intelligence Services ◽  
Political Turmoil ◽  
The Military

AbstractFollowing scandals concerning extensive corruption, electoral fraud and manipulation by the security services, Alberto Fujimori's authoritarian regime collapsed in November 2000, throwing Peru into political turmoil. A fresh ballot organised in 2001 led to the election of Alejandro Toledo as president. Assessments of the Toledo administration's performance and the health of Peruvian democracy in the post-Fujimori period have been overwhelmingly pessimistic. Recent political developments are analysed to argue that such negativity is mistaken. Apart from recording strong economic growth, under Toledo civilian control over the military and intelligence services has increased markedly. Greater horizontal and vertical accountability has produced a more open polity. Citizen's rights are better secured. Despite ongoing problems, post-Fujimori a process of democratic ‘deepening’ has occurred.

Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia's New Democracies

2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aurel Croissant ◽  
David Kuehn
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Empirical Analysis

Successful institutionalization of civilian control of the military is a necessary condition for the consolidation of democracy. This is particularly relevant for East Asia, where the military used to be a key player in the previous authoritarian regimes. This article analyzes the changes, advances, and setbacks in achieving civilian control in five countries that have made the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule: Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. The empirical analysis is built on a conception of civilian control that distinguishes three areas of political decisionmaking: political recruitment and overall public policymaking, national defense, and internal security. The study shows that only in Taiwan and South Korea have civilians succeeded in curtailing military influence in politics. In contrast, in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, the military has shown itself more or less resilient in guarding its prerogatives in the postauthoritarian era. This seriously impedes the democratically elected authorities' effective power to govern in these countries and has led to democratic deterioration in Thailand and the Philippines. The article highlights three arguments to account for the profound difference between the cases: historical legacies of authoritarian rule and the path of democratic transition, the internal security role of the military, and the relationship between development and democratic consolidation.

The Implications of Drones on the Just War Tradition

2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 337-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Brunstetter ◽  
Megan Braun
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Ethical Issues ◽  
Just War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
Jus In Bello ◽  
Drone Strikes ◽  
Just War Tradition ◽  
The Military

Increasingly, the United States has come to rely on the use of drones to counter the threat posed by terrorists. Drones have arguably enjoyed significant successes in denying terrorists safe haven while limiting civilian casualties and protecting U.S. soldiers, but their use has raised ethical concerns. The aim of this article is to explore some of the ethical issues raised by the use of drones using the just war tradition as a foundation. We argue that drones offer the capacity to extend the threshold of last resort for large-scale wars by allowing a leader to act more proportionately on just cause. However, they may be seen as a level of force short of war to which the principle of last resort does not apply; and their increased usage may ultimately raise jus in bello concerns. While drones are technically capable of improving adherence to jus in bello principles of discrimination and proportionality, concerns regarding transparency and the potentially indiscriminate nature of drone strikes, especially those conduced by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as opposed to the military, may undermine the probability of success in combating terrorism.

scholarly journals The Combatant’s Privilege in Asymmetric and Covert Conflicts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens David Ohlin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
Military Organization ◽  
Special Operations ◽  
Drone Strikes ◽  
The Government ◽  
Turf Battle

[First introductory paragraph] As the United States has engaged in an unprecedented campaign of targeted killings against members of al-Qaeda and associated forces, various agencies within the government have engaged in increasingly pitched squab-bling regarding their respective control over drone strikes in multiple foreign theaters. Authority and responsibility has vacillated between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Department’s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), the former being an intelligence agency tasked with both intelligence and covert operations directives, and the latter a military organization under the direction of the Secretary of Defense. In addition to the inherent policy questions in this turf battle, there are urgent elements of domestic and international law simmering beneath the surface. Some critics have suggested that CIA officers should not be involved in drone operations because CIA officers are non-uniformed individuals that do not meet the international law standards for privileged belligerency. According to this argument, the calculus regarding the appropriate agency for drone operations ought to take into ac-count that international law does not confer the combatant’s privilege on non-uniformed CIA employees.Published: 40 Yale J. Int'l L. 337-93 (2015)

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