Who Is a Refugee in Africa? A Principled Framework for Interpreting and Applying Africa’s Expanded Refugee Definition

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 290-320
Author(s):  
Tamara Wood

Abstract Africa’s expanded refugee definition – article I(2) of the 1969 Convention – provides the legal basis of protection for a significant number of the world’s refugees. It is a gateway to a host of rights aimed at protecting refugees from future harm and preserving their dignity until a durable solution can be found. The expansive nature of the African definition has seen it praised for being more humanitarian, more reflective of current causes of displacement, and an exemplar for the development of refugee protection regimes elsewhere. Despite this, the scope of the definition and the meaning of its terms remain poorly understood in both literature and practice. Attempts to interpret the definition to date have been largely superficial and often lacking in any principled interpretative framework. This undermines its implementation in practice, potentially risking the lives and security of those entitled to protection as refugees in Africa. This article sets out a principled framework for interpreting and applying Africa’s expanded refugee definition. The framework is drawn from international law principles of treaty interpretation, as set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and customary international law. However, this article goes beyond merely reciting the relevant principles: it analyses their scope, applicability to Africa’s expanded refugee definition, and implications for the interpretation of the definition’s terms. It also identifies, and describes in detail, four key principles for interpreting the expanded refugee definition. These four key principles are critical to addressing the shortcomings of existing understandings of the definition and some of the main controversies that arise in its interpretation and application. They also provide a practical and accessible source of guidance for refugee status decision makers and others that could assist in promoting consistency, transparency, and fairness in refugee status determination within African States.

Author(s):  
Bjorge Eirik ◽  
Kolb Robert

This chapter considers an issue that has garnered sustained attention by States and international courts and tribunals in recent years — the potential to allow (or deny) evolutionary interpretations to treaty terms. It highlights five conclusions about the interpretation of treaties over time. First, evolutionary interpretations are made based on an array of means of ordinary interpretation, as enshrined in Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties Articles 31–33 and customary international law. Second, evolutionary interpretation is an issue of fact and law arising in the circumstances of particular cases. Third, the main principle is that of ‘contemporaneous interpretation’, a term referring not to the interpreter but to the parties (i.e. contemporaneous to the time of conclusion of the treaty). Fourth, it makes no sense to apply the principle of contemporaneity in all circumstances, since there are some terms used in treaties that make legal sense only when understood to evolve over time. Finally, to keep the unity of the treaty and its terms, the new interpretation is retrospective, having effect back to the time of the treaty’s conclusion.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-200
Author(s):  
Danae Azaria

Abstract This article argues that the International Law Commission (ILC) interprets international law. In recent years, in documents intended to remain non-binding, the Commission has made interpretative pronouncements about a treaty in force, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and customary international law reflected therein. This development is called the ‘codification by interpretation’ paradigm in this article. This article argues that interpretation falls within the ILC’s function, and it analyses the effects of the Commission’s interpretative pronouncements. It explains that the ILC’s interpretative pronouncements are not per se binding or authentic. However, they may trigger an interpretative dialogue with states. The ILC’s interpretative pronouncements may constitute a focal point for coordination among states, a subsidiary means for determining rules of law and a supplementary means of (treaty) interpretation. The aim of the ILC’s ‘codification-by-interpretation’ paradigm in the four topics considered in this article is to introduce clarity and predictability into secondary rules on the law of treaties, thus ensuring the clarity and predictability of primary treaty rules across all fields of international law. The ILC endeavours to convince states to use international law as a medium by which they regulate their affairs.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 44-48
Author(s):  
Andrea K. Bjorklund

Party “intent” is not one of the tools that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) gives to treaty interpreters. To be sure, party intent is presumably reflected in the “object and purpose” of the treaty, but it is not a separate criterion; in fact, the VCLT implicitly excludes party intent from playing an interpretive role. Yet many decision-makers, counsel, and academics persistently look to party intent for guidance when interpreting treaties. The most favored nation (MFN) debate illustrates why party intent endures as an interpretive touchstone: treaty language, even when analyzed in context and in light of the convention's object and purpose, does not always lead to clear answers. Both Simon Batifort and J. Benton Heath and Stephan Schill, in their different ways, depart from traditional VCLT analysis and hark to party intent as a reason to endorse a modified approach to treaty interpretation. Yet they also illustrate why party intent is an imperfect tool: party intent is too malleable to be a conclusive guide to treaty meaning.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 855-875
Author(s):  
Kamrul Hasan Arif

Bangladesh is now the largest Rohingya refugee-hosting country in the world. 2017 saw the largest and fastest Rohingya refugee influx from Myanmar to Bangladesh. The very first influx took place in 1978 after just seven years of its independence. Despite being a non-signatory to the 1951 Refugee Status Convention, Bangladesh has an obligation to protect refugees under national and international laws. The legal basis of international protection comes from the different bodies of international law including customary international law. The basic customary international law applicable to the refugees found in the core international human rights instruments. The aims of this research are to find out the legal obligations and challenges of Bangladesh in the protection of refugees under the constitutional and statutory laws of Bangladesh. This research also aims to focus on the role of protecting refugees under different bodies of regional and international law including the principle of non-refoulement.


Author(s):  
Irina Buga

Treaties must undergo transformation and modernization to reflect changing norms and developments in international law. But treaties can be notoriously difficult to amend by formal means. One crucial way in which treaty evolution takes place is through subsequent practice, a well-established tool for treaty interpretation. While its initial aim is to shed light on the parties’ original intention, over time, subsequent practice acquires a force of its own and may come to evidence their contemporary understanding of the treaty. Subsequent practice may even diverge so far from treaty provisions that it can no longer be said to constitute an act of treaty interpretation, but becomes, in effect, one of modification. Furthermore, such practice can give rise to new norms of customary international law, which, in turn, may impact pre-existing treaty provisions. The modification of treaties by subsequent practice extends to all fields of international law, from the law of the sea, environmental law, and investment law, to humanitarian law and human rights. Such modifications can have significant practical consequences, from revising or creating new rights and obligations, to establishing new institutional mechanisms. Determining the point when the ‘switch’ from treaty interpretation to treaty modification occurs, however, is itself an act of interpretation. It poses difficulty to legal scholars and dispute settlement bodies alike, especially in light of the silence of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties on this point, and impacts States’ expectations as to their treaty obligations. This book addresses this insufficiently explored issue of international significance.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-76
Author(s):  
Marco Longobardo

Abstract This article explores the role of counsel before the International Court of Justice, taking into account their tasks under the Statute of the Court and the legal value of their pleadings in international law. Pleadings of counsel constitute State practice for the formation of customary international law and treaty interpretation, and they are attributable to the litigating State under the law on State responsibility. Accordingly, in principle, counsel present the views of the litigating State, which in practice approves in advance the pleadings. This consideration is relevant in discussing the role of counsel assisting States in politically sensitive cases, where there is no necessary correspondence between the views of the States and those of their counsel. Especially when less powerful States are parties to the relevant disputes, the availability of competent counsel in politically sensitive cases should not be discouraged since it advances the legitimacy of the international judicial function.


Author(s):  
De Wet Erika

This chapter explores potential formal requirements that may affect the validity of consent to direct military assistance. Customary international law only imposes two specific, formal limitations on the legal construct of military assistance on request. The first would be that the request for or consent to military assistance must be issued (and withdrawn) by the highest officials of a state, namely, the head of state and/or government. Where these two positions are not combined within the same person and there is disagreement between them as to whether consent exists, the domestic law of the country in question may be decisive in determining who has the final say in the matter. However, such disagreement between the two highest state officials is likely to be an indication of the political fragility of the consent, which should caution against relying exclusively on consent as the legal basis for the forcible measures. The second constraint imposed by customary international law concerns the requirement that ex ante consent as expressed in pro-invasion treaty clauses must be complemented by ad hoc consent at the time of the forcible measures. Apart from these two constraints, customary international law does not seem to impose any particular formal requirements on states expressing consent to forcible measures on its territory.


Author(s):  
Hobér Kaj

This chapter discusses the interpretation of the Energy Charter Treaty. The ECT is a multilateral treaty during the negotiation of which approximately fifty States participated, albeit to varying degrees. It goes without saying that in such a setting, there are many competing interests to take into account, often resulting in ambiguous treaty provisions. Indeed, almost every dispute based on the ECT involves issues of treaty interpretation. The law applicable to the interpretation of treaties is international law, unless the parties to the treaty in question have agreed otherwise. For all practical purposes, the most important international document when it comes to treaty interpretation is the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention defines ‘treaty’ as ‘an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation’. There is little doubt that the ECT is covered by this definition. Article 26(6) of the ECT provides that disputes under it are to be resolved on the basis of its provisions and ‘applicable rules and principles of international law’. The chapter then considers Articles 31—3 of the Vienna Convention, which deal with the interpretation of treaties.


Author(s):  
Zemanek Karl

When the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties confirmed the existence of peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens) they were conceived, like Roman jus publicum, as absolute law that could not be altered by the will of individual States. Scholars then transformed the concept into the manifestation of public policy (ordre public). They also argued for widening the scope of its application to unilateral legal acts and customary international law. A recent trend in academic theory assigns jus cogens an essential role in the constitutionalization of international law, postulating it either as hierarchically higher order or as embodying the constitutional principles. In view of the rashness of scholars in proclaiming the peremptory character of norms and also of the inexpertness of the European and national courts in applying supposedly peremptory international norms in their decisions, it seems better to keep jus cogens at its original task.


1998 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 837-854 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Reichert-Facilides

Over the last 30 years, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties1 has emerged as one of the most influential instruments of modern international law. The Convention, which was adopted at the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties on 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27 January 1980 and has meanwhile been ratified by more than 80 States.2 Yet, as it does not operate retroactively,3 the scope of application is growing only slowly and its practical importance stems, rather, from the fact that the Convention is widely considered a restatement of customary international law. As early as 1971 the International Court of Justice referred to the articles governing termination for breach of treaty as a codification of the existing law on the subject.4 Since then both international tribunals and national courts have more and more habitually relied on the material provisions of the Convention to ascertain traditional rules of the law of treaties.5


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