7. Trade Marks II

Author(s):  
Tanya Aplin ◽  
Jennifer Davis

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter discusses the relative grounds for refusal to register a trade mark; acts that constitute infringement; and remedies for infringement. It considers the finding of the Court of Justice of the EU that the investment, advertising, and commercial functions of a trade mark will be protected as well as its role as a badge of origin in cases of ‘double identity’ under the Trade Marks Directive. The chapter considers possible changes to the position under the new Trade Marks Directive and looks at the CJEU’s interpretation of cases where a third party is deemed to have taken unfair advantage of a trade mark with a reputation. It also discusses the use of trade marks on the internet and the implications for findings of infringement.

Author(s):  
Heather Taylor

AbstractThe extended protection of trade marks with a reputation is losing its “exceptional” character, making way for an almost categorical bar to the registration of any competing sign; indeed, the “unfair advantage” requirement appears to have been confounded with that of similarity. Certainly, trade marks are recognized as a legitimate restriction of the freedom of commerce and, arguably, in principle, competitors can and should invest their own efforts into conceiving and promoting an original sign under which they can market their goods and services. Nevertheless, trade mark law, insofar as it protects the investment function of a reputed mark, does not for as much shield the proprietor from all competition, even if this means that he must work harder in order to preserve this reputation. Indeed, the use of a similar sign is sometimes deemed to be ineluctable, where the applicant demonstrates that he cannot reasonably be required to abstain from using such a sign as, for example, it would be made necessary for the marketing of his products. This is especially true where the sign makes use of descriptive terms or elements in order to indicate the type of goods or services offered by the applicant under the mark applied for. This paper aims to critically discuss the most recent EU and UK jurisprudence on “unfair advantage” in the context of trade mark registration and infringement, focussing primarily on the components of this EU creation and how they are interpreted by courts on both a national and EU level.


2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (12) ◽  
pp. 926-927
Author(s):  
Eleonora Rosati

Abstract Court of Justice of the European Union, AMS Neve Ltd and Others v Heritage Audio SL and Pedro Rodríguez Arribas, Case C-172/18, EU:C:2019:674, 5 September 2019 (‘AMS Neve’) In its decision in AMS Neve, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has adopted a dynamic reading of Article 97(5) of the EU Trade Mark Regulation 207/2009 (now Article 125(5) of Regulation 2017/1001) and clarified that—in the event of an infringement of an EU trade mark over the Internet—also the courts of the place at which the defendant’s activity is targeted have jurisdiction to hear the resulting action.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-127
Author(s):  
Tamar Khuchua

The Court of Justice of the European Union has suggested that when the concept set out in the EU regulation is not defined by that regulation, it should be understood according to its usual, everyday meaning. There is no doubt that the understanding of ‘bad faith’ might differ from one person to another and especially from one firm to another. Indeed, ‘bad faith’ in trade mark law might take many different forms which are not easy to detect as the large number of cases concerning the issue of ‘bad faith’ in relation to national and EU trade marks illustrate. By analysing the current legislative framework as well as the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the paper suggests that in order to maintain and even extend the smooth functioning of the EU trade mark system, legislative changes should be introduced. In particular, it is argued that it is reasonable to examine the intention of trade mark applicants already at the application stage in order to avoid the waste of resources and the burden of dealing with the trade marks registered in ‘bad faith’ in the invalidity proceedings post factum and to provide a non-exhaustive list of what elements the ‘bad faith’ can consist of. These amendments should also do good in terms of serving the broader goals of the EU law, which amongst others include, undistorted competition, legal certainty and sound administration.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 53-85
Author(s):  
Petr Mádr

This article contributes to the growing scholarship on the national application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights ('the Charter') by assessing what challenges national courts face when dealing with Article 51 of the Charter, which sets out the Charter's material scope of application. In keeping with this aim, the relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) – with its general formulas, abstract guidance and implementation categories – is discussed strictly from the perspective of the national judge. The article then presents the findings of a thorough study of the case law of the Czech Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) and evaluates this Court's track record when assessing the Charter's applicability. National empirical data of that kind can provide valuable input into the CJEU-centred academic debate on the Charter's scope of application.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonja Lučić ◽  

In Case C-807/18 the Court of Justice of the EU had the opportunity to interpret Regulation 2015/2120, which contains the principle of Internet Neutrality, for the first time. On this occasion, the Court took position that Internet providers must not favor certain applications and services for providing and using data on the Internet to the detriment of others. The principle of net neutrality existed even before the adoption of Regulation 2015/2120. This Regulation establishes measures concerning open access to the Internet. Namely, the Regulation sets rules aimed at ensuring equality and nondiscriminatory treatement of traffic, as well as protection of the rights of end users. The principle of net neutrality implies that all providers of internet access services will treat all traffic equally without discrimination, restriction or interference and regardless of the sender and recipient, the content accessed or distributed,


Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. Article 340 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) governs compensation against the EU. It leaves the Court of Justice of the European Union with considerable room for interpretation, and directs it to consider the general principles common to the laws of the Member States. The key issue is the test for liability where losses are caused by EU acts that are illegal. The Court has fashioned different tests for cases where the challenged act is of a discretionary nature and for those where it is not. This chapter discusses the application of Article 340 in relation to discretionary and non-discretionary EU acts, official acts of Union servants, valid legislative acts, causation and damage, joint liability for the EU and Member States, contractual liability, and restitution.


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 53-71
Author(s):  
Samuel Boutruche Zarevac

Abstract ‘That assessment of the extent of the risk [of persecution] must, in all cases, be carried out with vigilance and care, since what are at issue are issues relating to the integrity of the person and to individual liberties, issues which relate to the fundamental values of the Union.’ The case law of the Court of Justice of the EU concerning the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is still limited. Nonetheless, even this limited case law already offers interesting insights into analysing the potential role of the Court of Justice of the EU in the development of the CEAS, and this jurisprudence is in any event likely to grow significantly, due to the fact that the provisions of the CEAS are the result of a political compromise and so lack clarity. This chapter examines the ruling delivered by the Court in the case of Elgafaji, which contains certain elements which address the interpretative difficulties raised by Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, and goes on to consider, through a discussion of the recent ruling in Abdulla, the extent to which the Court’s interpretation of those provisions of the CEAS which replicate the wording of the 1951 Convention will influence the interpretation of this international instrument, and the difficulties presented in this context. The extent of this influence remains to be seen, but it is clear in any event that the Court of Justice is likely to play a major role in the development of the CEAS. One amendment which may prove necessary is the modification of the Court of Justice’s procedural rules such that it can take into account the views of third-party organisations with a special expertise in this field.


2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-104
Author(s):  
Radim Charvát

Abstract The paper addresses the issue whether customs authorities of Member States are entitled to suspend or detain goods in transit (i.e., products directing from one non- Member State to another non-Member State through the EU) and the evolving case-law of the Court of Justice related to this matter. Prior to the judgment in Philips and Nokia cases, a so-called manufacturing fiction theory was applied by some Member State courts (especially Dutch courts). According to this theory, goods suspended or detained by customs authorities within the EU were considered to be manufactured in the Member State where the custom action took place. In the Philips and Nokia judgments, the Court of Justice rejected this manufacturing fiction theory. But the proposal for amendment to the Regulation on Community trade mark and the proposal of the new Trademark directive, as a part of the trademark reform within the EU, go directly against the ruling in the Philips and Nokia cases and against the Understanding between the EU and India.


Author(s):  
Hana Kelblová

The article deals with the verification of the starting hypothesis of complementariness of the law of consumer protection and the law of intellectual property. In order to achieve that goal the author analyzes individual the Czech Trade Marks Act from the standpoint of protection of rights and interests of consumers.The article follows the categorical requirement of a public law rule, the Consumer Protection Act, which prohibits deceiving consumers and establishes that deceiving may also consist in offering products and services unjustified designated by misleading trade mark.The consumer is deceived most frequently when trade marks are used for designation of products and their promotion. The Trade Marks Act may be analyzed in relation to consumer protection first from the standpoint of consumer protection against trade marks misleading someone about the origin and quality of products and services designated by them. Then it is possible to examine the question whether requirements of a designation for being registered as a trade mark are at the same time those attributes of the trade mark which meet the declared intention of the lawmaker, i.e. that the trade mark should be a source of information for the consumer about the origin and quality of the product de­sig­na­ted by it.Especially, the article deals with an interpretation of the conception „Likelihood of Confusion“ as the fundamental conception while judging the conflict with elderly trademarks applying for the re­gi­stra­tion into the list of The Patent Office.A perception of an average consumer is a fundamental factor for a judgement of „Likelihood of Confusion“ as results from the decision practice of The Czech Patent Office, Czech courts and The European Court of Justice. This is proof of the conclusion that rules of the Trademark Law are rules of the Consumer protection Law.


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