I. Legal Assessment of the Use of Force Against Iraq

2003 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 1059-1063

As the legal basis for the military action against Iraq references are made to Security Council resolutions 678 (1990), 687 (1991), 1441 (2002).In our view the above-mentioned resolutions considered in their entirety and in combination with other resolutions on Iraq, official statements of States on their interpretation and provisions of the UN Charter which were the basis for their adoption, show that the Security Council did not authorise Member States in this case to use force against Iraq.

Author(s):  
Gray Christine

This chapter discusses Security Council authorization of member states to use force. There is now general agreement that the original scheme of Chapter VII of the UN Charter is not workable, and that the UN itself will not conduct enforcement operations. Instead, the Security Council may authorize member states to take enforcement action, even if the precise legal basis for this in the Charter is not clear. The Security Council has not again authorized member states to use force against an aggressor state in the same way as it did against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait, but it has authorized action for a variety of other purposes. This chapter then discusses the controversy over claims of implied or revived authorization of the use of force by the Security Council.


2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-409
Author(s):  
Naoko Matsumura ◽  
Atsushi Tago

Authorization of the use of force by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is believed to increase levels of public support for military action. While scholars have performed sterling research both in theory and empirics on the power of UNSC authorization, there is still much that we do not understand. In particular, we believe that it is necessary to conduct a further study on ‘failed’ authorization cases. As Terrence Chapman points out in his theoretical framework, the general public can derive valuable information based on which of the permanent members of the Council casts a veto; this in turn affects public attitudes towards the use of force. An expected veto cast by the perpetual nay-sayer would not serve as information for the general public. However, if the veto is cast by an allied state of a proposer of the authorizing resolution, the negative vote functions as an information short-cut signaling that the use of force presents a variety of problems, thus reducing public support for the military action. Using online survey experiments, we find supportive evidence for this argument. Our data also suggest that surprising negative information changes the perceptions of legitimacy, legality, public goods, and US interest in a proposed military action, but is unrelated to the perception of costs, casualties or duration.


1964 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 130-131 ◽  

Secretary-General U Thant in his Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1962—15 June 1963 commented that the year under review had been marked by a number of developments which on the whole may be said to have brightened the international outlook and strengthened the UN as a result. According to the Secretary-General, the Cuban crisis provided the UN with the opportunity to help avert what appeared to be impending disaster. Proposals which he had been encouraged to make by a large number of Member States not directly involved in the crisis had the immediate effect of tending to ease the situation. In addition, the UN provided an opportunity, both through the Security Council and the Secretariat, for dialogues among the interested parties. The turn of the year also marked a sudden change for the better in the Congo. As a result the terms of the UN mandate in the Congo as far as the military force was concerned had now largely been fulfilled. External military interference in the Congo had ceased, the territorial integrity of the country had been secured, and law and order had generally been restored and were being maintained, although the situation in one or two areas still was giving some cause for concern.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 123-128
Author(s):  
Stefan Talmon

In his essay on the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, Larry Johnson suggests that the General Assembly can recommend non-use of force collective measures when the Security Council is blocked because of a permanent member casting a veto. He rightly points out that today there is no longer any need to use Uniting for Peace for such recommendations. The General Assembly can and has recommended so-called “voluntary sanctions” in cases where it found a threat to international peace and security to exist. For example, in resolution 2107 (XX) of December 21, 1965 concerning the Question of Territories under Portuguese Administration, the Assembly, making no reference to Uniting for Peace, urged “Member States to take the following measures, separately or collectively:(a)To break off diplomatic and consular relations with the Government of Portugal or refrain from establishing such relations;(b)To close their ports to all vessels flying the Portuguese flag or in the service of Portugal;(c)To prohibit their ships from entering any ports in Portugal and its colonial territories;(d)To refuse landing and transit facilities to all aircraft belonging to or in the service of the Government of Portugal and to companies registered under the laws of Portugal;(e)To boycott all trade with Portugal.”


2015 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Henderson

AbstractOn 29 August 2013, the UK government published a memorandum setting out its ‘position regarding the legality of military action in Syria following the chemical weapons attack in Eastern Damascus on 21 August 2013’. While other States had contemplated some form of military action, most notably the US, none had been as clear and candid as to the legal basis upon which this would be launched. It might seem in this respect perhaps a little surprising that the UK decided in its relatively brief opinion that ‘the legal basis for military action would be humanitarian intervention’. As this article will attempt to highlight, this basic justification is far from uncontroversial. This short article will seek to be clear as to what the UK's legal position exactly was, whether and how this position can be reconciled with the lex lata governing the use of force for humanitarian purposes and its immediate impact upon it, and finally offer some reflections upon the contribution the opinion and its central legal argument has made to future legal argumentation in this area.


2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niels Blokker

AbstractThis contribution discusses Article 16 (“Decisions, authorizations and recommendations addressed to member states and international organizations”) of the ILC draft articles on responsibility of international organizations, completed in first reading in 2009. According to Article 16, international organizations may incur international responsibility for their binding and non-binding decisions if certain conditions are fulfilled. The main rationale of this provision is that an international organization may not require its members to perform acts which the organization itself may not perform under its own obligations. The need to include this provision in the draft articles is not questioned. Five specific issues are addressed. The provision concerning authorizations may in the future turn out to be the most troublesome, in particular in relation to Security Council authorizations for the use of force.


2002 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-37 ◽  
Author(s):  

AbstractThe article explores the extent to which the Security Council has the legal authority to authorize regional (defence) organizations to enforce military measures on its behalf. In the process it identifies Article 53(1) of the Charter, as well as Articles 42 and 48(2) as the clauses that could facilitate such action. Whereas the first enables enforcement action between the regional organization and its members, the latter two allow for the military utilization of regional organizations outside of their territory and/or against non-members, as well as the military utilization of other organizations such as regional defence organizations. Thereafter, it explains how the centralization of the use of force within the Charter structure requires the Security Council to remain in overall control of the authorization. This factor, in combination with the `opt-in' character of Chapter VII decisions, necessitates the explicit and prior nature of the authorization. In addition, it implies that authorizations that are not subjected to an explicit time limit and from which no functional limitation can be derived, will only remain legal as long as they are supported by all five permanent members of the Security Council. The potential implications of these principles are illustrated with reference to the practise of Security Council with respect to ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as NATO in former Yugoslavia.


2003 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 239-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avril McDonald

Nineteen armed conflicts took place in 2003, but in terms of political, media, and scholarly attention there was really only one that mattered: Iraq. It dominated the headlines and aroused passions worldwide, particularly amongst members of civil society, on a scale unseen since the Vietnam War. The military campaign itself followed on some of the most emotional and divisive debates ever seen at the Security Council, which were interpreted by many as exposing not so much the cracks but the fault lines in the system of collective security, and the sharp divide between those states committed to it — and the Security Council's role as the exclusive decision-maker in matters pertaining to the use of force — and thelone rangers.


2021 ◽  
pp. 36-43
Author(s):  
G. Sidorova

The article highlights the activities of the UN in the African area: promoting the economic development of the UN states; combating international terrorism and organized crime; ensuring international security; preventing armed confl icts; strengthening cooperation of Member States in the fi ght against infectious and other dangerous diseases. The close attention of the UN Security Council to the political processes taking place on the African continent yields tangible results. Peacekeeping missions are being sent to hot spots in Africa. The military contingents of these missions, together with the army units of states, participate in the fi ght against militants of illegal armed formations, reduce the intensity of confl icts, help the civilian population to survive in a diffi cult military-political situation, as well as assist in the post-confl ict reconstruction of countries. Given the weakness and imperfection of the local armies, UN member states help to train the peacekeeping forces of African states. Russia, along with other states, is preparing Africans for peacekeeping activities through the Ministry of Internal Aff airs and the Ministry of Defense.


2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geir Ulfstein ◽  
Hege Føsund Christiansen

AbstractOn 17 March 2011 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 authorizing member states to take forceful measures to protect Libyan civilians. Clearly NATO actions to protect civilians were within the mandate. But the authors claim that operations aiming at overthrowing the Qaddafi regime were illegal use of force. The overstepping of the mandate may have a negative effect on the credibility of the responsibility to protect in future gross human rights violations.


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