J. L. Austin

Philosophy ◽  
2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guy Longworth

John Langshaw Austin (b. 1911–d. 1960) was White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford. He made a number of contributions in various areas of philosophy, including important work on knowledge, perception, action, freedom, truth, language, and the use of language in speech acts. Distinctions that Austin drew in his work on speech acts—in particular his distinction between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts—have assumed something like canonical status in more recent work. His work on knowledge and perception figures centrally in some recent work on these topics, especially with respect to questions about the nature of episodes of seeing and the way they can figure in enabling us to know things about our environments. His work on meaning and truth has played an important role in recent discussions of the extent to which sentence meaning can be accounted for in terms of truth-conditions. His work on action and freedom has played a role in some more recent discussions. However, Austin is often aligned with an approach to philosophical questions that focuses heavily on the way we use ordinary language. Many philosophers who are skeptical about the value of that approach are therefore skeptical about the worth of some of Austin’s work.

1806 ◽  
Vol 96 ◽  
pp. 305-326 ◽  

Dear Sir, Being perfectly convinced of your love of mathematical science, and your extensive acquirements in it, I submit to your perusal a new demonstration of the binomial theorem, when the exponent is a positive or negative fraction. As I am a strenuous advocate for smoothing the way to the acquisition of useful knowledge, i deem the following articles of some importance ; and unless I were equally sincere in this persuasion, and in that of your desire to promote mathemati­cal studies, in requesting the perusal, I should accuse myself of an attempt to trifle with your valuable time. The following demonstration is new only to the extent above mentioned ; but in order that the reader may perceive the proof to be complete, a successive perusal of all the articles is necessary. As far as it relates to the raising of in­tegral powers, it is in substance the same with one which I drew up in the year 1794, and which was honoured with a place in the Philosophical Transactions for 1795. If, therefore, you think the following demonstration worthy the attention of mathematicians, you will much oblige me by presenting it to the Royal Society.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefania M. Maci

Purpose This study aims to examine the way in which elderly people, men and women, with a terminal illness use language to construct a narrative about their “living-with-dying” experience. Design/methodology/approach This investigation is a secondary analysis based on a corpus of health and illness narratives collected by the Health Experiences Research Group at the University of Oxford and published by the DIPEx charity (available at: http://healthtalk.org/home). Findings This study shows that there are qualitative differences in the way in which not only elderly people but also men and women report their experience with terminal illness and their relation to death. Originality/value Understanding the different perspectives from which elderly people narrate their experiences of how they live while dying from terminal illness can help health professionals to develop more effective all-inclusive health policies and practices in end-of-life care.


The book provides a detailed and practical description of how companies can put purpose into practice in their organizations. Based on a ground-breaking research project on the Economics of Mutuality undertaken jointly by the Saïd Business School at the University of Oxford and Mars Catalyst, the think tank of Mars Inc., the food and beverages company, over a period of five years, the book describes how purpose promotes business growth and performance. In particular, it gives a highly accessible and readable account of how companies can determine and implement their corporate purposes, and how, by so doing, they address critical issues in their ecosystems, such as rising inequality and environmental degradation, while delivering superior performance and resilience. The book will equip executives, managers, investors, policymakers, academics, and students with tools to understand the way in which companies can build purpose-centric businesses, map and orchestrate stakeholder ecosystems, identify untapped resources, create unconventional partnerships, measure and manage performance beyond financial reporting, and adopt a new definition of profit to promote corporate purposes. The book includes fourteen case studies of companies of varying sizes, sectors, and geographies that sought to put purpose into practice. They provide deep insights into the way in which companies have delivered corporate purpose and the challenges they faced in doing this. The book stresses both the opportunity and obligation on business to reposition itself to address the changing needs of society and the planet in the twenty-first century.


2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Vargas

AbstractI consider some themes and issues arising in recent work on moral responsibility, focusing on three recent books—Carlos Moya's Moral Responsibility, Al Mele's Free Will and Luck, and John Martin Fischer's My Way. I argue that these texts collectively suggest some difficulties with the way in which many issues are currently framed in the free will debates, including disputes about what constitutes compatibilism and incompatibilism and the relevance of intuitions and ordinary language for describing the metaphysics of free will and moral responsibility. I also argue that each of the accounts raise more particular puzzles: it is unclear to what extent Moya's account is properly an account of free will; Mele's account raises questions about the significance of luck for compatibilist theories; and Fischer's account of the value of responsibility as self-expression raises questions about the normative significance of moral responsibility.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-190
Author(s):  
Joseph S. O’Leary

Abstract In this article, Joseph S. O’Leary recounts the origin and inspirations behind the 1979 Colloquium Heidegger et la Question de Dieu, and reflects on why it became such a key moment in the development of many of those who took part in it. In addition to the contingent factors of a particular time and place, and the deep personal and intellectual significance that Heidegger bore for many of them, O’Leary identifies the perennial philosophical questions which the participants were able to address in original and controversial ways. O’Leary also reflects on the way this Colloquium served as a subsequent influence on his own original work as well as the critical dialogue he engaged in with many of the other participants, culminating in his most recent work on interreligious dialogue which further amplifies the central problematics here concerning the nature of the quest for truth.


Author(s):  
Lindsay Judson

John Lloyd Ackrill (1921–2007), a Fellow of the British Academy, had a powerful and far-reaching influence on the way ancient philosophy is done in the English-speaking world and beyond. In his first article, he interpreted Plato's claim at Sophist 259e, in the process confronting what would have been at the time the authoritative interpretation, that of W. D. Ross. Ackrill was born in Reading to Frederick William Ackrill and Jessie Anne Ackrill. He was educated at Reading School and at St John's College in the University of Oxford; his philosophy tutors at St John's were Paul Grice and John Mabbott. Ackrill's first book was Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione. He also published a pair of seminal articles on Plato's Sophist. Perhaps the most important aspect of Ackrill's enduring influence was his editorship of the Clarendon Aristotle Series.


Author(s):  
Paul F. Snowdon

Strawson taught at the University of Oxford from 1947, becoming Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy in 1968, and retiring in 1987. A sequence of influential books and articles established him as one of the leading philosophers in Oxford during that period. He had a crucial role in the transition there from the dominance of Austin and linguistic philosophy in the 1950s to the more liberal and metaphysical approaches in the 1960s and later. The principal topics about which he has written are the philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology and the history of philosophy. Strawson became famous with ‘On Referring’ (1950), in which he criticized Russell for misconstruing our ordinary use of definite descriptions. Strawson endorses the slogan ‘ordinary language has no exact logic’, a viewpoint which is explored in Introduction to Logical Theory (1952). He argues that the utility of formal logic in its application to ordinary speech does not imply that the meaning of ordinary language is captured by the semantics of standard formal systems. In Individuals (1959), Strawson’s most discussed work, his task is descriptive metaphysics. He attempts to describe the referentially basic subject matter of our thought. They are relatively enduring, perceptible and reidentifiable bodies. The other element in the basic framework is what Strawson calls persons, enduring entities with both material and psychological features. In The Bounds of Sense (1966), Strawson continued the development of his metaphysical and epistemological ideas, by combining a critical study of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, with the defence of some transcendental claims similar to Kant’s. To think of oneself as an enduring subject of experience requires that one recognize objects which are independent of oneself. So the major epistemological problem in the empiricist tradition, of building up to the external world from private experiences, cannot arise. Skepticism and Naturalism; Some Varieties (1985a) studies the conflicts between fundamental opinions which are natural to us, such as that we know things, and philosophical viewpoints claiming that these opinions are mistaken. Strawson argues that scepticism about these natural views can and should be resisted. Throughout his career, Strawson has tried to describe the basic content of our thoughts and experiences, to counter scepticism about or revisions of such thoughts, to illuminate them by making analytical connections between their basic elements, as well as investigating language, our vehicle for expressing these thoughts. He has linked his explorations to the insights of philosophers of the past, while engaging in critical debate with the period’s other leading philosophers, such as Austin, Quine, Davidson and Dummett.


2020 ◽  
pp. 81-83
Author(s):  
Vitaly Ogleznev

I will try to focus in my talk on the history and significance of the so-calledSaturday Morning Meetings—a scien-tific seminar that John Langshaw Austin (President of the Aristotelian society 1956-1957) organized in 1947 at the University of Oxford—forthe development of Oxford philosophy. The ideas that were discussed at these informal meetings were subsequently seriously developed within the philosophy literature, and many participants of the seminar became world-famous philosophers. The success of the Saturday Morning Meetings can be explained by the fact that it was not a formalized University institution, but a community of like-minded people who believed that only through joint discussion philosophical problems could be clarified.


2018 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 498-516
Author(s):  
Neil O'Sullivan

Of the hundreds of Greek common nouns and adjectives preserved in our MSS of Cicero, about three dozen are found written in the Latin alphabet as well as in the Greek. So we find, alongside συμπάθεια, also sympathia, and ἱστορικός as well as historicus. This sort of variation has been termed alphabet-switching; it has received little attention in connection with Cicero, even though it is relevant to subjects of current interest such as his bilingualism and the role of code-switching and loanwords in his works. Rather than addressing these issues directly, this discussion sets out information about the way in which the words are written in our surviving MSS of Cicero and takes further some recent work on the presentation of Greek words in Latin texts. It argues that, for the most part, coherent patterns and explanations can be found in the alphabetic choices exhibited by them, or at least by the earliest of them when there is conflict in the paradosis, and that this coherence is evidence for a generally reliable transmission of Cicero's original choices. While a lack of coherence might indicate unreliable transmission, or even an indifference on Cicero's part, a consistent pattern can only really be explained as an accurate record of coherent alphabet choice made by Cicero when writing Greek words.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document