scholarly journals "Touching the Third Rail: Time to Return the Retirement Age for Early Social Security Benefits to 65"

1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-149
Author(s):  
E. B. Palmore
2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 175-192
Author(s):  
Anurag Pant ◽  
Raj K. Kohli

When to retire is an individual decision based on many criteria like health of the individual, family responsibilities, expected life of the individual, single family income or dual family income, and other such considerations. A financial consideration can also be made. Retiring early will imply a reduction in social security benefits for the rest of your life. Retiring later than your full retirement age can mean a significant bump in benefits for the rest of your life. This paper simulates different conditions to estimate how long a life one needs to live to recover from the reduction in benefits resulting from earlier retirements.  Specifically, we model four permutations of the time value of money and the marginal tax rate on early benefits. Our results show there are significant advantages of withdrawing early benefits in most cases where life expectancy is shorter. But when expected life terms are much higher above 83, delaying retirement can significantly enhance the payout of benefits.


2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Cabo ◽  
Ana García-González

An aging population in modern societies has put stress on public pension systems. To prevent social security deficits from increasing to unbounded levels of public debt we focus on two policies: reducing the generosity of pension benefits, determined by the government, and postponing the effective retirement age, chosen by employees. An atomistic employee would disregard the effect of his retirement decision on the public debt and would retire as soon as possible. Conversely, an ideal farsighted agency considering all current and future employees would postpone retirement, thereby alleviating the pressure on public debt and allowing a more generous long-run pension. The government may design a proper incentive strategy to induce myopic atomistic decision makers to act nonmyopically. This strategy is a two-part incentive with nonlinear dependence on the stock of public debt. It is credible if deceiving employees slightly adjust their retirement-age decisions to increments in the public debt.


Author(s):  
Gábor Juhász

Abstract Given the recent salience of anti-immigrant propaganda and politics in Hungary, the inclusiveness of the Hungarian social legislation towards individuals in a situation of international mobility is a particularly relevant topic. The first section of this chapter gives an overview of the Hungarian welfare system and the main migration feature in the country. The second section closely examines differences in terms of access of nationals and non-nationals to social security benefits. The third section demonstrates that, despite negative public attitude to migration and anti-migration government measures, the Hungarian social legislation is not particularly restrictive concerning migrants’ entitlement to social security benefits. We conclude that it is probably due to the filtering effect of contributory benefits that dominate the Hungarian welfare system and prevent gaining access to the most essential benefits without work. At the same time, the chapter identifies several obstacles that foreign (and particularly non-EU) residents face when trying to access social security benefits in Hungary.


Author(s):  
Patrick A. Gaughan ◽  
Charles L. Baum

Abstract It seems to be increasingly common that some personal injury lost earnings projections are being extended by some experts to the “Normal Retirement Age” (NRA) – the age where workers can receive full, unreduced Social Security benefits. The selection of this age often implies a rejection of the worklife expectancy. However, statistics on claiming behavior of Social Security benefit recipients show that only a minority of recipients wait until the NRA to claim benefits. We use actual claiming behavior and the respective ages to show the use of the NRA for determining the ending date of lost earnings projections, instead of the well-researched worklife expectancy, results in exaggerated and speculative lost earnings damages.


2012 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 303
Author(s):  
Fred Hebein

n important topic for many individuals approaching 66 in 2011 is whether to start social security benefits at full retirement age (FRA) or to delay the benefits in order to gain greater payouts in the future. In 2009, the bonus for delaying the start of benefits rose to about 8% per year. By delaying benefits for four years (to age 70), it is possible to increase benefits by 38 to 55 percent per month for the remainder of the retirees life. In addition to the higher monthly benefits from delaying start of benefits, there are also substantial benefits for high income retirees in relocating to lower tax states. Also, given that the remaining age to death for most retirees at FRA is clearly finite, one would expect to see some value in discounting future earnings. Our paper evaluates accumulated benefits over a 25 year time horizon to assess retirement decisions post FRA. We consider three examples of accumulated benefits: (1) constant dollar accumulated benefits without discount or taxes; (2) alternative rates of discount of the future stream of earnings without income taxes; and (3) discounted after tax benefits. Each scenario is evaluated to assess whether delaying social security benefits past FRA is a profitable idea. Based upon our analysis, any discount rate in excess of 5% of the available after-tax returns provides no breakeven age within expected life ages. That is, at high discount rates, it is always better to start benefits at FRA or with only short delay once FRA is reached, if the individual wishes to maximize accumulated benefits over the expected life. At discount rates of less than 3%, the accumulated benefits may be increased within the expected life span by delaying the start of benefits. If no discount rate is applied, accumulated benefits are maximized by delayed start since all breakeven ages occur within life expectancy. In addition, we find that the negative impact of taxes on accumulated benefits can be as large as a discount rate of 3% on accumulated benefits. For high income retirees, a strategy of (1) relocating to lower tax states and (2) delaying the start of benefits can provide substantial increases to accumulated benefits. Finally, we note that the retirement decision is not entirely financial, but that many factors including family, spouse, work climate, health, expected life span, and fear of running out of money lead individuals into making decisions that may not optimize the present value of future benefits.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-436 ◽  
Author(s):  
GOPI SHAH GODA ◽  
SHANTHI RAMNATH ◽  
JOHN B. SHOVEN ◽  
SITA NATARAJ SLAVOV

AbstractDespite the large and growing returns to deferring Social Security benefits, most individuals claim Social Security before the full retirement age. In this paper, we use a panel of administrative tax data on individuals likely to financially benefit from delaying Social Security claiming to explore the relationship between Social Security claiming and distributions from tax-advantaged retirement savings accounts. We find that the majority of our sample claim Social Security prior to taking distributions from Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). We also find that a third of our sample have IRA balances equivalent to at least two additional years of Social Security benefits, and a quarter have IRA balances equivalent to at least 4 years of Social Security benefits. We complement our analysis with data from the Health and Retirement Study and find that these percentages are considerably higher when other financial assets are taken into account.


2016 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theodore Figinski ◽  
David Neumark

Reducing or eliminating Social Security’s retirement earnings test (RET) can encourage labor supply of older individuals receiving benefits. However, these reforms can encourage earlier claiming of Social Security benefits, permanently lowering future benefits. We explore the consequences, for older women, of eliminating the RET from the full retirement age to age 69 (in 2000), relying on the intercohort variation in exposure to changes in the RET to estimate these effects. The evidence is consistent with the conclusion that eliminating the RET increased the likelihood of having very low incomes among women in their mid-70s and older—ages at which the lower benefits from claiming earlier could outweigh higher income in the earlier period when women or their husbands increased their labor supply.


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