The Basic Systems of Surface Water Allocation

Author(s):  
Joseph W. Dellapenna

From earliest times, at least in arid and semi-arid regions, law has been used to allocate water to particular users, at particular locations, and for particular uses, as well as to regulate the uses of water. In the early 21st century, such laws are found everywhere in the world. While the details of such systems of water law are specific to each culture, these systems, in general terms, conform to one of three basic patterns, or to some combination thereof. The three patterns can be understood as a system of common property, a system of private property, or a system of public property. In a common property system, each person is free to use water as he or she chooses so long as the person has lawful access to the water source and does not unreasonably interfere with other lawful users. Such systems were common in humid regions where generally there was enough water available for all uses, but these break down when demand begins to outstrip supply frequently. Private property systems, more common in arid and semi-arid regions, where water is generally not available to meet all demand on the water sources, is a system that allocates specific amounts of water from an identified water source, for a particular water use at a particular location, and with a definite priority relative to other uses. The problem with such private property systems is their rigidity, with transfers of existing water allocations to new uses or new locations proving difficult in practice. In Australia, the specified claim on a water source is defined not as a quantity, but as a percentage of the available flow. Despite the praise heaped upon this system, it has proven difficult to implement without heavy government intervention, benefiting only large irrigators without adequately addressing the public values that water sources must serve. In part, the problems arise because cheating is easier in the absence of clear volumetric entitlements. The public property systems, which has roots dating back centuries but is largely an artifact of the 20th century, treats water as subject to active public management, whether through collaborative decision-making by stakeholders (a situation that is also sometimes called “common property” but is actually very different from the concept of common property used here), or through governmental institutions. Public property systems seek to avoid the deficiencies of the other two systems (particularly by avoiding the incessant conflicts characteristic of common property systems as demand approaches supply and the rigidity characteristics of actual private property systems), but at the cost of introducing bureaucratized decision making. In the late 20th century, many stakeholders, governments, and international institutions turned to market systems—usually linked to a revived or new private property system—as the supposed optimum means to allocate and re-allocate water to particular uses, users, and locations. Before the late 20th century, markets were rare and small, but institutions like the World Bank set about to make them the primary mechanism for water allocation. Markets, however, proved difficult to implement, at least without transferring wealth from relatively poor users to more prosperous users, and therefore produced a backlash in the form of support for a human right to water that would trump the private property claims central to water markets. The protection of public values, such as ecological or navigational flows, also proved difficult to maintain in the face of the demands of the marketplace. Each of these systems has proven useful in particular settings, but none of them can be universally applied.

2019 ◽  
Vol 78 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Rodgers

AbstractThis article argues that public property rights should be recognised as a separate category of property interest, different and distinct from private and common property interests and conferring distinctive rights and obligations on both “owners” and members of the public. It develops a taxonomy to differentiate private, public and common property rights. The article concludes that it is a mistake to think in terms of “private property”, “common property” or “public property”. The division and allocation of resource entitlements in land can result in private, common and public property rights subsisting over the same land simultaneously, in different combinations and at different times. The categorisation of property interests in land (as private, common or public) may also shift and change from time to time. The article considers the importance of distinguishing between private, common and public property interests for developing new strategies for environmental governance, and for implementing the effective protection of natural resources.


2013 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-403
Author(s):  
Sarah E. Hamill

This article uses the recent Occupy litigation of Batty v. City of Toronto to argue that Canadian courts no longer have a robust understanding of common property and its attendant rights. The lack of judicial understanding of common property is hardly surprising given property theory’s focus on private property, particularly individual private property. This article argues that rather than use the traditional analogy of governments holding common property in trust for the public, Batty relies on an analogy of common property which treats the government as an owner. The emergence of the latter understanding of common property can be traced to Supreme Court jurisprudence from the early 1990s. Although the government-as-owner analogy of common property was introduced in a concurring judgment, more recent Supreme Court decisions have since reiterated the analogy. Such an understanding of common property is a clear attempt to force all property into a private property model and emphasize the rights of owners above all other rights in property. This article argues that the government-as-owner analogy is problematic given its emphasis on the government’s use of property rather than the public’s benefit from common property and calls for a return to the trust analogy of common property.


2012 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Paletto ◽  
Isabella De Meo ◽  
Fabrizio Ferretti

Abstract The property rights and the type of ownership (private owners, public domain and commons) are two fundamental concepts in relationship to the local development and to the social and environmental sustainability. Common forests were established in Europe since the Middle Ages, but over the centuries the importance of commons changed in parallel with economic and social changes. In recent decades, the scientific debate focused on the forest management efficiency and sustainability of this type of ownership in comparison to the public and private property. In Italy common forests have a long tradition with substantial differences in the result of historical evolution in various regions. In Sardinia region the private forests are 377.297 ha, the public forests are 201.324 ha, while around 120.000 ha are commons. The respect of the common rights changed in the different historical periods. Today, the common lands are managed directly by municipalities or indirectly through third parties, in both cases the involvement of members of community is very low. The main objective of the paper is to analyse forest management differences in public institutions with and without common property rights. To achieve the objective of the research the forest management preferences of community members and managers were evaluated and compared. The analysis was realized through the use of the principal-agent model and it has been tested in a case study in Sardinia region (Arci-Grighine district). The analysis of the results showed that the categories of actors considered (members of community, municipalities and managers) have a marked productive profile, but municipalities manage forests perceiving a moderate multifunctionality. Moreover, the representatives of the municipalities pay more attention to the interests of the collectivity in comparison to the external managers. They also attribute high importance to environmental and social forest functions.


Author(s):  
Adam M. Sowards

For more than a century after the republic’s founding in the 1780s, American law reflected the ideal that the commons—the public domain—should be turned into private property. As Americans became concerned about resource scarcity, waste, and monopolies at the end of the 19th century, reform-minded bureaucrats and scientists convinced Congress to maintain in perpetuity some of the nation’s land as public. This shift offered a measure of protection and an alternative to private property regimes. The federal agencies that primarily manage these lands today—U.S. Forest Service (USFS), National Park Service (NPS), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), and Bureau of Land Management (BLM)—have worked since their origins in the early decades of the 20th century to fulfill their diverse, competing, evolving missions. Meanwhile, the public and Congress have continually demanded new and different goals as the land itself has functioned and responded in interdependent ways. In the mid-20th century, the agencies intensified their management, hoping they could satisfy the rising—and often conflicting—demands American citizens placed on the public lands. This intensification often worsened public lands’ ecology and increased political conflict, resulting in a series of new laws in the 1960s and 1970s. Those laws strengthened the role of science and the public in influencing agency practices while providing more opportunities for litigation. Predictably, since the late 1970s, these developments have polarized public lands’ politics. The economies, but also the identities, of many Americans remain entwined with the public lands, making political standoffs—over endangered species, oil production, privatizing land, and more—common and increasingly intractable. Because the public lands are national in scope but used by local people for all manner of economic and recreational activities, they have been and remain microcosms of the federal democratic system and all its conflicted nature.


Inner Asia ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-46
Author(s):  
Lewis Mayo

AbstractThis paper analyses the relationships between illness and structures of authority in the oasis of Dunhuang in the late 20th century and during the time of the Guiyijun regime which ruled the area as an independent warlord state from the middle of the 9th to the beginning of the 11th century. Both the medieval and the modern systems for dealing with illness in Dunhuang are analysed here as part of a larger problem of threat as an inherent element in any order of authority. In this paper, illness is taken as a political and administrative problem, both in the sense that political forces are mobilised around it and in the sense that political and administrative structures give illness an organisational form. Guiyijun systems of storage and structures of governance in the political and familial realms are understood as the reference point for the strategies deployed in the face of illness ‘events’ and as explanatory frameworks closely linked to accounts of dysfunction in the internal order of the body. The late 20th century order of disease management in Dunhuang forms a counterpart to these medieval structures, despite the major differences in the forms for responding to and attacking illness in the oasis in the public health regimes of the modern era and in the medical and ceremonial practices used a millennium before.


2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
RACHAEL E. GOODHUE ◽  
NANCY McCARTHY

ABSTRACTTraditional pastoralist land management institutions in sub-Saharan Africa have been stressed by an increasing human population and related forces, including private enclosure of grazing land; government-sponsored privatization; and the increasing prevalence of violent conflicts and livestock theft. We model the incompleteness and flexibility of traditional grazing rights using fuzzy set theory. We compare individual and social welfare under the traditional system to individual and social welfare under a private property system and a common property system. Whether the traditional system is preferred to private property depends on whether the value of mobility, as defined by the traditional system, is more valuable than the right of exclusion inherent in private property. We find that under some conditions the imprecision which characterizes traditional rights can result in higher social returns than a common property regime characterized by complete symmetric rights across all members of the user group and complete exclusion of non-members.


2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-99
Author(s):  
María Luz Endere ◽  
Lucía Carolina Colombato

Abstract:The recent reform of the Unified National Civil and Commercial Code will bring about significant changes in the Argentine legal system. The aim of this article is to analyze their impact in relation to the area of cultural heritage, especially in regard to the public property status of archaeological and paleontological heritage. Changes adopted—in contrast to those proposed, which referred to the issues related to indigenous communities and the protection of collective rights—are also discussed. The latter is the most innovative aspect of the reform since it involves a change of approach regarding private property and strengthens the regulatory powers of the state over private property, which might be applied to the protection of cultural property.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Szilárd Sztranyiczki

Abstract Taking into account the recent change in Romanian civil legislation, we consider the present scientific material very useful for an overview of this institution under the auspices of the New Civil Code. The national legal provisions set clear, therefore, that the property is divided into two institutions, the public property and the private property. Property classification is very important in this form for us to understand the legal nature and the applicable regime for each type of property. Moreover, the property right, either private or public, has an elite regulation in most European laws, but also in universal laws the respect for it and the guarantee of this right can be also found in the fundamental human rights, in the international treaties, and in the constitutions of different nations. We will try, therefore, to offer a brief overview of the new Romanian legislation in the mentioned field, which is already harmonized with European legislation, the result being the New Romanian Civil Code. We believe that the interpretation should be considerably more extensive, but - pragmatically - we will try to capture the main theoretical and practical features to denote the importance of this institution.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 27-44
Author(s):  
Marzena Dyjakowska

The paper discusses the confiscation of property (publicatio bonorum) as a source of revenue for the fiscus in ancient Rome. The term fiscus means, among other things, the public property, State funds, but also the private property of emperors. The confiscated property could be adjudged not only to aerarium – the State Treasury (publicare), but also to the personal treasury of emperors, and trials seem to have been inspired to supply it. The most „successful” accusation was connected with the crime of lese-majesty: the scope of this crime was especially wide and it was easy to convict the defendant. The Senate often voted for adjudgement of the confiscated property in respect of the Emperor, especially if the convict had received some benefits from him. This practice turned into a rule and the Emperor’s treasury became the sole beneficiary of publicatio bonorum. Some emperors are especially known as rulers accumulating their private property on confiscated goods (Caligula, Septimius Severus, Domitian). A portion of those goods was due to the children of the defendant; some rescripts issued by the emperors even ordered to transfer his whole property in the first place to his descendants. In spite of the rule that it was necessary to find the defendant guilty to confiscate his property, the publicatio bonorum was not available; when he committed suicide before the sentence, a presumption was made that this act was equal to a guilty plea. According to another rule – confessus pro indicato est – the defendant was convicted unless his suicide was justified. The personal belongings (pannicularia) were to be confiscated, too, but only after the conviction.


1991 ◽  
Vol 15 (12) ◽  
pp. 765-766
Author(s):  
Jeremy Musson

It could be said that one of the chief architectural legacies of the late 20th century, when it comes to be considered retrospectively, will be the wanton destruction and dispersal of buildings constructed in the previous century for the public benefit. Churches, schools and hospitals have been systematically sold off, and a good number of them, if not totally demolished, have lapsed into a pathetic state of limbo, particularly in this time of economic recession. Some of the worst cases of this known to the Victorian Society are hospitals of great architectural quality, constructed for the treatment of the mentally ill, then known as lunatic asylums.


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