7 Security Council authorization of member states to use force

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gray Christine
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Member States ◽  
Enforcement Action ◽  
Original Scheme

This chapter discusses Security Council authorization of member states to use force. There is now general agreement that the original scheme of Chapter VII of the UN Charter is not workable, and that the UN itself will not conduct enforcement operations. Instead, the Security Council may authorize member states to take enforcement action, even if the precise legal basis for this in the Charter is not clear. The Security Council has not again authorized member states to use force against an aggressor state in the same way as it did against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait, but it has authorized action for a variety of other purposes. This chapter then discusses the controversy over claims of implied or revived authorization of the use of force by the Security Council.

I. Legal Assessment of the Use of Force Against Iraq

2003 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 1059-1063
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Member States ◽  
Military Action ◽  
Legal Assessment ◽  
The Military

As the legal basis for the military action against Iraq references are made to Security Council resolutions 678 (1990), 687 (1991), 1441 (2002).In our view the above-mentioned resolutions considered in their entirety and in combination with other resolutions on Iraq, official statements of States on their interpretation and provisions of the UN Charter which were the basis for their adoption, show that the Security Council did not authorise Member States in this case to use force against Iraq.

scholarly journals The Legalizing and Legitimizing Function of UN General Assembly Resolutions

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 123-128
Author(s):  
Stefan Talmon
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
International Peace ◽  
Member States ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
Permanent Member ◽  
Un General Assembly ◽  
The Government

In his essay on the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, Larry Johnson suggests that the General Assembly can recommend non-use of force collective measures when the Security Council is blocked because of a permanent member casting a veto. He rightly points out that today there is no longer any need to use Uniting for Peace for such recommendations. The General Assembly can and has recommended so-called “voluntary sanctions” in cases where it found a threat to international peace and security to exist. For example, in resolution 2107 (XX) of December 21, 1965 concerning the Question of Territories under Portuguese Administration, the Assembly, making no reference to Uniting for Peace, urged “Member States to take the following measures, separately or collectively:(a)To break off diplomatic and consular relations with the Government of Portugal or refrain from establishing such relations;(b)To close their ports to all vessels flying the Portuguese flag or in the service of Portugal;(c)To prohibit their ships from entering any ports in Portugal and its colonial territories;(d)To refuse landing and transit facilities to all aircraft belonging to or in the service of the Government of Portugal and to companies registered under the laws of Portugal;(e)To boycott all trade with Portugal.”

Forceful Intervention for Protection of Human Rights in Africa

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Kuwali
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Military Intervention ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Territorial Integrity ◽  
Enforcement Action ◽  
Political Independence ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights

Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) obliges States to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN. The formulation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter gives room to argue that military intervention for purposes of protecting human rights is not covered in the prohibition if it does not threaten the territorial integrity or political independence of a State, especially since promotion of human rights is one of the purposes of the UN under Article 1(3) of the Charter. However, the majority of commentators argue that the Charter prohibits any unilateral use of force and the travaux préparatoires leave no doubt that the terms ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘political independence’ were included not to qualify an absolute prohibition of the use of force but rather as intensifiers to emphasize the protection of States from acts of aggression. The purpose of inserting the phrase ‘or in any other manner inconsistent with’ in Article 2(4) was not to open the door to implicit exceptions from the rule but to make the prohibition watertight. Thus, Article 2(4) constitutes general prohibition of use of force in international law, subject only to the two exceptions outlined in the Charter: self-defense under Article 51 and chapter 7 enforcement action by the Security Council. Thus, except in self-defense, the use of force is the preserve of the Security Council. On this basis, any use of force to protect human rights in another State is subject to authorization of the Security Council.

Abuse of the Members: Questions concerning Draft Article 16 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations

2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niels Blokker
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Member States ◽  
Draft Article ◽  
The Future ◽  
International Responsibility

AbstractThis contribution discusses Article 16 (“Decisions, authorizations and recommendations addressed to member states and international organizations”) of the ILC draft articles on responsibility of international organizations, completed in first reading in 2009. According to Article 16, international organizations may incur international responsibility for their binding and non-binding decisions if certain conditions are fulfilled. The main rationale of this provision is that an international organization may not require its members to perform acts which the organization itself may not perform under its own obligations. The need to include this provision in the draft articles is not questioned. Five specific issues are addressed. The provision concerning authorizations may in the future turn out to be the most troublesome, in particular in relation to Security Council authorizations for the use of force.

The Relationship between the Security Council and Regional Organizations during Enforcement Action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter

2002 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
Sierra Leone ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Functional Limitation ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Legal Authority ◽  
Regional Organizations ◽  
Enforcement Action ◽  
United Nations Charter ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThe article explores the extent to which the Security Council has the legal authority to authorize regional (defence) organizations to enforce military measures on its behalf. In the process it identifies Article 53(1) of the Charter, as well as Articles 42 and 48(2) as the clauses that could facilitate such action. Whereas the first enables enforcement action between the regional organization and its members, the latter two allow for the military utilization of regional organizations outside of their territory and/or against non-members, as well as the military utilization of other organizations such as regional defence organizations. Thereafter, it explains how the centralization of the use of force within the Charter structure requires the Security Council to remain in overall control of the authorization. This factor, in combination with the `opt-in' character of Chapter VII decisions, necessitates the explicit and prior nature of the authorization. In addition, it implies that authorizations that are not subjected to an explicit time limit and from which no functional limitation can be derived, will only remain legal as long as they are supported by all five permanent members of the Security Council. The potential implications of these principles are illustrated with reference to the practise of Security Council with respect to ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as NATO in former Yugoslavia.

Remotely Piloted Warfare as a Challenge to the Jus Ad Bellum

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordan Paust
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Legal Principles ◽  
Enforcement Action ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Collective Self ◽  
State Actors ◽  
Self Defence

This chapter examines the use of remotely piloted and other robotics during war and outside the context of war during permissible measures of self-defence and their implications for the jus ad bellum, interpretation of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter, and applications of underlying general principles. It discusses the phenomenon of ‘remotely piloted warfare’ as it applies to the use of force by state and non-state actors with respect to self-defence, collective self-defence, self-determination assistance, regional action, and enforcement action authorized by the Security Council. It then considers the use of remotely piloted attacks, self-defence, and warfare in relation to compliance with the principles of reasonable necessity, distinction in targeting, and proportionality. In particular, the chapter looks at the use of weaponized drones and the possible challenges they present to compliance with basic legal principles that limit violence, and some current applications and issues regarding compliance.

When the Security Council is Divided

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Johnstone
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
International Peace ◽  
Regional Organizations ◽  
Political Body ◽  
Enforcement Action ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
Peacekeeping Missions

This chapter examines the scope and limits of the UN Security Council’s competence in dealing with situations requiring the use of force. It discusses the Charter provisions on the delegation of enforcement action to regional organizations or coalitions of the willing, and legal issues that have arisen in practice. It looks at the establishment or authorization of robust peacekeeping missions with some enforcement powers, with both regional organizations and coalitions either occasionally acting on the basis of implicit authorizations to use force or claiming retroactive approval. It analyses three types of case that tend to arise when the Security Council is divided: imprecise authorization, implied mandates, and failure to act due to ‘unreasonable’ exercise of the veto. Although wishing the Council to be clear and consistent, the contestation surrounding these cases is to be expected from a deeply political body and reinforces its value for managing international peace and security.

THE LEGALITY OF THE NATO BOMBING IN LIBYA

2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geir Ulfstein ◽  
Hege Føsund Christiansen
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Human Rights Violations ◽  
Member States ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Resolution 1973 ◽  
Nato Bombing

AbstractOn 17 March 2011 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 authorizing member states to take forceful measures to protect Libyan civilians. Clearly NATO actions to protect civilians were within the mandate. But the authors claim that operations aiming at overthrowing the Qaddafi regime were illegal use of force. The overstepping of the mandate may have a negative effect on the credibility of the responsibility to protect in future gross human rights violations.

scholarly journals Comment on Larry Johnson, “Uniting for Peace”

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 135-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Richardson
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
General Analysis ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
International Peace ◽  
Member States ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
Permanent Member ◽  
A Current

Larry Johnson’s essay on the UN General Assembly’s Uniting for Peace resolution (UFP) is a useful general analysis of issues arising from UN Security Council Permanent Member veto-paralysis. His essay, which focuses on the text of the original Resolution, is directed at asking whether the UFP retains a current “useful purpose.” Relying on a text-centric interpretation of the presence or absence of subsequent invocations of the UFP, he concludes that no “useful purpose” remains, in part because evolved General Assembly authority has displaced the need to specifically invoke the UFP to make recommendations on certain issues of international peace and security. Johnson then asks whether, under the original UFP or subsequently, the Assembly may recommend to Member States “enforcement” uses of force, notwithstanding the prohibitions of Article 2(4) of the Charter. He finds Article 2(4) to be an absolute barrier to Assembly authority to recommend those measures, but not for “innovative and inventive non-use-of force measures.”

scholarly journals Law and Force After Iraq: A Transitional Moment

2003 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 628-642 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane E. Stromseth
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Enforcement Action ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
The Face ◽  
Hard Problems ◽  
The Military

What impact will the Iraq war of 2003 have on international law governing the use of force and on the future of the United Nations Security Council? Some commentators have proclaimed that the military intervention led by the United States amounted to the “death” of the UN Charter and the end of “the grand attempt to subject the use of force to the rule of law.” The Security Council’s failure to reach agreement—in die face of French-U.S. antagonisms—spells the end, they argue, of an effective Council role in addressing major threats to peace and security. My own view is that it is premature to pronounce the “death” of the UN Charter or to give up on future prospects for Security Council agreement on the use of force. We are, nevertheless, at a difficult and precarious transitional moment in the international legal system governing the use of force, and the stark tensions reflected in the differences over Iraq are symptomatic of hard problems that may persist for the foreseeable future. Both the rules and the system need refining and reform. Success in doing so will require imagination and much greater willingness by policy makers to consider law’s potential role, not as a barrier to necessary action, but as a means to enhance global security in the face of emerging threats. In seeking such reform, it will be important to build upon the realism of the Charter’s founders, who combined rules governing the use of force with a clear commitment to credible enforcement action in response to threats to peace and security.

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