Birthing the Liberal International Order

2020 ◽  
pp. 164-207
Author(s):  
Kyle M. Lascurettes

Chapter 7 (“Birthing the Liberal International Order”) focuses on the American order project after the Second World War. It argues that there were actually two distinct American visions for order in the 1940s, a universalist global order vision—manifested in the United Nations system—and a smaller Western order vision—comprised of the Bretton Woods economic and NATO security systems. Observers often posit that these layers were complementary, representing an evolving but not contradictory strategy by the United States to build an inclusive and multilayered international order. By contrast, this chapter argues that this transition from global to Western order can be best explained by American leaders’ shifting threat perceptions during this critical period. While they began with a more inclusive global order vision, they soon shifted to a more exclusive and adversarial Western order idea as they became increasingly wary of the extraordinary threat posed by their former wartime ally, the Soviet Union. The Soviet threat is the most important causal force in explaining this shift in America’s ordering strategy, and the story of the liberal international order’s origins simply cannot be told without it.

Author(s):  
Robert J. McMahon

‘The Second World War and the destruction of the old order’ focuses on the Second World War, the most destructive conflict in human history. The death and destruction precipitated by the war left not only much of Europe and Asia in ruins but the old international order as well. The origins of the Cold War lay in the intersection between a war-shattered world and the conflicting recipes for international order that the United States and the Soviet Union sought to impose on that world. The Soviets and Americans each saw themselves acting out of noble motives—acting to usher humanity into a new age of peace, justice, and order.


2018 ◽  
pp. 52-62
Author(s):  
Oksana Salata

The second world and its constituent German-Soviet wars became the key events of the 20th century. Currently, the study of domestic and foreign historiography in the context of the disclosure of the information policy of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, the information confrontation of the Nazi and Soviet systems of information and psychological infl uence on the enemy population is relevant. Thanks to the work of domestic and foreign scholars, the attraction of new archival materials and documents, the world saw scientifi c works devoted to various aspects of the propaganda activities of Nazi Germany, including in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. Among them are the works of Ukrainian historians: A. Podolsky, Y. Nikolaytsya, P. Rekotov, O. Lysenko, V. Shaikan, M. Mikhailyuk, V. Grinevich; Russian historians M. I. Semiaryagi, E. Makarevich, V. I. Tsymbal and G. F. Voronenkova. An analysis of scientifi c literature published in Germany, England and the United States showed that the eff ectiveness and negative eff ects of German information policy are revealed in the works of German historians and publicists O. Hadamovsky, N. Muller, P. Longerich, R. Coel, et al. Along with the works devoted to armed confrontation, one can single out a study in which the authors try to show the information technologies and methods of psychological action that were used by the governments of both countries to infl uence the consciousness and the moral and psychological state of their own population and the enemy’s population, on the results of the Second World War. Most active in the study of Nazi propaganda and information policy of the Third Reich, in general, were the German historians, in particular E. Hadamovskie , G. Fjorsterch and G. Schnitter, and others. The value of their work is to highlight the process of the creation in 1933–1945 of the National Socialist Party in Germany of an unprecedented system of mass manipulation in the world’s history, fully controlled by the Nazi leadership of the information space. Thus, an analysis of the works of domestic and foreign scholars shows that the information confrontation between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union was extremely powerful, since both warring parties possessed the most up-to-date information and ideological weapon. Unfortunately, today there is no comprehensive study of this problem that could reveal all aspects of the information confrontation in the modern information world.


2017 ◽  
Vol 223 (1) ◽  
pp. 399-422
Author(s):  
M. Shaheen Siham Abdel Razzaq

The events that took place in Iran during the second world war are considered an important item for Iraqi diplomacy and follow-up by the Foreign Ministry in Iraq. On the other hand, this Iraqi diplomacy was considered to be quite flexible when a reshuffle occurred. It was looking for its causes and  linking them, and then adopting accurate scenarios to protect its interests. Iraq was not far from what was happening in Iran .When Mohammad Reza Pahlavi took power in Iran, The oil conflict has also existed. In addition to Iran's strategic position, making US intervention clear. Which prompted Iran to build an intimate relationship with the United States and strengthen its relations in all respects, especially when Ahmed assigned the strength of the Sultanate to form the ministry on the ninth of August 1924 and consider America a third force used by Ahmed Qawam as a bargaining chip to confront the British and Soviet Union in the region. After the issue of oil emerged on the political scene and at that time, the Iranian government took a deep breath in the embrace of the United States. In fact, Reza Shah Pahlawi inherited a backward country, especially in the economic field. He tried to reform the country's economic recession and make Iran to acquire a new stage, and the result of foreign demand for Iranian oil led to widespread reactions at the internal level and became pro-Western groups to reject the Soviet demand and solidarity with the independent. While the Iranian Communist Party (Toda Party) supported the request and held demonstrations for the immediate admission of the Soviet Union


2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-95
Author(s):  
Michael O. Slobodchikoff

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was reduced from the role of a global hegemon to that of a regional hegemon. As the regional hegemon, Russia was responsible for creating a regional order that was nested within the global order. However, since the Soviet Union had collapsed, it could not be assumed that Russia would create a regional order that was compatible with the global order. Would Russia create a regional order that was incompatible with the global order, and further, would Russia be a dissatisfied state that would challenge US hegemony? Using network analysis, I discover that Russia created a regional order that was compatible with the global order. In other words, Russia did not directly challenge the global order. More specifically, Russia accepted the global order that existed at the end of the Cold War. Providing that the global order remained static, Russia would not challenge that order. However, US actions following the collapse of the Soviet Union such as the expansion ofnatoand the withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty are interpreted by Russia as a dynamic change in the global order. The Ukrainian crisis further exacerbated the wedge that had developed between the United States and Russia. It has further isolated Russia, destroyed the regional order nested within the global order, and ensured that Russia fully became a dissatisfied state looking to challenge US hegemony. Russia will now turn to China to try to challenge US hegemony.


2019 ◽  
pp. 96-121
Author(s):  
Vince Houghton

The fourth chapter discusses the American intelligence shift in focus from the German atomic bomb program to the atomic research effort of the Soviet Union. Alsos scientists were eventually convinced that the German atomic bomb program was far behind that of the United States, and would not be a factor in the Second World War. However, Alsos was kept in Europe to ensure that the Soviet Union did not gain access to German atomic resources. This meant capturing German scientists, occupying German research facilities and laboratories, and capturing German raw materials and industrial centers. In some cases, when it became apparent that Allied forces would not be able to reach certain areas before Soviet forces arrived, Groves utilized the conventional forces of the U.S. Army and the covert forces of the OSS to destroy the resource to ensure it could not be of benefit to the Soviets.


Arthur Szyk ◽  
2004 ◽  
pp. 217-232
Author(s):  
Joseph P. Ansell

This chapter encompasses Arthur Szyk's final years. It shows his continued dedication to freedom struggles around the world even as it contemplates on the dwindling number of exhibitions he held during this period. During this time, the United States was also turning inward after the Second World War. This attitude was one which Szyk did not share and which his work, with its liberal and international themes, did not support. Moreover, the chapter reveals his growing sympathy towards the Soviet Union, which was so evident in the political cartoons and related works from the years of alliance during the Second World War. It also shows that, by the early years of the Cold War, his health was somewhat precarious, forcing him to choose his activities carefully.


Author(s):  
David Abulafia

The Allied victory over Germany in the Second World War, like that in the First, left the Mediterranean unsettled. After Greece emerged from its civil war with a pro-western government, there were ever louder rumbles in Cyprus, where the movement calling for enôsis, union with Greece, was gathering pace again. Precisely because the Greeks sided with the West, and because Turkey had kept out of the war, during the late 1940s the United States began to see the Mediterranean as an advance position in the new struggle against the expanding power of the Soviet Union. The explicit theme was the defence of democracy against Communist tyranny. Stalin’s realism had prevented him from supporting Communist insurgency in Greece, but he was keen to find ways of gaining free access to the Mediterranean through the Dardanelles. In London and Washington, the fear that Soviet allies would establish themselves on the shores of the Mediterranean remained real, since the partisan leader in Yugoslavia, Tito, had played the right cards during the last stages of the war, even winning support from the British. Moreover, the Italians had lost Zadar along with the naval base at Kotor and chunks of Dalmatia they had greedily acquired during the war, while Albania, after an agonizing period of first Italian and then German occupation, had recovered its independence under the Paris-educated Communist leader Enver Hoxha, whose uncompromising stance was to bring his country into ever-greater isolation. When he took power, Hoxha imagined that his country would form part of a brotherly band of socialist nations, alongside Tito’s renascent Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Close ties with the Yugoslavs were sealed by economic pacts which reveal Tito’s hope of drawing Albania into the Yugoslav federation. Hoxha had other aspirations, and in his view Albania’s right to defend every square inch of the national territory extended into the waters off the Albanian coast: the Corfu Channel, long used as a waterway linking Greece to the Adriatic, was mined to prevent foreign incursions. Britain decided to send warships through the channel, asserting its right to police the Mediterranean on behalf of the nations of the world.


Author(s):  
Kal Raustiala

The single most important feature of American history after 1945 was the United States’s assumption of hegemonic leadership. Europeans had noted America’s enormous potential since at least the nineteenth century. After the Civil War the United States had one of the largest economies in the world, but, as noted earlier in this book, in geopolitical terms it remained a surprisingly minor player. By 1900 the United States was playing a more significant political role. But it was only after 1945 that the nation’s potential on the world stage was fully realized. Victory in the Second World War left the United States in an enviable position. Unlike the Soviet Union, which endured devastating fighting on its territory and lost tens of millions of citizens, the United States had experienced only one major attack on its soil. Thanks to its actions in the war America had great influence in Europe. And the national economy emerged surprisingly vibrant from the years of conflagration, easily dominant over any conceivable rival or set of rivals. When the First World War ended the United States ultimately chose to return to its hemispheric perch. It declined to join the new League of Nations, and rather than maintaining engagement with the great powers of the day, America generally turned inward. The years following the Second World War were quite different. In addition to championing—and hosting—the new United Nations, the United States quickly established a panoply of important institutions aimed at maintaining and organizing international cooperation in both economic and security affairs. Rising tensions with the Soviet Union, apparent to many shortly after the war’s end, led the United States to remain militarily active in both Europe and Asia. The intensifying Cold War cemented this unprecedented approach to world politics. The prolonged occupations of Germany and Japan were straightforward examples of this newly active global role. In both cases the United States refashioned a conquered enemy into a democratic, free-market ally—a significant feat. The United States did not, however, seek a formal empire in the wake of its victory.


Author(s):  
Michael J. Seth

As the Second World War came to an end, most Koreans hoped that their nation would be an independent and prosperous state. ‘From colony to competing states’ shows that, instead, events took an unexpected turn. Korea became both free of Japanese colonial rule and simultaneously partitioned into two occupation zones by the United States and the Soviet Union. From these zones, two separate states were created: the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; two societies with different leaderships, political systems, and geopolitical orientations. When North Korea attempted to reunify the country in 1950, foreign powers again intervened resulting in the Korean War, a costly conflict that left the peninsula still divided.


2006 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 635-644
Author(s):  
MARTIN H. FOLLY

The Second World War continues to be an attractive subject for scholars and even more so for those writing for a general readership. One of the more traditional areas of focus has been the ‘Big Three’ – the alliance of the United States with Britain and the Soviet Union. Public interest in the three leaders – Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin – remains high, and their decisions continue to resonate in the post-Cold War era, as demonstrated by continued (and often ahistorical) references to the decisions made at the Yalta Conference. Consequently, while other aspects of Second World War historiography have pushed into new avenues of exploration, that which has looked at the Grand Alliance has followed fairly conventional lines – the new Soviet bloc materials have been trawled to answer old questions and using the frames of reference that developed during the Cold War. This has left much to be said about the nature of the relationship of the United States with its great allies and the dynamics and processes of that alliance, and overlooked full and rounded analysis of the role of that alliance as the instrument of Axis defeat.


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