Migration and Economic Coercion

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Brendan J Connell ◽  
Samantha L Moya ◽  
Adrian J Shin

Abstract Sender costs of economic sanctions exacerbate the enforcement problem associated with multilateral coercive measures. When third-country sanctioners share strategic interests with the target state, they have commercial and diplomatic incentives to defect from multilateral sanctions arrangements. In addition to these well-documented sender costs, this article argues that migration pressure from the target state has become an important consideration for potential sanctioners. Economic sanctions often increase the economic distress on the target country, which in turn causes more people to migrate to countries where their co-ethnics reside. Countries hosting a large number of nationals from the target country face a disproportionately high level of migration pressure when sanctions increase emigration from the target country. Therefore, policymakers of these countries oppose economic sanctions on the target country as an attempt to preempt further migration. Analyzing the sanctions bills in the European Parliament from 2011 to 2015, we find empirical support for our prediction.

Since at least the Athenian trade ban on Megara, in the run-up to the Peloponnesian War, states have used economic sanctions to pursue their foreign policy goals. Using a definition popularized by Hufbauer, et al. (Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 2017, p. 3), political scientists consider economic sanctions to be the “deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations.” Sanctions are imposed by a sender country on a target country. While praised by Woodrow Wilson as a way to force the target government to change its policies while sparing its civilians from the scourges of war, by the end of the 1990s critics charged that sanctions were impotent to change the target government’s behavior but were deadly for civilians. Sanctions have been credited with ending apartheid and preventing nuclear proliferation, and have been criticized for facilitating genocide in the former Yugoslavia and causing the deaths of hundreds of thousands of children in Iraq (although the latter claim has since been proven to be false). In order to go beyond considering only a handful of examples and consider sanctions comprehensively, political scientists have developed mathematical models to examine how sanctions work in theory, and comprehensive data sets of sanctions cases to study them statistically. They have examined why senders impose sanctions, how targets respond, and what sanctions do to the civilians who live under them.


1979 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 471-494 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Stuart Olson

Earlier studies of economic sanctions underestimated the role and importance of more subtle forms of coercion because they concentrated attention on highly public, formally legislated attempts at economic coercion in world politics, such as the cases of Italy in the 1930s and Rhodesia since 1965. The author agrees with Galtung, Knorr, and others that in highly public cases, sanctions will often fail in their avowed political purpose because they actually stimulate nationalism and thus resistance in the target-state; he argues that in an increasingly (but unequally) interdependent world, relatively subtle sanctions can be politically effective—with only moderately purely economic effects—by exploiting the LDC's typically fragmented interest-group and class structure. In order to describe and explain how such economic coercion works, it is necessary to bridge several “islands” of literature: on economic sanctions, on the structure of dependency, and on the causes of political instability.


Author(s):  
LE THANH HA ◽  
HOANG PHUONG DUNG ◽  
PHAM HONG CHUONG ◽  
TO TRUNG THANH

This paper investigates the effects of global economic sanctions (GESs) on global bank linkages (GBLs) by using 4,032 pairs of 66 countries during the 2001–2013 period. We use the structural gravity model combining with the rich database of the Global Sanction Data Base introduced by Felbermayr et al. [(2020). The global sanctions data base. European Economic Review, 129, 1–23]. Our empirical results show a negative association between the GESs and GBLs. The differential effects of GESs on the GBLs are conditional on the sanction types. Furthermore, the consequences of global sanctions become more severe for countries featuring higher information asymmetries, captured either by a high level of world uncertainty, an occurrence of crisis and shocks or by a weak institutional system. Our results are robust and reliable when we use an alternative measure of bank connections, and in the context of controlling the potential endogeneity of global sanction.


Author(s):  
Christopher Daase ◽  
Nicole Deitelhoff

The present chapter turns from the justification of war (the use of force) to the justification of coercion. It proceeds on the assumption that to stabilize the current international order requires less ‘legitimate force’ and more ‘legitimate coercion’ since in most institutions the enforcement of norms—as the very basis of order—does not only or even primarily rely on physical force but on various forms of political and economic coercion. The chapter distinguishes various forms of coercion and reconstructs debates in International Law and International Relations with regard to their legality, legitimacy, and effectiveness. Doing so, Christopher Daase and Nicole Deitelhoff intend to broaden the debate on world order by redirecting the focus from the use of force to the use of less violent coercive measures. Specifically, the chapter introduces a concept of sanction as a means of communicating normative expectations to the normative community rather than executing punishments.


1996 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 431-441 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Zimmerman ◽  
David T. Lush ◽  
Neil J. Farber ◽  
Jon Hartung ◽  
Gary Plescia ◽  
...  

Objective: The authors examined whether there is empirical support for the notion that medical patients are upset by being asked questions about psychiatric disorders. Method: Six hundred and one patients attending a primary care clinic completed the SCREENER—a newly developed, brief self-administered questionnaire that surveys a broad range of psychopathology. In addition, they completed a second questionnaire that assessed their attitudes toward the SCREENER. Results: We found a high level of acceptance by patients. The questions were judged easy to answer, and they rarely aroused significant negative affect. Fewer than 2 percent of the patients judged the questions difficult to answer, and fewer than 3 percent were “very much” embarrassed, upset, annoyed, or uncomfortable with the questions. Individuals with a history of psychiatric treatment and poorer current mental health reacted more unfavorably to the questionnaire. Conclusions: From the patient's perspective, it is feasible and acceptable to use self-administered questionnaires for routine screening of psychiatric problems in primary care settings.


1973 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna P. Schreiber

The application of economic sanctions against Rhodesia and the results of that effort raise the question of the effectiveness of economic coercion as an instrument of foreign policy. A review of U.S. economic coercion against Cuba, in effect since June 1960, and against the Dominican Republic during the period 1960–1962 may be timely and instructive. By exploring the steps leading to the application of U.S. economic coercion, its objectives, and its concrete impact on the target states it may be possible to develop some useful generalizations about the role of economic weapons as tools of foreign policy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-193
Author(s):  
Tomasz Aleksandrowicz

The article is devoted to the issue of the implementation of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council (EU) of 6 July 2016 on measures contributing to a high level of security of networks and information systems within the territory of the Union (the so-called NIS Directive) into the Polish legal system. In this context, the author analyses the Act on the National Cybersecurity System, presenting the system and its individual components. The subjects of consideration are the provisions of the Act on National Cybersecurity System of the Republic of Poland and other legal acts concerning the subject matter, which entered into force before the adoption of the analysed act. In conclusion, the author states that in some cases, it is necessary to amend individual legal acts in order to avoid ambiguities which lead to disruption of the system as a whole. The basic method used in this article is legal dogmatics and critical analysis of the scientific literature, documents and opinions of experts—practitioners.


2015 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 881-912 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin M. Barry ◽  
Katja B. Kleinberg

AbstractScholarship on the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows has produced valuable insights into the role of host state characteristics and home-host relations. This study draws attention to another factor in investment decisions—the political and economic relations that home and host states maintain with third-party states. More narrowly, we focus on how investors respond to their home-state's imposition of economic sanctions against a trading partner. Greater economic integration has allowed states to use economic sanctions more frequently in recent decades. At the same time, economic sanctions are thought to have a distorting effect on global trade and financial flows as firms and governments adjust to new constraints. We argue that as firms at home in the sanctioning state respond to coercive measures against a trading partner by looking for alternative sources of profit, they will shift investments to states that can provide indirect access to the sanctioned economy. In particular, those states that are perceived as prospective sanctions-busters—major trading partners of the sanctions target or states with a history of sanctions-busting behavior—will benefit disproportionately from the misfortune of others. We test this conjecture using data on US economic sanctions and global flows of US FDI from 1966 to 2000. The findings reveal that investor decision making in part responds to political developments beyond the home-host dyad.


Author(s):  
Chien Min Chen ◽  
Hong Tau Lee ◽  
Sheu Hua Chen ◽  
Tsung Hsien Tsai

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the perceptions and satisfaction between police officers and citizens on Kinmen Island (of Taiwan), using an analytical framework that combines five primary dimensions and 25 corresponding determinants. Design/methodology/approach – It considers recent developments in the application of performance measures and management to public and, particularly, police services. It goes on to assess comparative rural police performance which suggests that the application of targets could ultimately serve to provide the overall satisfaction with police services. Findings – The findings of the study suggest that perceptions and satisfaction of both citizens and police staff may result in the success of the policing management, and that police managers have to satisfy their citizens with a high level of service quality based on different localities. Practical implications – From managerial perspectives, police managers should consider both the service quality and customer satisfaction constructs as determinants of behavioural intentions, based on the fact that satisfaction can be a strategic key to maintain long term relationship with citizens as it is found of significant impact on the intentional behaviour. Originality/value – This research adds empirical support to this vein of literature and has identified the five main dimensions and the 25 sub-dimensions as important constructs for police service quality.


Author(s):  
Thomas Altmann ◽  
Jason Giersch

AbstractThe literature on unintended consequences of economic sanctions is well developed, but few studies have addressed terrorism in target states, and none have assessed whether that terrorism becomes more effective when sanctions are in place. In this study, we test whether economic sanctions lead to an increase in the lethality of terrorism. Using data from multiple sources, we find that while sanctions are unrelated to the rate of success of terrorist attacks, they are positively associated with the number of fatalities resulting from terrorist attacks. These findings further the need for policymakers to consider the consequences sanctions have on the target country populace.


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