When the Security Council is Divided

Author(s):  
Ian Johnstone

This chapter examines the scope and limits of the UN Security Council’s competence in dealing with situations requiring the use of force. It discusses the Charter provisions on the delegation of enforcement action to regional organizations or coalitions of the willing, and legal issues that have arisen in practice. It looks at the establishment or authorization of robust peacekeeping missions with some enforcement powers, with both regional organizations and coalitions either occasionally acting on the basis of implicit authorizations to use force or claiming retroactive approval. It analyses three types of case that tend to arise when the Security Council is divided: imprecise authorization, implied mandates, and failure to act due to ‘unreasonable’ exercise of the veto. Although wishing the Council to be clear and consistent, the contestation surrounding these cases is to be expected from a deeply political body and reinforces its value for managing international peace and security.

2019 ◽  
pp. 346-374
Author(s):  
Gleider Hernández

This chapter looks at the use of force and collective security. Today, the United Nations Charter embodies the indispensable principles of international law on the use of force. These include the prohibition on the unilateral use of force found in Article 2(4), and the recognition of the inherent right of all States to use force in self-defence found in Article 51. Finally, under Chapter VII, a collective security system centred upon the Security Council was established for the maintenance of international peace and security. A key debate over the scope of Article 2(4) is whether a new exception has been recognized which would allow the use of force motivated by humanitarian considerations. It is argued that these ‘humanitarian interventions’ would allow a State to use force to protect people in another State from gross and systematic human rights violations when the target State is unwilling or unable to act.


2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 241-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alena F. Douhan

The United Nations organization was planned to be established as a single universal system of collective security. Major efforts were supposed to be taken by the UN Security Council. Regional organizations were introduced into the system as a subordinate subsidiary means – elements of the system. Over the course of the time it has, however, appeared that the UN Security Council was not able to act in the way prescribed by the UN Charter in suppressing newly emerged threats and challenges in the sphere of security. In the contrary, the role of regional organizations has increased substantially. They do the majority of tasks in the sphere of maintenance of international peace and security, often without authorization or even informing the UN Security Council, although the legality of some of these actions may be dubious. As a result, the Council itself transfers the accent in relations between the UN and regional organizations from subsidiarity to complementarity or even partnership. It is thus necessary to re-check the meaning of the concepts of complementarity and subsidiarity as well as the UN Charter provisions in the changed circumstances and to specify principles of the new system.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 123-128
Author(s):  
Stefan Talmon

In his essay on the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, Larry Johnson suggests that the General Assembly can recommend non-use of force collective measures when the Security Council is blocked because of a permanent member casting a veto. He rightly points out that today there is no longer any need to use Uniting for Peace for such recommendations. The General Assembly can and has recommended so-called “voluntary sanctions” in cases where it found a threat to international peace and security to exist. For example, in resolution 2107 (XX) of December 21, 1965 concerning the Question of Territories under Portuguese Administration, the Assembly, making no reference to Uniting for Peace, urged “Member States to take the following measures, separately or collectively:(a)To break off diplomatic and consular relations with the Government of Portugal or refrain from establishing such relations;(b)To close their ports to all vessels flying the Portuguese flag or in the service of Portugal;(c)To prohibit their ships from entering any ports in Portugal and its colonial territories;(d)To refuse landing and transit facilities to all aircraft belonging to or in the service of the Government of Portugal and to companies registered under the laws of Portugal;(e)To boycott all trade with Portugal.”


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
ZOU Keyuan

AbstractThe Charter of the United Nations designates the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as one of the principal organs of the United Nations, assuming the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”. It has the power to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, to make recommendations, and decide what measures should be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security. This article addresses a number of issues concerning how the UNSC Resolutions are enforced at sea in accordance with applicable international law and makes special reference to the circumstances in East Asia, particularly the Korean Peninsula.


Author(s):  
Nigel D. White

This chapter examines the division of competence between the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly concerning matters of international peace and security but placed within the context of the prohibition on the use of force. Although the Security Council can authorize the use of force by states, what is not clear is whether the General Assembly can recommend that states take military action. The chapter considers the conundrum faced by the United Nations with respect to an imminent and catastrophic use of force or act of egregious violence, when the UN Security Council is deadlocked because of the lack of agreement between the permanent members. It discusses the debate over the legality of the (in)famous Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950 within the context of the emerging principle of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as well as within existing principles of international law.


2003 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 563-576 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Yoo

In his speech before the United Nations (UN) in September 2002, President George W. Bush characterized the possible use of force against Iraq as necessary to enforce existing Security Council resolutions and to eliminate a dangerous threat to international peace and security. The Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1441, which found Iraq to be in material breach of previous Security Council resolutions and threatened serious consequences for further intransigence. When Iraq refused to fully comply with these resolutions, the United States led an ad hoc “coalition of the willing” that invaded Iraq on March 19,2003, quickly defeated Iraq’s armed forces, and ended the regime of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party. On May 1,2003, President Bush announced that major combat operations in Iraq had ended. At the time of this writing, the United States has assumed the position of an occupying power that is responsible for rebuilding Iraq, as recognized by the Security Council in Resolution 1483.


2002 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-37 ◽  
Author(s):  

AbstractThe article explores the extent to which the Security Council has the legal authority to authorize regional (defence) organizations to enforce military measures on its behalf. In the process it identifies Article 53(1) of the Charter, as well as Articles 42 and 48(2) as the clauses that could facilitate such action. Whereas the first enables enforcement action between the regional organization and its members, the latter two allow for the military utilization of regional organizations outside of their territory and/or against non-members, as well as the military utilization of other organizations such as regional defence organizations. Thereafter, it explains how the centralization of the use of force within the Charter structure requires the Security Council to remain in overall control of the authorization. This factor, in combination with the `opt-in' character of Chapter VII decisions, necessitates the explicit and prior nature of the authorization. In addition, it implies that authorizations that are not subjected to an explicit time limit and from which no functional limitation can be derived, will only remain legal as long as they are supported by all five permanent members of the Security Council. The potential implications of these principles are illustrated with reference to the practise of Security Council with respect to ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as NATO in former Yugoslavia.


2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 353-369 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERIKA DE WET

AbstractThis article examines the evolution of military operations by the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the South African Development Community (SADC) over the last three decades. By looking at constitutional (treaty) developments and organizational practice, it questions whether these sub-regional organizations have displaced the primacy of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in matters pertaining to international peace and security, as foreseen in Articles 24(1) and 103 of the United Nations Charter (the UN Charter). The relevance of this question is underscored by the fact that ECOWAS and SADC have engaged in various peace operations since the 1990s. The article concludes that, since all the interventions under discussion were underpinned by the consent of the recognized government, it would be premature to suggest that the practice of African sub-regional organizations amounts to the emergence of a new customary right to engage in ‘first-instance enforcement action’.


2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 319-345
Author(s):  
Leonardo Borlini

The Security Council’s reaction to the nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) in 2016 through Resolutions 2270 and 2321 have significantly changed the picture of UN sanctions regime against this country and created the most comprehensive, legally-binding, sanctions program imposed against a State since Iraq in the 1990s. While raising questions on their lawfulness under international law, the DPRK’s military actions have repeatedly challenged the international community. At the moment of finalising the present article, the situation seems more precarious than ever: despite the severity and comprehensiveness of the sanctions regime, the DPKR’s launches of ballistic missiles hit the headlines again, and its military aggressiveness does not appear reversed. The article examines this regime against the background of the Council’s past practice and the international rules on non-proliferation, also by discussing legal issues related to the different actions by Pyongyang. Ultimately, it seeks to assess the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile tests vis-à-vis relevant international law and to determine the main limitations of the new set of binding obligations placed upon Member States to thwart the “North Korean threat”. For, in order to succeed, sanctions must be capable of coercing their targets into adjusting the particular course of behaviour that, according to the Security Council, poses a threat to international peace and security, the article concludes that the new sanctions regime is still affected by weaknesses that impair its effectiveness.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 135-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Richardson

Larry Johnson’s essay on the UN General Assembly’s Uniting for Peace resolution (UFP) is a useful general analysis of issues arising from UN Security Council Permanent Member veto-paralysis. His essay, which focuses on the text of the original Resolution, is directed at asking whether the UFP retains a current “useful purpose.” Relying on a text-centric interpretation of the presence or absence of subsequent invocations of the UFP, he concludes that no “useful purpose” remains, in part because evolved General Assembly authority has displaced the need to specifically invoke the UFP to make recommendations on certain issues of international peace and security. Johnson then asks whether, under the original UFP or subsequently, the Assembly may recommend to Member States “enforcement” uses of force, notwithstanding the prohibitions of Article 2(4) of the Charter. He finds Article 2(4) to be an absolute barrier to Assembly authority to recommend those measures, but not for “innovative and inventive non-use-of force measures.”


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