scholarly journals Central banks and civil war termination

2021 ◽  
pp. 002234332110381
Author(s):  
Ana Carolina Garriga
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
War Termination ◽  
International Credit ◽  
The Government ◽  
Good Signal

The ability to finance conflict likely affects the odds of sustaining a war and succeeding in it. Recent literature explores rebel group funding, but far less is known about how states finance their own war efforts. This article posits that the design of central banks should affect civil war termination. In particular, it argues that central bank independence affects civil war termination through two channels. First, financial markets consider central bank independence as a good signal in terms of macroeconomic stability and debt repayment. In this way, independent central banks enhance the ability of the government to access credit to finance and end a civil war. Second, central bank independence is associated with lower inflation. Inflation control reduces one source of additional grievances that the civil war may impose on citizens. On a sample of civil wars between 1975 and 2009, central bank independence is associated with a substantial increase in the likelihood of war termination. When the form of termination is disaggregated, (higher) central bank independence is associated with a higher probability of government victory, relative to continued conflict and to other outcomes. Additional tests provide support for the argued mechanisms: during civil wars, countries with more independent central banks access international credit markets in better conditions – i.e. they pay lower interest rates, and receive longer grace and maturity periods on new debt. Furthermore, in countries experiencing civil wars, central bank independence is associated with lower inflation.

scholarly journals Opportunistic, not Optimal Delegation: The Political Origins of Central Bank Independence

2020 ◽  
pp. 001041402095767
Author(s):  
Nicole Rae Baerg ◽  
Julia Gray ◽  
Jakob Willisch
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Political Experience ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The Government ◽  
Communist Countries ◽  
Optimal Delegation ◽  
Central Bankers

Economists have long argued that central banks ran by technocrats have greater independence from the government. But in many countries, politically experienced central bankers are at the helm, including even highly independent central banks. To explain the level of central bank independence awarded, we develop a formal model where nominating politicians screen central bankers for their political ambitions. We show how screening and reelection efforts by the nominating politician changes the level of autonomy associated with different types of candidates. We predict that technocrats are associated with higher levels of independence than nominees with political experience, but as the appointing politician faces tougher reelection, candidates with political experience are associated with higher independence as well. We test our theory using new data from 29 post-communist countries between 1990 and 2012. We find evidence that the reelection strategy of the nominating politician is an important predictor of the level of central bank independence.

The Political Economy of Monetary Policy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Bodea
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
World War I ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Exchange Rates ◽  
Institutional Arrangement ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Rate System ◽  
Fixed Exchange Rates ◽  
The Government

The recent global economic crisis has renewed interest in the nature and history of monetary policy, the distributional effects of central bank policy, central bank governance, and the personalities at the helm of major central banks. In modern times, a country’s central bank formulates, or, to a minimum, implements, a country’s monetary policy, or the process of adjustment of a country’s money supply to achieve some combination of stable prices and sustainable economic growth. Monetary policy depends heavily on a country’s exchange rate system. Under fixed exchange rates, the country’s commitment to keep the level of the currency at a certain level dictates monetary policy to a great degree. As the gold standard was unraveling after World War I, many countries experienced high inflation or even hyperinflation. A similar situation faced monetary policy after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the 1970s. By the 1980s, however, countries turned toward central bank independence as an institutional arrangement to control inflation. The current issues surrounding monetary policy have emerged from the historical increase in central bank independence and the 2007 economic and financial crisis. In particular, the opacity of central bank decisions, given their autonomy to pursue stable prices without political interference, has increased the demand for transparency and communication with the government, the public, and financial markets. Also, the 2007 crisis pushed central banks toward unconventional measures and macro-prudential regulation, and brought back into focus the monetary policy of the euro area.

The president-led peace process and institutional veto players

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-185
Author(s):  
Aya Watanabe
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Peace Process ◽  
Dynamic Nature ◽  
War Termination ◽  
Negotiated Settlement ◽  
Political Relationships ◽  
The Government ◽  
Commitment Problems

What makes a negotiated settlement of civil wars so complicated? This question attracts much scholarly attention. Many existing studies focus on information asymmetry and commitment problems when examining civil war termination or duration. These studies tend to assume conflicting parties as unitary, not grasping the dynamic nature within the conflicting party. This article disaggregates government actors, drawing on the ‘veto player’ framework, and examines how political relationships among them affect the peace process, using the Mindanao conflict as a case study. The Philippine case illustrates how government actors influence the peace process, shedding light on a neglected aspect of the government influence on civil war termination.

Stick Then Carrot: When Do Governments Give Amnesty during Civil War?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley-Ann Daniels
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Policy Choice ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
The Government

Abstract Governments grant amnesties to rebel groups during civil wars and this is a puzzle. Why would the government offer an amnesty, which can be interpreted as a signal of weakness? In certain circumstances, offering amnesty is a rational policy choice. Governments should give amnesties when they are winning: the risk of misinterpreted signals is lessened, costs are low, rebel groups are weakened, and so amnesty can be used instrumentally to encourage defection or division among foot soldiers or as an incentive to leaders. Therefore, the government capitalizes on its military advantage and offers amnesty in a “stick then carrot” tactic. Using a database of amnesties during conflicts from 1990 to 2011, the article shows that governments are more likely to give amnesties following high rebel deaths. The use of amnesty during conflict is nuanced and context is important when understanding strategic choices.

Australian central bank holds rate as growth slips

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Labour Markets ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Commercial Lenders ◽  
The Government ◽  
Roll Out ◽  
Growth Forecasts

Significance The RBA has cut its growth forecasts amid rising job losses, weakening demand and increasing signs that the latest COVID-19 lockdowns will continue to slow the economy until the pace of the vaccine roll-out programme can be increased. Impacts Although the RBA is independent, the government will hope it keeps rates low ahead of the elections due next year. Commercial lenders could raise interest rates independently of the RBA if inflation remains high. Wage pressures will re-emerge as labour markets tighten but may be mitigated by the extent of underemployment. Economic growth will be uneven across the country in coming months as pandemic-related restrictions vary by location.

scholarly journals Central Bank Independence – The Case of the Central Bank of Montenegro

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 25-40
Author(s):  
Milivoje Radovic ◽  
Milena Radonjic ◽  
Jovan Djuraskovic
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Inflation Rate ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Transition Countries ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Eu Accession ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
The Eu

Abstract In recent decades, there has been a trend in increasing the level of independence of central banks. The key factor that has contributed to a growing interest in this concept is grounded in economic theory that confirms the link between a lower inflation rate and a greater level of central bank independence. For this reason, in many countries, the existing regulations relating to central bank have been modified to protect its position from the absolute influence of the executive power of the state. This trend was particularly prevalent in transition countries, which was conditioned primarily by the EU accession criteria. The aim of this paper is to analyse independence of the Central Bank of Montenegro through the prism of functional, institutional, financial, and personal independence, and to assess the level of its legal independence by using appropriate indices.

Rethinking the Conflict “Resource Curse”: How Oil Wealth Prevents Center-Seeking Civil Wars

2016 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 727-761 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Paine
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Resource Curse ◽  
Revenue Sources ◽  
Societal Challenges ◽  
The Government ◽  
Oil Wealth ◽  
Oil Revenues ◽  
Civil War Onset

AbstractA broad literature on how oil wealth affects civil war onset argues that oil production engenders violent contests to capture a valuable prize from vulnerable governments. By contrast, research linking oil wealth to durable authoritarian regimes argues that oil-rich governments deter societal challenges by strategically allocating enormous revenues to enhance military capacity and to provide patronage. This article presents a unified formal model that evaluates how these competing mechanisms affect overall incentives for center-seeking civil wars. The model yields two key implications. First, large oil-generated revenues strengthen the government and exert an overall effect that decreases center-seeking civil war propensity. Second, oil revenues are less effective at preventing center-seeking civil war relative to other revenue sources, which distinguishes overall and relative effects. Revised statistical results test overall rather than relative effects by omitting the conventional but posttreatment covariate of income per capita, and demonstrate a consistent negative association between oil wealth and center-seeking civil war onset.

scholarly journals Central Bank Independence, Transparency and Accountability Indexes: a Survey

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florin Cornel Dumiter
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Aggregate Index ◽  
Central Bank Transparency ◽  
Considerable Impact ◽  
High Degree ◽  
Transparency And Accountability

Abstract Recently, the remarkable trend upon central bank independence and the efficient monetary policy were seriously highlighted in the monetary economics field. Starting from 1990s’ central bank independence was at the core of policy making and central banking problems, because of the widespread economical, political, personal and budgetary autonomy of the central bank. Nowadays, we can observe an increasing trend upon central bank transparency, for evaluating more accurate the central bank’s performances by the wide public, mass-media and financial markets. Consequently, a central bank must encompass a high degree of accountability and responsibility, because of the final liability in case of failure. In this paper we present, analyze and assess the construction of the most important indices regarding central bank independence, transparency and accountability in a chronological manner, presenting also the advantages and disadvantages of these indices related to actual practices of central banks. Moreover, we analyze the analytical results of the empirical testing of these indices with a considerable impact upon the developed and developing country group. In regard with the empirical results of different authors, we suggest the importance and the necessity for constructing an aggregate index for measuring central bank independence, transparency and accountability, based on de jure stipulations and the actual practices of the central banks.

Does Central Bank Independence in Arab Oil Exporters Matter?

2019 ◽  
pp. 119-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hoda Selim
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Oil Prices ◽  
Macroeconomic Policy ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Policy Performance ◽  
Weak Institutions

This chapter shows that central banks in Arab oil exporters are not independent. Low independence reflects institutional arrangements that allow the executive branch to influence, interfere, even dominate central bank operations. In a context of weak institutions, central bank independence (CBI) has not always mattered for macroeconomic policy outcomes. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) central banks delivered a better macroeconomic policy performance than those of the populous group because the credible peg discouraged discretion. Soft peg arrangements in the populous economies, in a context of weak institutions and discretionary policymaking and no de facto independent central bank, led to disappointing monetary policy outcomes. As oil exporters adapt to a new normal of low oil prices, the sustainability of fixed exchange rate regimes may not be guaranteed without sound macroeconomic institutions. Stronger institutions and effective accountability mechanisms are needed to insulate central banks from political pressures. In the short term, a rules-based framework could help.

The Investment Manager

2020 ◽  
pp. 275-295
Author(s):  
Einar Lie
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Rapid Expansion ◽  
Financial Wealth ◽  
Investment Manager ◽  
The Government ◽  
Traditional Roles

This chapter assesses how the management of the nation’s long-term savings in what is now the Government Pension Fund Global brought Norges Bank a brand new responsibility from the mid-1990s, and an unusual one for a central bank. While many central banks have historically played an important part in contributing to government financing and investing government debt in liquid securities, this had never been one of Norges Bank’s main roles. Indeed, one of the key aims of the acts of 1816 and 1891 was to prevent the government from funding itself through the central bank. From the mid-1990s, however, Norges Bank was in a way given the opposite task: a separate mandate to manage the country’s financial wealth on behalf of the government by investing it abroad in long-term bonds, shares, and eventually real estate. Within twenty years, thanks to high oil prices and substantial inflows from the government, the fund’s market value soared from nothing to around NOK 7 trillion. In recent years, the fund’s rapid expansion and financial importance have brought Norges Bank—and Norway—at least as much international attention as the bank’s more traditional roles in monetary policy and financial stability.

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