The brain as the subject’s heir?
‘The brain as the subject’s heir?’ critiques the claims according to which subjectivity is to be regarded as an epiphenomenon of neuronal processes and thus one’s experience of agency and freedom of choice should be seen as an illusion. First it is shown that the subjectivity of ‘experiential facts’ cannot be reduced to objective or physical facts about brain processes. Likewise, the reduction of the intentionality of consciousness to relations of representation is refuted. Moreover, the identification of the subject with the brain leads to fundamental category mistakes which are examined as the ‘mereological fallacy’ and the ‘localization fallacy’. On this basis, a critique of the thesis of the powerlessness of the subject is developed. The summary analyses the basic ‘naturalistic fallacy’ of an objectifying account of consciousness which believes it can remove itself from its rootedness in the lifeworld.