Emmanuel Levinas

Philosophy ◽  
2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel Malenfant

Emmanuel Levinas (b. 1906–d. 1995) was a philosopher famous for having developed an original interpretation of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological method, using the latter to address the foundations of ethics and normativity. Published in more than twenty-five books spanning over eighty years, his oeuvre can be divided into three categories: (1) his philosophical works, which regroup monographs, essays, and interviews, (2) his Talmudic readings and essays on Judaism, and (3) posthumous notes, remarks, and texts, some of which are still being published. Although references will be made to the second and third categories, the first remains the central focus of this article. Apart from the influence of Husserl, Levinas was also inspired by Martin Heidegger as well as by Maurice Blanchot and Jacques Derrida. Of Heidegger, he wrote an uncompromising philosophical critique that addressed the secondary role played by ethics in his phenomenology—a critique he then expanded to the Western philosophical tradition as a whole. Ethics, Levinas argued, had to be reinterpreted and understood as “first philosophy” (i.e., as metaphysics), rather than as a derivative extension based on premises coming from ontological, epistemological, or political narratives. Not unlike Plato centuries before, although in a different manner and with very different implications, Levinas contended that the question of the Good has priority over that of Being, since interhuman relationality precedes any discourse or logos about beings—human or otherwise. His “ethics” is thus not that of the tradition: its aim is not to become prescriptive. Without denying the importance of the following properties or faculties for practical decision making, Levinas’s ethics relies neither on virtues, reason, nor utility. The word “ethics,” for Levinas, refers to the fact that “I” cannot refuse responsibility for the other, since that act of disregarding or refusing responsibility is possible only on the basis of my being always already capable of responding to an other who imposes responsibility on me. It is this ability for responding to the other, this command that I cannot efface (even when I ignore it) that allows for other discourses—such as ontology, epistemology, or political philosophy—to make sense at all. The consequences of this original interpretation of the nature and meaning of ethics are deep and manifold. Therefore, this article does not intend to present an all-encompassing portrait of Emmanuel Levinas’s thought. Rather, its aim is to provide the reader with a selection of texts that represent the wide array of philosophical questions addressed by Levinas and his commentators. Given the immense number of publications by Levinas, this entry proposes a commented list of selected major works and articles by the author (instead of referencing complete collections, for instance). The secondary literature is then organized by themes that correspond to areas of research—both well established and new—within Levinas studies.

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franco Masciandaro

The principal aim of this study is to participate in the current renewed discourse on the meaning of friendship, initiated in 1994 by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida with his Politics of Friendship, by combining the philosophical method of inquiry with the hermeneutical approach to poetic representations of friendship in the Iliad, the Divine Comedy, and the Decameron. It examines friendship not only as the unique love between two persons based on familiarity and proximity, but as the love for the one who is far away, the stranger, for this is a natural extension of the implicit love of the distant other, of the other-as-stranger – what Emmanuel Levinas has called "the infinity of the Other" – which is concealed in our friend, and which, in the words of Maurice Blanchot, puts us "authentically in relation" with him or her.


Problemos ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 84 ◽  
pp. 46-59
Author(s):  
Rita Šerpytytė

Straipsnio tikslas yra atskleisti Vakarų filosofijos tradicijoje savitai įsitvirtinusios patyrimo struktūros, įvardijamos pakartojimu, nihilistinę prasmę. Šioje hermeneutinėje analizėje, viena vertus, re­miamasi tam tikra nihilizmo samprata, numatančia du nihilizmo teorinius modelius – nihilizmą, parem­tą Überwindung teorija, ir nihilizmą, paremtą différance idėja. Kita vertus, remiamasi tam tikru („onto-teologiniu“) pretekstu Vakarų mąstymo tradicijoje atpažįstant pakartojimo struktūrą – Pauliaus Laiško efeziečiams Ef. I, 10 teksto fragmentu, laikomu paradigmine pakartojimo struktūros išsklaida. Herme­neutinė analizė projektuojama į Kierkegaardo ir Agambeno filosofiją, atskirus jų mąstyme atpažįstamus pakartojimo invariantus atskleidžiant kaip minėto Pauliaus Laiško fragmento eksplozijos atvejus. Ke­liamas klausimas, kas yra pakartojimas, kur slypi jo negatyvumas ir kaip pasirodo jo nihilistinė prasmė? Kaip šioje negatyvumo ir nihilizmo atskleistyje „tarpininkauja“ différance? Straipsnyje parodoma, jog skirtis kaip neigimo judesys, atstovaujantis nihilistinei logikai, gali būti traktuojamas ir vien formaliai, ir realiai. Skirties kaip realaus neigimo traktavimas Kierkegaardo ir Agambeno mąstyme atitinka pačios patirties struktūros – pakartojimo – ontologinį (tikrovišką) įšaknytumą.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: pakartojimas, nihilizmas, différance, negatyvumas, laikasPakartojimas ir nihilizmasRita Šerpytytė   AbstractThe purpose of this article is to reveal the nihilistic sense of an experiential structure, which has been distinctively rooted in Western philosophical tradition. On the one hand, this hermeneutical analysis will be based on a certain conception of nihilism presupposing two theoretical models of nihilism – nihilism, which refers to the theory of Überwindung, and nihilism associated with the idea of différance. On the other hand, it builds upon a certain (the so-called “onto-theological”) pretext, which might be used for recognition of the structure of repetition in Western tradition of thinking, – i.e. the fragment of a text from St. Paul’s Letter to the Ephesians Eph. I, 10 – the paradigmatic passage proposing this universal structure of repetition. Focused both on philosophy of Kierkegaard and Agamben, hermeneutical analysis will aim to disclose the separate invariants of such repetition as cases of explosion of the mentioned text fragment. The question is raised – what is repetition? Where does its negativity lie? How does its nihilistic sense appear? How does the différance mediate in this process of revealing of negativity and nihilism? The article argues that difference, as a motion of negation representing nihilistic logic, can be treated both in merely formal and in a realistic way. The treating of différance as real denying in Kierkegaard’s and Agamben’s thinking corresponds to the ontological rootedness of the very structure of experience – repetition.Keywords: repetition, nihilism, différance, negativity, time


2008 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-83
Author(s):  
Scott DeShong ◽  

This essay treats the field of philosophy and the study of disability such that each may be conceived of in terms of the other, perhaps to the extent that they may be thought of as one. First, it examines the bases and methods of various documents in the study of disability, finding that such study may be conceived of as essentially philosophical, even as the philosophical nature of disability studies threatens such studies’ practice. Then philosophy is depicted as that discourse which necessarily interrogates its bases and methods -that is, as discourse that engages its own ability. The two fields are presented as exemplary of the interrogation of ability, particularly of discursive ability. The essay’s primary influence is Emmanuel Levinas, mainly for the emphasis he places on the nature of language in his approach to philosophical critique. Developing the notion of im/possibility -the simultaneous emergence of a discourse’s conditions of possibility with those of its impossibility -the essay focuses on “dis/ability” as the central notion in the convergence of philosophy and disability studies.


Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emilie Kutash

There is an analogy between two types of liminality: the geographic or cultural ‘outside’ space of the Marrano Jew, alienated from his/her original religion and the one he or she has been forced to adopt, and, a philosophical position that is outside of both Athens and Jerusalem. Derrida finds and re-finds ‘h’ors- texte’, an ‘internal desert’, a ‘secret’ outside place: alien to both the western philosophical tradition and the Hebraic archive. In this liminal space he questions the otherness of the French language to which he was acculturated, and, in a turn to a less discursive modality, autobiography, finds, in the words of Helene Cixous, “the Jew-who-doesn’t know-that-he-is”. Derrida’s galut (exile) is neither Hebrew nor Greek. It is a private place outside of all discourse, which he claims, is inevitably ethnocentric. In inhabiting this outside space, he exercises the prerogative of a Marrano, equipped to critique the French language of his acculturation and the western philosophy of the scholars. French and Hebrew are irreconcilable binaries, western philosophy and his Hebrew legacy is as well. These issues will be discussed in this paper with reference to Monolingualism of the Other and Archive Fever as they augment some of his earlier work, Writing and Difference and Speech and Phenomena.


2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-97
Author(s):  
Hugues Dusausoit

A constructive dialogue between Henry’s phenomenology and Rorty’s pragmatism does not seem very likely: each would probably consider that the other has not been faithful to his claim of breaking with philosophical tradition and thus ultimately reproduces its limits. Nevertheless, one can also note that Henry and Rorty are not at the same level of analysis: while Henry focuses on giving coherent grounds for any philosophical critique of representation, Rorty is occupied with the consequences of such critique on philosophy itself. If one considers this difference, there emerge new results: Henry’s phenomenology is fundamental for the recognition of what Rorty calls the “human being’s sense of self-identity”, while it falls to Rorty’s pragmatism to ensure that, as hoped by Henry, there is “a mode of philosophy that does not harm essence”.  


2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (91) ◽  
pp. 245
Author(s):  
Marcelo Fabri

O objetivo deste artigo é enfocar o tema da linguagem em Emmanuel Levinas, tal como aparece na relação com a tarefa de desmistificação, descrita por este filósofo como expressão e palavra. A palavra é uma possibilidade de vencer a anarquia dos fatos e o anonimato de um mundo marcado pela ausência de sentido. Em nossa perspectiva, Levinas entende que o primado do saber, presente na tradição filosófica ocidental, não está imune a um tipo de petrificação e aprisionamento bem próximos daqueles que fazem parte do mundo mítico. Assim, quando fala numa desmistificação da linguagem, Levinas pretende questionar tanto o valor incondicional de uma suposta unidade da razão como os perigos de um mundo que se caracteriza pelo abalo desta mesma unidade. O significado do pensamento de Levinas encontra-se, assim, não numa recusa da razão, mas na intenção de preservá-la de uma mistificação e, conseqüentemente, de libertá-la do fechamento ontológico a partir da referência ao sentido, que é irredutível a esta prisão.Abstract: This paper aims to emphasize the theme of language in Levinas in its relation to the endeavor of demystification, that is, as a process which Levinas describes as “expression and word”. The word is a possibility of overcoming the anarchy of facts as well as the anonymity of a world without sense. In our perspective, Levinas thinks that the preeminence of Knowledge, as it has been present in the western philosophical tradition, is not free from that kind of petrifaction and imprisonment which characterized the mythical world. Thus, when he refers to a demystification of language, Levinas intends to question the unconditional value of a supposed unity of reason and, at the same time, the danger of a world marked by the challenge of this unity itself. 


1975 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 395-407
Author(s):  
S. Henriksen

The first question to be answered, in seeking coordinate systems for geodynamics, is: what is geodynamics? The answer is, of course, that geodynamics is that part of geophysics which is concerned with movements of the Earth, as opposed to geostatics which is the physics of the stationary Earth. But as far as we know, there is no stationary Earth – epur sic monere. So geodynamics is actually coextensive with geophysics, and coordinate systems suitable for the one should be suitable for the other. At the present time, there are not many coordinate systems, if any, that can be identified with a static Earth. Certainly the only coordinate of aeronomic (atmospheric) interest is the height, and this is usually either as geodynamic height or as pressure. In oceanology, the most important coordinate is depth, and this, like heights in the atmosphere, is expressed as metric depth from mean sea level, as geodynamic depth, or as pressure. Only for the earth do we find “static” systems in use, ana even here there is real question as to whether the systems are dynamic or static. So it would seem that our answer to the question, of what kind, of coordinate systems are we seeking, must be that we are looking for the same systems as are used in geophysics, and these systems are dynamic in nature already – that is, their definition involvestime.


Author(s):  
Zimmatul Liviana

The research grammatical interference in a collection ofshort stories Biarkan Aku Memula iwork Nurul F. Hudaisa collection ofshort storiesset in the back that Is start work Let Nurul F. Huda contains many grammatical interference.The problem of this   study were(1)how   the various morphologi calinterference containedin   a   collection of short stories Biarkan Aku Memulai work Nurul F. Huda. (2)how the various syntactic interference contained in a collection of short stories Biarkan Aku Memulai work Nurul F. Huda. The purposeof this studyis to describe the morphological and         Syntactic interference contained in a collection of short stories Biarkan Aku Memulai work Nurul F. Huda. Sociolinguistics is the study of language variation and use in society. Interference is the event of the use of language elements of one into the other language elements that occur in the speakers themselves. This research uses descriptive qualitative method because to describe the actual realityin order to obtainan accurateand objective. Qualitative descriptive methods were used to analyzethe elements ofa word orphrase that incorporated elements of other languages with the analysis and description of the formulation of the problem is the answer. Data collection techniques using observation techniques, the determination ofthe object of research, the selection of short stories.Based on the analysis of the data in this study can be found that there are six forms of interference morphology, namely (1) the prefix nasal N-sound, (2) the addition of the suffix, (3) the exchange prefix, (4) exchange suffixes, (5) exchange konfiks, (6) removal affixes. While the syntactic interference only on the words and phrases in a sentence. The results of the study it can be concluded that the interference morphology more common than syntactic interference.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Carlos Alvaréz Teijeiro

Emmanuel Lévinas, the philosopher of ethics par excellence in the twentieth century, and by own merit one of the most important ethical philosophers in the history of western philosophy, is also the philosopher of the Other. Thereby, it can be said that no thought has deepened like his in the ups and downs of the ethical relationship between subject and otherness. The general objective of this work is to expose in a simple and understandable way some ideas that tend to be quite dark in the philosophical work of the author, since his profuse religious production will not be analyzed here. It is expected to show that his ideas about the being and the Other are relevant to better understand interpersonal relationships in times of 4.0 (re)evolution. As specific objectives, this work aims to expose in chronological order the main works of the thinker, with special emphasis on his ethical implications: Of the evasion (1935), The time and the Other (1947), From the existence to the existent (1947), Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority (1961) and, last, Otherwise than being, or beyond essence (1974). In the judgment of Lévinas, history of western philosophy starting with Greece, has shown an unusual concern for the Being, this is, it has basically been an ontology and, accordingly, it has relegated ethics to a second or third plane. On the other hand and in a clear going against the tide movement, our author supports that ethics should be considered the first philosophy and more, even previous to the proper philosophize. This novel approach implies, as it is supposed, that the essential question of the philosophy slows down its origin around the Being in order to inquire about the Other: it is a philosophy in first person. Such a radical change of perspective generates an underlying change in how we conceive interpersonal relationships, the complex framework of meanings around the relationship Me and You, which also philosopher Martin Buber had already spoken of. As Lévinas postulates that ethics is the first philosophy, this involves that the Other claims all our attention, intellectual and emotional, to the point of considering that the relationship with the Other is one of the measures of our identity. Thus, “natural” attitude –husserlian word not used by Lévinas- would be to be in permanent disposition regarding to the meeting with the Other, to be in permanent opening state to let ourselves be questioned by him. Ontology, as the author says, being worried about the Being, has been likewise concerned about the Existence, when the matter is to concern about the particular Existent that every otherness supposes for us. In conclusion it can be affirmed that levinasian ethics of the meeting with the Other, particular Face, irreducible to the assumption, can contribute with an innovative looking to (re)evolving the interpersonal relationships in a 4.0 context.


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