The Implications of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction for the Prohibition of the Use of Force

Author(s):  
Daniel Joyner

This chapter examines the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) between states and non-state actors and its implications for international law governing the use of force. It considers whether WMD proliferation and changes in security realities have brought a crisis in international law on the use of force and discusses the use of pre-emptive force for preventing states and non-state actors ‘of concern’ from developing and using WMD. It analyses the shift in the policy positions of the US and other relatively powerful states, from more multilateral and diplomacy-based ‘non-proliferation’ to increased emphasis on proactive and often unilateral or small-coalition-based ‘counterproliferation’. It looks at concerns that several states will be emboldened to apply the doctrine of counterproliferation-oriented pre-emption to their regional conflicts. Finally, it evaluates proposals to reform the provisions and procedures of the UN Charter system for regulating the use of force, including the law on self-defence.

2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAPHAËL VAN STEENBERGHE

AbstractThis article analyses the recent state practice in which the right of self-defence has been invoked in order to justify the use of force in response to attacks by non-state actors. The main purpose of this analysis is to determine whether the law of self-defence has evolved through this practice. It is submitted that the latter confirms the tendency, evidenced by the US operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan in 2001, towards allowing states to respond in self-defence to private armed attacks, that is, attacks which are committed by non-state actors only. The article also aims to shed some light on other fundamental conditions of the law of self-defence which played a significant role in the legal assessment of the recent state practice. It is argued in this respect that this practice confirms that any armed attack must reach some level of gravity – which may be assessed by accumulating minor uses of force – in order to trigger the right of self-defence, and that proportionality of the action taken in self-defence may be assessed in quantitative terms, but only as a means of making a prima facie judgement about the necessity of this action.


2006 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 963-972 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Wilmshurst

There are few more controversial questions in international law than the proper limits of the right of self-defence. The rules are being challenged in the light of what are seen as new threats from terrorism and from the possession of weapons of mass destruction. The UN High-level Panel, in its report to the Secretary-General of 2004, concluded that in all cases relating to decisions to use military force ‘we believe that the Charter of the United Nations, properly understood and applied, is equal to the task’.4 The Principles that follow are intended to provide a clear statement of the rules of international law ‘properly understood’ governing the use of force by states in self-defence.


Author(s):  
Byers Michael

This chapter addresses the US and NATO-led intervention in Afghanistan from 2001 to the present day. It examines the different legal justifications advanced or available for the intervention, namely self-defence, UN Security Council authorization, and intervention by invitation. It explores the complex relationships between these justifications and, particularly, the strategies adopted by states in choosing between them. The chapter concludes by considering the effects of the intervention on the customary international law of self-defence as it concerns non-state actors located in “unaware or unable” states, and anticipatory or pre-emptive responses.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 303-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen

This article analyses the legal regulation of the use of force in international law in the context of three emerging Palestinian forms of struggle against Israeli occupation: the Knife Intifada, the disturbances at the border, and the launching of incendiary kites. It discusses what legal paradigms or concepts should regulate the type and level of force used in each situation – a question that is complicated by various dilemmas – and finally, appraises the Israel Defence Forces policies tailored in response. The article evaluates the applicability of two legal paradigms regulating the use of force in military operations – (i) the conduct of hostilities and (ii) law enforcement – as well as the concept of personal self-defence in international law and the escalation of force procedure. While the Knife Intifada clearly falls under the law enforcement paradigm, the disturbances at the border and the launching of incendiary kites raise more difficult legal questions. Categorising them under a paradigm of law enforcement is less straightforward, and may have undesirable ramifications for safeguarding humanitarian interests. The article argues that the use of force in the disturbances at the border and the incendiary kites cases should be regulated by the concept of self-defence and escalation of force procedure, and that the application of the self-defence concept should be adapted, mutatis mutandis, to situations of law enforcement and to situations of hostilities.


Author(s):  
Dire Tladi

In July 2021, the author presented a Special Course for the Hague Academy of International Law Summer Courses on the Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors. The course focused on two bases for the extraterritorial use of force against non-state actors, namely self-defence and intervention by invitation. The lectures came to a conclusion that may, at first glance, appear contradictory. With respect to the use of force in self-defence, the lectures adopted a restrictive (non-permissive) approach in which the use of force is not permitted save in narrowly construed exceptions. With respect to intervention by invitation, the lectures adopted a more permissive approach in which the use of force is generally permitted and prohibited only in narrowly construed exceptions. This article serves as post-script (PS), to explain the apparent contradiction. It concludes that the main reason for this apparent contradiction is the application of the fundamental principles of international law—sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence—which are consistent with intervention by invitation but are undermined by self-defence against non-state actors.


2007 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Guilfoyle

AbstractCan the law of countermeasures be used to police the high seas? The freedom of the high seas is guaranteed by the immunity of a State's flag vessels from interference by the public vessels of other States, subject to limited exceptions. However, this rule of non-interference may shield those engaged in unregulated or illegal fishing or transporting weapons of mass destruction and their precursors. This article argues that while such conduct may breach obligations protecting the common interest, unilaterally boarding and arresting a vessel involved would constitute an illegal use of force and cannot be justified as a countermeasure.


Author(s):  
Wood Michael

This contribution summarizes the facts of the celebrated incident from 1837, in which British militia from Upper Canada crossed to the US shore of the Niagara River and set adrift a small rebel-operated vessel, The Caroline (which drifted over the Falls). The chapter cites the lengthy correspondence between US Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, and British Government’s representatives in Washington (Mr Fox and Lord Ashburton), in which Webster repeatedly used the celebrated Caroline formula (“a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation”). The case is referred to, even today, in discussions of anticipatory self-defence, the requirements of necessity and proportionality, and the use of force against non-State actors. The chapter concludes by examining differing views on the current relevance of the Caroline incident and formula.


Author(s):  
Ashley Deeks

This chapter examines one of the most contentious issues in the jus ad bellum: whether and when international law permits a state to use force unilaterally before it suffers an armed attack. More specifically, it considers whether pre-emption needs to be tamed. The discussion begins by sorting through the terminology used by states and scholars with respect to acts of self-defence in advance of an attack, with particular reference to three different terms: anticipatory self-defence, pre-emptive self-defence, and preventive self-defence. The chapter then outlines the basic positions in the historical debate about the legality of such self-defence before turning to three geopolitical and technological factors that put pressure on the doctrine of pre-attack self-defence: weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and cyber attacks. Finally, it evaluates the future of pre-emption, with emphasis on changes in the timing of a state’s right to use force in self-defence.


Author(s):  
Vaios Koutroulis

This chapter examines the approach used by arbitral tribunals and commissions of inquiry or fact-finding missions with respect to rules governing the use of force after the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, with emphasis on the right to self-defence and the conditions relating to its exercise. It assesses the legal significance of arbitral awards and fact-finding reports and considers how they have interpreted and applied jus contra bellum—the prohibition of the use of force in international relations and its exceptions. The chapter focuses on two significant arbitration precedents: the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission and an arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Finally, it discusses questions relating to the threshold for the application of jus contra bellum rules, namely Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter, and whether such rules are applicable to non-state actors.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document