Economics of International Organizations

Author(s):  
Joel P. Trachtman

The essence of an international organization is the delegation of decision-making authority from individual states to the organization, representing the collectivity of member states. In simple terms, international organizations are to international law as firms are to contracts: states form international organizations in order to reduce the transaction costs associated with cooperation, as compared to the entry into international legal rules without organizations. The core questions are the same: why are these institutions formed, what powers do they have, and how are they exercised? This chapter analyzes the reasons for the creation of international organizations, as well as the reasons why particular structures of international organizations are utilized. It assesses the relationship among assignment of subject matter authority, legislative capacity, adjudicative capacity, enforcement capacity, and membership. It examines how these features correspond to particular contexts of international cooperation.

2004 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niels Blokker

AbstractThe law of international organizations is a field of study full of themes with variations. With respect to a number of key chapters in this field, such as the legal status of international organizations, their institutional structure, powers, decision-making and decisions, sanctions, fundamental principles exist or are being developed. These principles or themes have a large number of variations in the rules and practice of individual organizations. Like in music, the variations in themselves may be interesting as such, but they can only be fully appreciated by not losing sight of the theme. Like in music, the themes in themselves may be interesting as such, but they can only be fully appreciated by also listening carefully to the multicoloured variations. This contribution is devoted to a central theme of the law of international organizations: the relationship between an international organization and its members. Already in the early days of existence of international organizations, this topic has given rise to numerous questions. Many of these have now been answered, but sometimes resurface in contemporary variations. In addition there are new questions. It is useful to first explore briefly the meaning of the word "members". The English word "member" and the French "membre" are both derived from the Latin word "membrum", which means "part of the body". This meaning is important because it indicates clearly that members are part of a whole – a fact which takes us straight to one of the core questions addressed in this article. Members of an international organization are not just members, after all – like the members of a bridge club or a gardening club. In most cases, the members of international organizations are states. How then can members of an international organization be members of a whole when in most cases those members are sovereign states, even if the concept of sovereignty of states is no longer as absolute at it used to be? This is one of the major questions within the field of the law of international organizations. In order to examine this question, this contribution is divided into two parts. Section I will concentrate on the role of members vis-à-vis international organizations. In Section II the focus will shift to the whole of which the members are part; this Section will briefly look at some of the questions involved in giving a certain amount of autonomy to this whole.


Author(s):  
Miriam Bak McKenna

Abstract Situating itself in current debates over the international legal archive, this article delves into the material and conceptual implications of architecture for international law. To do so I trace the architectural developments of international law’s organizational and administrative spaces during the early to mid twentieth century. These architectural endeavours unfolded in three main stages: the years 1922–1926, during which the International Labour Organization (ILO) building, the first building exclusively designed for an international organization was constructed; the years 1927–1937 which saw the great polemic between modernist and classical architects over the building of the Palace of Nations; and the years 1947–1952, with the triumph of modernism, represented by the UN Headquarters in New York. These events provide an illuminating allegorical insight into the physical manifestation, modes of self-expression, and transformation of international law during this era, particularly the relationship between international law and the function and role of international organizations.


2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Odette Murray

AbstractThis paper applies two manifestations of the principle of good faith – pacta sunt servanda and the doctrine of abuse of rights – to the complex relationship between member states and international organizations. The paper argues that these existing doctrines operate as a legal limit on the conduct of states when creating, controlling and functioning within international organizations. The paper begins by exploring an innovative provision in the International Law Commission's recently finalised Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations – Draft Article 61 – according to which a member state will bear international responsibility for the act of an international organization where the member state uses the organization to circumvent its own international obligations. Examining the development of Draft Article 61 and the jurisprudence upon which it is based, this paper argues that the principle which the Commission in fact seeks to articulate in Draft Article 61 is that of good faith in the performance of treaties. As such, being based on a primary rule of international law, this paper queries whether Draft Article 61 belongs in a set of secondary rules. The paper then considers the role of states in the decision-making organs of international organizations and argues that the widely held presumption against member state responsibility for participation in decision-making organs can and should be displaced in certain cases, in recognition of the various voting mechanisms in international organizations and the varied power which certain states may wield. The paper argues that the doctrine of abuse of rights operates as a fundamental legal limit on the exercise of a member state's voting discretion, and thereby forms a complementary primary obligation placed on states in the context of their participation in international organizations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jozef Valuch ◽  
Tomáš Gábriš ◽  
Ondrej Hamuľák

Abstract The aim of this paper is to evaluate and differentiate between the phenomena of cyberwarfare and information warfare, as manifestations of what we perceive as postmodern warfare. We describe and analyse the current examples of the use the postmodern warfare and the reactions of states and international bodies to these phenomena. The subject matter of this paper is the relationship between new types of postmodern conflicts and the law of armed conflicts (law of war). Based on ICJ case law, it is clear that under current legal rules of international law of war, cyber attacks as well as information attacks (often performed in the cyberspace as well) can only be perceived as “war” if executed in addition to classical kinetic warfare, which is often not the case. In most cases perceived “only” as a non-linear warfare (postmodern conflict), this practice nevertheless must be condemned as conduct contrary to the principles of international law and (possibly) a crime under national laws, unless this type of conduct will be recognized by the international community as a “war” proper, in its new, postmodern sense.


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 308-340
Author(s):  
Gloria Fernández Arribas

The Kimberley Process represents a new method of international cooperation between subjects of international law. It was named by its creators as a process, setting it apart from international organizations, and leading too to its consideration as informal international law-making or soft law. In this study we shall analyze the extent to which the Kimberley Process falls into these categories. Our main task, however, is to compare it to formal international organizations, with a view to establishing whether what really has been created is an institutionalization process that is like an international organization, but with a different name. To do this, we will analyze with reference to the Kimberley Process the various respective fields of international organizations, such as founding agreement, membership, structure, decision-making process and legal order.


Author(s):  
Brölmann Catherine

The 1980 WHO Advisory Opinion elaborates on the general legal obligations (grounded in the duty of co-operation and good faith) that are part of the relationship between an international organization and its host state. In this opinion the ICJ possibly for the first time articulated this relationship as a set of mutual obligations between legal equals. The opinion moreover enunciates the sources of international legal obligations binding upon international organizations (IOs): the treaties they conclude (uncontroversial); I customary international law; their constitutions. The Court uses the proverbial reassurance of UN member states in saying that the WHO is not a ‘super-state’. Finally, in accepting jurisdiction the Court explicitly separated the legal character of the question from the political considerations motivated by that question.


Author(s):  
Geert De Baere

The present chapter considers the position of the European Union in other international organizations. It is based on the premise that the Union, while arguably also a federal or quasi-federal structure, is legally still itself an international organization. From the perspective of international law, that explains at least partly the complexities involved in an international organization such as the EU acquiring a status in—let alone membership of—another international organization. The term ‘status’ or ‘position’ is understood here as the influence the Union can exercise, either formally or informally, in decision-making processes in other international organizations. As an ever-increasing number of decisions having an impact on the Union’s policies originate in international organizations, its position in such fora matters.


2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean d'Aspremont

AbstractIt is classically contended that when an international organization endowed with international legal personality commits an international wrongful act, the organization is to be held exclusively responsible even though the act would have constituted a violation of its member states' obligations if committed by them. This Article intends to depart from such a rigid interpretation of the responsibility of international organization and makes the argument that when member states abuse the international legal personality of an international organization through the exercise of an excessive control over the decision-making process of the organization, they must be held, together with the organization, responsible for violations of international law by the organization provided that such a wrongful act would also constitute a breach of the member states' international obligations if committed by them. It is posited here that, in this situation, member states can no longer hide behind the screen of the international legal personality of the organization. Failing to take the extent of control exercised by member states over the decision-making process of an international organization into account boils down to ignoring that autonomy is one of the constitutive elements of the legal personality of an international organization, which can bolster the contemporary move away from international institutionalism.


2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christiane Ahlborn

In view of the adoption and future reception of the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO) on second reading, this contribution seeks to offer some reflections on the ‘copy-paste narrative’ that has characterized the process of drafting the ARIO by the International Law Commission (ILC). On the basis of a brief introduction to the concept of analogies in international law, it is explained that the use of analogies is not to be equated with a mechanical exercise of copy-pasting legal rules; rather, it constitutes a method of legal reasoning based on a principled assessment of relevant similarities and differences. By comparing the ARIO with the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility (ASR), it will be demonstrated that the ARIO actually do not follow the example of the ASR in many key provisions. Interestingly, much of the critique of the ARIO has been directed against these dissimilar provisions, especially when they concern the relations between an international organization and its member States. Since this critique is mainly driven by considerable uncertainty as to the determination of the responsible actor(s), it will be suggested that the ILC should have used closer analogies with the ASR in order to enhance the overall coherence of the law of international responsibility. This is because, as argued in conclusion, the corporate complexity of international organizations and States may necessitate a unified set of Articles on International Responsibility.


Author(s):  
Arthur Roberto Capella Giannattasio ◽  
Débora Roma Drezza ◽  
Maria Beatriz Wehby

Abstract This article examines the limits that academics from peripheral countries might encounter while trying to influence the decision-making process inside an international organization. Although there are different mechanisms whereby academia might influence non-academic debates, we highlight here the use of policy papers, in order to examine and discuss the non-textual barriers which might be faced by those academics. After an analysis of primary sources this article presents some pragmatic limits in the use of policy papers and discusses the consequences of this condition for the legitimation of international organizations. As such, relevant international organizations still seem to be unresponsive to some initiatives in particular: closed to the spontaneous participation of academia; and not willing to call for contributions from academic communities. This is particularly relevant for contributions from peripheral academia and other non-state actors, who lack the capability to disturb the traditional ideational power exercised by core (Western) countries and by state-centric ideology in current international law.


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