The International Fraternity of the Uniform: Implications for Civil–Military Relations

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel J. Sokolsky
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Professional Education ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Global Network ◽  
Operational Effectiveness ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Democratic Norms

The profession of arms shares with other professions a certain universality, in terms of both time and place. This transnational “corporateness” helps to foster strong military-to-military ties on a bilateral and multilateral basis between and among the armed forces of states. Through senior international professional education and the operations of its global network of unified Combatant Commands (COCOMs), the United States seeks to develop and reinforce a web of relationships with military leaders as an element of its national security strategy. These professional and operational linkages create an international fraternity of the uniform. The fraternity of the uniform, by providing an additional military avenue of communication between the United States and foreign states, one that at times seems to skirt and compete with normal diplomatic and political relations, can be viewed as a challenge to liberal-democratic norms in civil–military relations both at the national and international level. That is to say it can be used by foreign military leaders as a “shirking” tactic employed to reduce the inequality inherent in the civil–military dialogue. The challenge for governments, then, is to leverage the advantages afforded by having their militaries join in the fraternity, while not allowing such membership to undermine proper civil–military relations. In doing so, the international fraternity of the uniform contributes to the operational effectiveness of American-led military multilateralism and the mutual security of its participants.

US Civil-Military Relations in the Gray Zone

2020 ◽  
pp. 263-282
Author(s):  
Sarah Sewall
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Gray Zone ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Civilian Leaders ◽  
The Face ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

This chapter argues that the changing character of conflict demands rethinking U S civil-military relations. The United States has long relied on a nuclear deterrent and conventional military superiority to defend itself, but its adversaries have changed the rules of the game to exploit civilian vulnerabilities in the U S homeland using non kinetic tools. To ensure continued civilian control of the military use of force and effective management of competition below the threshold of war, civilian leaders must assume greater responsibility for the political and operational management of hostilities in the Gray Zone. Because civilian leaders are underprepared for this new global competition, they will be tempted to default to conventional military solutions. Traditional civil-military frameworks did not envision permanent conflict or the centrality of civilian terrain, capabilities, and operational responsibilities. The United States needs civilian-led tools and approaches to effectively avoid the dual extremes of national immobilization in the face of non kinetic threats and inadvertent escalation of conflict without civilian authorization or intent. Civilian adaptation could also diminish the traditional role of the armed forces in defending the nation. The United States must rewire the relationship of the military and civilians through its decisions about how to manage Gray Zone competition.

The New Civil-Military Relations

1961 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gene M. Lyons
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Minimum Cost ◽  
The United States ◽  
Fundamental Principle ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Military Establishment ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Historically the character of civil-military relations in the United States has been dominated by the concept of civilian control of the military. This has largely been a response to the fear of praetorianism. As recently as 1949, for example, the first Hoover Commission asserted that one of the major reasons for strengthening the “means of exercising civilian control” over the defense establishment was to “safeguard our democratic traditions against militarism.” This same warning was raised in the report of the Rockefeller Committee on defense organization in 1953. While the overriding purpose of the committee's recommendations was to provide “the Nation with maximum security at minimum cost,” the report made it clear that this had to be achieved “without danger to our free institutions, based on the fundamental principle of civilian control of the Military Establishment.” Finally, during the debate on the reorganization proposals of 1958, senators and congressmen used the theme of a “Prussianized” military staff to attempt to slow down the trend towards centralization in the military establishment.Despite this imposing support, the concept of civilian control of the military has little significance for contemporary problems of national security in the United States. In the first place, military leaders are divided among themselves, although their differences cannot be reduced to a crass contrast between dichomatic doctrines. Air Force leaders who are gravely concerned over the need to maintain a decisive nuclear retaliatory force are by now acknowledging the need to develop a limited war capability.

Introduction to Symposium

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-4 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia M. Shields
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
National Security ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Military Officers ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Society Symposium ◽  
Senior Officer ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

This Armed Forces & Society symposium on the ethics of senior officer resignation in the United States includes a collection of four papers, each looking at principled resignation in different ways. Two authors, Dubik and Snider, believe principled resignation of senior military officers is sometimes justified, especially in wartime, where their inherent morals clash with their professional demands; these senior officer’s ability to resign in protest distinguishes their service to this nation between stewards and servants. Conversely, Feaver and Kohn believe principled resignation is almost never justified as this action weakens the military profession and ultimately threatens national security. Further, the disastrous effects increase the ever present friction and mistrust in the civil-military process. Each author answers the question in the context of current American civil military relations and it is their hope that this symposium will lead to further discussions, research, and policies regarding the ethics surrounding the issue.

The U.S. Civil–Military Relations Gap and the Erosion of Historical Democratic Norms

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marybeth P. Ulrich
Keyword(s):  
Civic Education ◽  
Military Service ◽  
The United States ◽  
American People ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Volunteer Force ◽  
Democratic Norms ◽  
Elected Representatives

The gap between the American people and the United States military is growing, with implications for the preservation of democratic institutions. The gap has contributed to the erosion of democratic norms by negatively affecting perceptions of citizenship obligations and weakening the attachment to national institutions. Ironically, a feature of the gap is the rise of a “warrior caste” of men and women who self-select to join the all-volunteer force (AVF), leaving the remaining 99.5% of citizens to think that national defense is a concern for “other people.” With only 1 in 200 Americans directly involved in military service, the wars that the AVF serves in do not directly affect most Americans or their elected representatives. This indifference has led to perpetual wars with poor oversight, eroding the democratic norm of citizen oversight of and participation in the nation’s wars. The civil–military gap can be mitigated with a comprehensive expansion of programs that offer opportunities for military and national service, the adoption of more robust civic education in civilian and military education systems, and fostering a culture of defense among the citizenry.

Conclusion: The armed forces and perennial problems

2020 ◽  
pp. 123-126
Author(s):  
Joseph T. Glatthaar
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Military Force ◽  
Traditional Values ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
American Military

Since the 1970s, the United States has struggled to accept that its economic and military powers are finite. The Conclusion looks at ways the American military might make progress while acknowledging these limitations. The American military could be reinvigorated by better communication between politicians and military leaders, a return to traditional values of prudence and circumspection, and greater support during wartime. Technology may have transformed warfare, but enemies often find low-cost means of reducing their impact. The United States possesses the world’s most sophisticated military force, but sometimes the task is greater than it can fulfill, or the results are not worth the price.

Georgia: Warlords, Generals, and Politicians

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Darchiashvili ◽  
Stephen Jones
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Russian Revolution ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Executive Authority ◽  
Democratic Control ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Relationship

The balance between civil and military structures is central to understanding the development of Georgian statehood since the beginning of the 20th century. The first modern independent Georgian state was established after the 1917 Russian Revolution. The Democratic Republic of Georgia declared its independence in May 1918. In February 1921, the young republic was incorporated into the Soviet state and had no separate army of its own. Since regaining its independence in 1991, Georgia has experienced multiple administrations, and despite significantly different policies on the military, the overall pattern has been one of civilian (though not always democratic) control. Georgian militias and paramilitaries, between 1918 and 1921 and again between 1991 and 1995, played important roles in determining political power at times of revolutionary or constitutional crises. Since 1991 there have been three presidents - Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Eduard Shevardnadze, and Mikheil Saakashvili - with strong executive authority. In 2013, the position of president was made semi-ceremonial and a prime-ministerial system was instituted. Since 2013, there have been multiple prime ministers. Bidzina Ivanishvili was the first and the most powerful. All of Georgia’s leaders have shifted from a Soviet to pro-Western orientation. Since the second half of the 1990s, the relationship with NATO has grown closer, which has had a major impact on the structure of the Georgian armed forces and on their relationship with Georgia’s civil authorities. The 2008 war with Russia had a major impact on the Georgian military, and, since then, the level of professionalization of the Georgian armed forces has increased dramatically. Samuel Huntington, Eric Nordlinger, and other Western students of civil-military relations have pointed to the important balance required between civil and military authorities for a stable democracy. Georgia still displays continuing features of nepotism, clientelism, corruption, and dominant political personalities, which has significant consequences for the independence of the Georgian military and for civil-military relations more generally. Western states such as the United States and Germany, and international organizations like NATO continue to urge reform and provide training to the Georgian armed forces

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