scholarly journals Bargaining Theory, Civil War Outcomes, and War Recurrence: Assessing the Results of Empirical Tests of the Theory

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline A. Hartzell
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Bargaining Theory ◽  
Intrastate Conflict ◽  
War Termination ◽  
Interstate War ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Empirical Tests ◽  
War Outcomes ◽  
Bargaining Problems

Once ended, a significant number of civil wars recur. One influential empirical international relations theory on which scholars have drawn in an effort to provide an explanation for this phenomenon is the bargaining model of war. Devised initially for the study of interstate war, the theory posits that bargaining problems may prevent belligerents from reaching a deal that enables them to avoid a costly war. Bargaining problems also have been identified as contributing to the recurrence of armed intrastate conflict. Working within the framework of bargaining theory, a number of scholars have claimed that the most effective way to inhibit a return to civil war is to end the conflict via military victory as such an outcome is thought to help solve key bargaining problems. However, a growing number of empirical tests cast doubt on this proposition. An analysis of the results of these tests as well as new scholarship on civil war termination highlight some of the limitations inherent in employing a theory devised for the study of interstate war to analyze questions related to civil wars.

scholarly journals ‘No peace, no war’ proponents? How pro-regime militias affect civil war termination and outcomes

2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huseyn Aliyev
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
War Termination ◽  
Intrastate Conflicts ◽  
State Actors ◽  
War Outcomes ◽  
Conflict Termination ◽  
Extra State ◽  
Conflict Outcomes

Previous research on non-state actors involved in civil wars has tended to disregard the role of extra-dyad agents in influencing conflict outcomes. Little is known as to whether the presence of such extra-dyadic actors as pro-regime militias affects conflict termination and outcomes. This article develops and tests a number of hypotheses on the pro-government militias’ effect upon civil war outcomes. It proposes that pro-regime militias involved in intrastate conflicts tend to act as proponents of ‘no peace, no war’, favouring low-activity violence and ceasefires over other conflict outcomes. These hypotheses are examined using an expanded dataset on pro-government militias and armed conflict in a statistical analysis of 229 civil war episodes from 1991 to 2015. These findings shed new light on the role of extra-state actors in civil wars.

scholarly journals Do Terrorists Win? Rebels' Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes

2015 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 519-556 ◽  
Author(s):  
Virginia Page Fortna
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
War Outcomes ◽  
Better Than

AbstractHow effective is terrorism? This question has generated lively scholarly debate and is of obvious importance to policy-makers. However, most existing studies of terrorism are not well equipped to answer this question because they lack an appropriate comparison. This article compares the outcomes of civil wars to assess whether rebel groups that use terrorism fare better than those who eschew this tactic. I evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of terrorism relative to other tactics used in civil war. Because terrorism is not a tactic employed at random, I first briefly explore empirically which groups use terrorism. Controlling for factors that may affect both the use of terrorism and war outcomes, I find that although civil wars involving terrorism last longer than other wars, terrorist rebel groups are generally less likely to achieve their larger political objectives than are nonterrorist groups. Terrorism may be less ineffective against democracies, but even in this context, terrorists do not win.

International Recognition, Compliance Costs, and the Formalities of War

Wars of Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 38-71
Author(s):  
Tanisha M. Fazal
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
International Community ◽  
Laws Of War ◽  
War And Peace ◽  
Compliance Costs ◽  
Interstate War ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
International Recognition ◽  
Peace Treaties

This chapter develops the main arguments of the book, focusing on how belligerents in interstate and civil war have reacted to the development of the laws of war detailed in Chapter 2. States involved in interstate war are perversely incentivized to evade the laws of war as these laws have proliferated. Thus, they are decreasingly likely to engage the formalities of war, specifically declarations of war and peace treaties. Secessionist rebel groups fighting civil wars aim to please the international community, and therefore are decreasingly likely to declare independence formally, generally likely to avoid targeting civilians, and increasingly likely to conclude peace treaties.

Reputation and the occurrence and success of mediation in civil wars

2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 410-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Keels ◽  
J Michael Greig
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Political Process ◽  
The Political ◽  
Intrastate Conflict ◽  
Ethnic Exclusion ◽  
Negotiated Settlement ◽  
Future Challenges

In this article, we argue that because governments fear that accepting mediation and reaching agreements with opponents may signal weakness to other potential challengers, civil war governments tend to resist mediation as a means of demonstrating their resolve. Building on current theories of reputation in civil war, we argue that the threat of future challenges from other groups is likely to be particularly acute in states with multiple ethnic groups, especially states with high levels of ethnic exclusion. We therefore expect that civil wars in these states will be less likely to see mediation and to produce agreements when they do. By examining all instances of mediation in intrastate conflict from 1990 to 2008, we test this argument empirically and find that mediation is more likely to emerge in civil wars where there are a large number of ethnic groups, but is less likely to occur when many of those ethnic groups are excluded from the political process. Once mediation is underway, however, it is less likely to yield a negotiated settlement when there are a large number of ethnic groups, but more likely to end in a negotiated settlement when many of the ethnic groups are excluded from the political process.

Competitive Intervention, Protracted Conflict, and the Global Prevalence of Civil War

2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 692-706 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noel Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Qualitative Case Study ◽  
Average Duration ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Intrastate Conflict ◽  
Global Prevalence ◽  
Protracted Conflict ◽  
Internal Conflicts

Abstract This article develops a theory of competitive intervention in civil war to explain variation in the global prevalence of intrastate conflict. I describe the distortionary effects competitive interventions have on domestic bargaining processes and explain the unique strategic dilemmas they entail for third-party interveners. The theory uncovers the conditional nature of intervention under the shadow of inadvertent escalation and moves beyond popular anecdotes about “proxy wars” by deriving theoretically grounded propositions about the strategic logics motivating intervener behaviors. I then link temporal variation in patterns of competitive intervention to recent decreases in the prevalence and average duration of internal conflicts. The theory is tested with a quantitative analysis of all civil wars fought between 1975 and 2009 and a qualitative case study of the Angolan civil war (1975–1991). My results underscore the importance of a generalizable account of competitive intervention that not only explains past conflicts, but also informs contemporary policy.

Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?

2010 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monica Duffy Toft
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Statistical Analysis ◽  
Policy Analysis ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
The Other ◽  
War Termination ◽  
Negotiated Settlement ◽  
Long Term Stability ◽  
Negotiated Settlements

Since 1990, negotiated settlements have become the preferred means for settling civil wars. Historically, however, these types of settlements have proven largely ineffective: civil wars ended by negotiated settlement are more likely to recur than those ending in victory by one side or the other. A theoretical and statistical analysis of how civil wars end reveals that the type of ending influences the prospects for longer-term outcomes. An examination of all civil war endings since 1940 finds that rebel victories are more likely to secure the peace than are negotiated settlements. A statistical analysis of civil wars from 1940 to 2002 and the case of Uganda illustrate why rebel victories result in more stable outcomes. Expanding scholarly and policy analysis of civil war termination types beyond the current default of negotiated settlement to include victories provides a much larger set of cases and variables to draw upon to enhance understanding of the conditions most likely to support long-term stability, democracy, and prosperity.

scholarly journals Central banks and civil war termination

2021 ◽  
pp. 002234332110381
Author(s):  
Ana Carolina Garriga
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
War Termination ◽  
International Credit ◽  
The Government ◽  
Good Signal

The ability to finance conflict likely affects the odds of sustaining a war and succeeding in it. Recent literature explores rebel group funding, but far less is known about how states finance their own war efforts. This article posits that the design of central banks should affect civil war termination. In particular, it argues that central bank independence affects civil war termination through two channels. First, financial markets consider central bank independence as a good signal in terms of macroeconomic stability and debt repayment. In this way, independent central banks enhance the ability of the government to access credit to finance and end a civil war. Second, central bank independence is associated with lower inflation. Inflation control reduces one source of additional grievances that the civil war may impose on citizens. On a sample of civil wars between 1975 and 2009, central bank independence is associated with a substantial increase in the likelihood of war termination. When the form of termination is disaggregated, (higher) central bank independence is associated with a higher probability of government victory, relative to continued conflict and to other outcomes. Additional tests provide support for the argued mechanisms: during civil wars, countries with more independent central banks access international credit markets in better conditions – i.e. they pay lower interest rates, and receive longer grace and maturity periods on new debt. Furthermore, in countries experiencing civil wars, central bank independence is associated with lower inflation.

Teaching from experience: foreign training and rebel success in civil War

2020 ◽  
pp. 073889422091297
Author(s):  
Eric Keels ◽  
Jay Benson ◽  
Michael Widmeier
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Quantitative Analysis ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Past Research ◽  
Intrastate Conflicts ◽  
War Outcomes ◽  
Conflict Outcomes ◽  
The Relationship

This paper addresses the relationship between rebel training from external sponsors and civil war outcomes. While past research has examined how foreign support, broadly, shapes the dynamics of civil wars, little attention has been paid to how foreign training of rebel fighters affects civil wars. We theorize that rebels that receive training from formerly successful rebels are more likely to experience favorable conflict outcomes than those with no training or with training from sponsors inexperienced with fighting a civil war. These propositions are tested with a quantitative analysis of all intrastate conflicts from 1975 to 2010, providing support for our hypothesis.

The Security Bazaar: Business Interests and Islamist Power in Civil War Somalia

2015 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 89-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aisha Ahmad
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Ethnic Politics ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Business Interests ◽  
Identity Based ◽  
War Outcomes ◽  
Security Costs ◽  
Economic Considerations ◽  
Close Investigation

In civil wars across the world, certain Islamist groups have competed exceptionally well against their rivals. The conventional wisdom points to either religion or ethnic politics to explain Islamist success. These ideological and identity-based explanations, however, tend to overlook the powerful economic influence that the local business class has over civil war outcomes. Civil war can be modeled as a market for security, wherein protection must be purchased from multiple substate rackets. Using this market model, a close investigation of the Somali case reveals why and under what conditions the interests of the profit-driven business class align with those of ideologically motivated Islamist groups. Security costs are of critical importance to businesses in a civil war, and Islamists are uniquely competitive in lowering these costs. The business-Islamist alliance is therefore driven by rational, economic considerations, which can contribute to the rise of Islamist power.

How Civil Wars End: The International System, Norms, and the Role of External Actors

2018 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 127-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lise Morjé Howard ◽  
Alexandra Stark
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
International System ◽  
Methodological Approach ◽  
War Termination ◽  
International Intervention ◽  
Negotiated Settlement ◽  
Time Periods ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
External Actors

Historically, civil wars ended in one-sided victory. With the end of the Cold War, however, the very nature of how civil wars end shifted: wars became two times more likely to terminate in negotiated settlement than in victory. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the proportion of victories has increased, especially for civil wars that include a terrorist group; wars are also ending less frequently. Why would civil war termination vary by time period? The literature on civil wars looks to three basic types of causes: domesticstructural factors, bargaining dynamics, and types of international intervention. Current explanations cannot account for why civil wars would end differently in different time periods because, as Kenneth Waltz might say, they are “reductionist” in nature. Material and ideational factors constitute the international political environment, which varies in different time periods. This environment drives outside actors' normative strategies of viewing victory, negotiation, or stabilization as the appropriate solution to civil war. These norms, in turn, directly affect how civil wars end. A novel, three-part methodological approach using quantitative analysis, case studies, and original content analysis demonstrates that civil wars tend to end the way external actors think they ought to end.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document