The Security Bazaar: Business Interests and Islamist Power in Civil War Somalia

2015 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 89-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aisha Ahmad
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Ethnic Politics ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Business Interests ◽  
Identity Based ◽  
War Outcomes ◽  
Security Costs ◽  
Economic Considerations ◽  
Close Investigation

In civil wars across the world, certain Islamist groups have competed exceptionally well against their rivals. The conventional wisdom points to either religion or ethnic politics to explain Islamist success. These ideological and identity-based explanations, however, tend to overlook the powerful economic influence that the local business class has over civil war outcomes. Civil war can be modeled as a market for security, wherein protection must be purchased from multiple substate rackets. Using this market model, a close investigation of the Somali case reveals why and under what conditions the interests of the profit-driven business class align with those of ideologically motivated Islamist groups. Security costs are of critical importance to businesses in a civil war, and Islamists are uniquely competitive in lowering these costs. The business-Islamist alliance is therefore driven by rational, economic considerations, which can contribute to the rise of Islamist power.

scholarly journals Do Terrorists Win? Rebels' Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes

2015 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 519-556 ◽  
Author(s):  
Virginia Page Fortna
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
War Outcomes ◽  
Better Than

AbstractHow effective is terrorism? This question has generated lively scholarly debate and is of obvious importance to policy-makers. However, most existing studies of terrorism are not well equipped to answer this question because they lack an appropriate comparison. This article compares the outcomes of civil wars to assess whether rebel groups that use terrorism fare better than those who eschew this tactic. I evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of terrorism relative to other tactics used in civil war. Because terrorism is not a tactic employed at random, I first briefly explore empirically which groups use terrorism. Controlling for factors that may affect both the use of terrorism and war outcomes, I find that although civil wars involving terrorism last longer than other wars, terrorist rebel groups are generally less likely to achieve their larger political objectives than are nonterrorist groups. Terrorism may be less ineffective against democracies, but even in this context, terrorists do not win.

Teaching from experience: foreign training and rebel success in civil War

2020 ◽  
pp. 073889422091297
Author(s):  
Eric Keels ◽  
Jay Benson ◽  
Michael Widmeier
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Quantitative Analysis ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Past Research ◽  
Intrastate Conflicts ◽  
War Outcomes ◽  
Conflict Outcomes ◽  
The Relationship

This paper addresses the relationship between rebel training from external sponsors and civil war outcomes. While past research has examined how foreign support, broadly, shapes the dynamics of civil wars, little attention has been paid to how foreign training of rebel fighters affects civil wars. We theorize that rebels that receive training from formerly successful rebels are more likely to experience favorable conflict outcomes than those with no training or with training from sponsors inexperienced with fighting a civil war. These propositions are tested with a quantitative analysis of all intrastate conflicts from 1975 to 2010, providing support for our hypothesis.

scholarly journals Bargaining Theory, Civil War Outcomes, and War Recurrence: Assessing the Results of Empirical Tests of the Theory

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline A. Hartzell
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Bargaining Theory ◽  
Intrastate Conflict ◽  
War Termination ◽  
Interstate War ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Empirical Tests ◽  
War Outcomes ◽  
Bargaining Problems

Once ended, a significant number of civil wars recur. One influential empirical international relations theory on which scholars have drawn in an effort to provide an explanation for this phenomenon is the bargaining model of war. Devised initially for the study of interstate war, the theory posits that bargaining problems may prevent belligerents from reaching a deal that enables them to avoid a costly war. Bargaining problems also have been identified as contributing to the recurrence of armed intrastate conflict. Working within the framework of bargaining theory, a number of scholars have claimed that the most effective way to inhibit a return to civil war is to end the conflict via military victory as such an outcome is thought to help solve key bargaining problems. However, a growing number of empirical tests cast doubt on this proposition. An analysis of the results of these tests as well as new scholarship on civil war termination highlight some of the limitations inherent in employing a theory devised for the study of interstate war to analyze questions related to civil wars.

scholarly journals ‘No peace, no war’ proponents? How pro-regime militias affect civil war termination and outcomes

2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huseyn Aliyev
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
War Termination ◽  
Intrastate Conflicts ◽  
State Actors ◽  
War Outcomes ◽  
Conflict Termination ◽  
Extra State ◽  
Conflict Outcomes

Previous research on non-state actors involved in civil wars has tended to disregard the role of extra-dyad agents in influencing conflict outcomes. Little is known as to whether the presence of such extra-dyadic actors as pro-regime militias affects conflict termination and outcomes. This article develops and tests a number of hypotheses on the pro-government militias’ effect upon civil war outcomes. It proposes that pro-regime militias involved in intrastate conflicts tend to act as proponents of ‘no peace, no war’, favouring low-activity violence and ceasefires over other conflict outcomes. These hypotheses are examined using an expanded dataset on pro-government militias and armed conflict in a statistical analysis of 229 civil war episodes from 1991 to 2015. These findings shed new light on the role of extra-state actors in civil wars.

scholarly journals Varieties of post-civil war violence

2021 ◽  
pp. 263300242110398
Author(s):  
Daniel Odin Shaw ◽  
Enrique Wedgwood Young
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Political Violence ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Violent Crime ◽  
Quantitative Research ◽  
Recurrence Risk ◽  
State Repression ◽  
Low Intensity ◽  
Marginalized Groups ◽  
War Outcomes

Quantitative research on the “durability” of peace following civil wars typically captures the breakdown or survival of “peace” in a binary manner, equating it with the presence or absence of civil war recurrence. In the datasets that underpin such studies, years that do not experience full-scale civil war are implicitly coded as “peaceful.” Yet, post-civil war environments may remain free from war recurrence, while nevertheless experiencing endemic violent crime, state repression, low-intensity political violence, and systematic violence against marginalized groups, all of which are incongruent with the concept of peace. Approaches to assessing post-civil war outcomes which focus exclusively on civil war recurrence risk overestimating the “durability” of peace, implicitly designating as “peaceful” a range of environments which may be anything but. In this article, we discuss the heterogeneity of violent post-civil war outcomes and develop a typology of “varieties of post-civil war violence.” Our typology contributes to the study of post-civil war peace durability, by serving as the basis for an alternative, categorical conceptualization of “peace years” in conflict datasets.

Partitioning to Peace: Sovereignty, Demography, and Ethnic Civil Wars

2008 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 140-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carter Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Low Level ◽  
War Outcomes ◽  
Ethnic War

Some scholars have proposed partition as a way to solve ethnic civil wars. Partition theorists advocate the demographic separation of ethnic groups into different states, arguing that this is the best chance for an enduring peace. Opponents argue that partition is costly in terms of its human toll and that its advocates have yet to demonstrate its effectiveness beyond a limited number of self-selected case studies. This analysis systematically examines the outcome of partition, highlighting the centrality of demography by introducing an index that measures the degree to which a partition separates ethnic groups. This index is applied to all civil wars ending in partition from 1945 to 2004. Partitions that completely separated the warring groups did not experience a recurrence of war and low-level violence for at least five years, outperforming both partitions that did not separate ethnic groups and other ethnic war outcomes. These results challenge other studies that examine partition as a war outcome. The results also have direct implications for Iraq's civil war, postindependence Kosovo, and other ethnic civil wars.

Too Much of a Bad Thing? Civilian Victimization and Bargaining in Civil War

2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 685-706 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reed M. Wood ◽  
Jacob D. Kathman
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Risk Analysis ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Curvilinear Relationship ◽  
Competing Risk Analysis ◽  
Conflict Processes ◽  
Negotiated Settlement ◽  
War Outcomes ◽  
The Impact

While studies of the motives for intentional insurgent violence against civilians are now common, relatively little academic research has focused on the impact of victimization on conflict processes or war outcomes. This article addresses this gap in the literature. Specifically, the authors examine the influence of civilian victimization on bargaining between the regime and insurgents during a civil war. A curvilinear relationship between the level of civilian victimization used by insurgents and the likelihood that conflict ends in negotiated settlement is posited. The probability of settlement is highest for groups that engage in a moderate level of civilian killing but declines at particularly high levels. A competing risk analysis using monthly conflict data on African civil wars between 1989 and 2010 supports this argument.

scholarly journals Lasting peace or temporary calm? Rebel group decapitation and civil war outcomes

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirssa Cline Ryckman
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Group Leaders ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Lasting Peace ◽  
Rebel Group ◽  
War Outcomes ◽  
The Government

Existing research has found that killing or capturing rebel group leaders can lead to the termination of civil wars. This paper considers the quality of those terminations, examining how wars end and whether this produces a lasting peace or only a temporary reprieve from violence. Decapitation is expected to weaken rebel groups, shifting the balance of power to the government; however, results suggest that killing or capturing a rebel group leader tends to produce termination through inactivity rather than outright government victories. Decapitation is also found to have no effect on the chances of civil war recurrence. This suggests that the removal of rebel group leaders is effective primarily as a short-term strategy that does not tend to generate a lasting peace.

Through the prism of Spain. Socio-economic causes of different outcomes of Russian and Spanish civil wars

2017 ◽  
pp. 142-155
Author(s):  
I. Rozinskiy ◽  
N. Rozinskaya
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
World War I ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Spanish Civil War ◽  
Statistical Data ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Russian Civil War ◽  
World War ◽  
Common Features ◽  
Economic Well Being

The article examines the socio-economic causes of the outcome of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1936), which, as opposed to the Russian Civil War, resulted in the victory of the “Whites”. Choice of Spain as the object of comparison with Russia is justified not only by similarity of civil wars occurred in the two countries in the XX century, but also by a large number of common features in their history. Based on statistical data on the changes in economic well-being of different strata of Spanish population during several decades before the civil war, the authors formulate the hypothesis according to which the increase of real incomes of Spaniards engaged in agriculture is “responsible” for their conservative political sympathies. As a result, contrary to the situation in Russia, where the peasantry did not support the Whites, in Spain the peasants’ position predetermined the outcome of the confrontation resulting in the victory of the Spanish analogue of the Whites. According to the authors, the possibility of stable increase of Spanish peasants’ incomes was caused by the nation’s non-involvement in World War I and also by more limited, compared to Russia and some other countries, spending on creation of heavy (primarily military-related) industry in Spain.

Stick Then Carrot: When Do Governments Give Amnesty during Civil War?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley-Ann Daniels
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Policy Choice ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
The Government

Abstract Governments grant amnesties to rebel groups during civil wars and this is a puzzle. Why would the government offer an amnesty, which can be interpreted as a signal of weakness? In certain circumstances, offering amnesty is a rational policy choice. Governments should give amnesties when they are winning: the risk of misinterpreted signals is lessened, costs are low, rebel groups are weakened, and so amnesty can be used instrumentally to encourage defection or division among foot soldiers or as an incentive to leaders. Therefore, the government capitalizes on its military advantage and offers amnesty in a “stick then carrot” tactic. Using a database of amnesties during conflicts from 1990 to 2011, the article shows that governments are more likely to give amnesties following high rebel deaths. The use of amnesty during conflict is nuanced and context is important when understanding strategic choices.

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