Nietzsche

Author(s):  
G. A. Cohen

This chapter examines Friedrich Nietzsche's moral philosophy, first by explaining what makes him different from most of the other moral philosophers such as David Hume, Thomas Hobbes, the Greeks, and Baruch Spinoza. It then considers Nietzsche's notion of good and evil by addressing three questions: How do we find out what sort of creatures men are? How do we decide what sort of creature man ought to be? Is it possible for man to transform himself into that sort of creature. It also discusses the problem faced by Nietzsche in his attempts to assess human nature, namely: what is to count as health in the spiritual dimension, when is a soul diseased, what is mens sana. Finally, it analyzes the main arguments put forward by Nietzsche in his two books Beyond Good and Evil and The Genealogy of Morals.

Utilitas ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. L. Van Holthoon

Why did Hume drop sympathy as a key concept of his moral philosophy, and why—on the other hand—did Smith make it into the ‘didactic principle’ of his Theory of Moral Sentiments? These questions confront us with the basic issue of ethical theory concerning human nature. My point in dealing with these questions is to show what views of human nature their respective choices involved. And my procedure will be to take a close look at the revisions they made to their ethical theories to bring out the contrasting aspects of their views of human nature.


Author(s):  
Jacqueline Taylor

In Leviathan (1651), Thomas Hobbes argued that since good and evil are naturally relative to each individual’s private appetites, and man’s nature is predominantly selfish, then morality must be grounded in human conventions. His views provoked strong reactions among British moral philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Moral sense theories comprise one set of responses. A moral sense theory gives a central role to the affections and sentiments in moral perception, in the appraisal of conduct and character, and in deliberation and motivation. Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson argued that we have a unique faculty of moral perception, the moral sense. David Hume and Adam Smith held that we cultivate a moral sensibility when we appropriately regulate our sympathy by an experience-informed reason and reflection.


Author(s):  
Nathan Widder

This chapter examines Friedrich Nietzsche's political philosophy, first by focusing on his claim that the ‘death of God’ inaugurates modern nihilism. It then explains Nietzsche's significance for political theory by situating him, on the one hand, against the Platonist and Christian traditions that dominate political philosophy and, on the other hand, with contemporary attempts to develop a new political theory of difference. The chapter also considers Nietzsche's genealogical method and proceeds by analysing the three essays of On the Genealogy of Morals, along with his views on good and bad, good and evil, slave morality, the ascetic ideal, and the nihilism of modern secularism. Finally, it reviews contemporary interpretations of Nietzsche's relation and relevance to political theory and how his philosophy has inspired a broader set of trends that has come to be known as ‘the ontological turn in political theory’.


Author(s):  
T.M. Scanlon

Questions of justification arise in moral philosophy in at least three ways. The first concerns the way in which particular moral claims, such as claims about right and wrong, can be shown to be correct. Virtually every moral theory offers its own account of moral justification in this sense, and these accounts naturally differ from each other. A second question is about the justification of morality as a whole – about how to answer the question, ‘Why be moral?’ Philosophers have disagreed about this, and about whether an answer is even possible. Finally, some philosophers have claimed that justification of our actions to others is a central aim of moral thinking. They maintain that this aim provides answers to the other two questions of justification by explaining the reasons we have to be moral and the particular form that justification takes within moral argument.


2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-83
Author(s):  
Derek Reiners

AbstractThis article argues that underlying Thomas Hobbes' prescription for concentrated power is system of ethics based on his understanding of human nature and the biological processes that govern natural human function. His thesis in Leviathan is not so much an argument for how rulers should rule as much as it is an argument for why individuals should allow themselves to be ruled in a specific manner. The justification for accepting rule comes from right reason which, in turn, comes to us from the dictates of the biological organism. If the biological organism is functioning correctly, it supports those processes and impulses which drive self-preservation. Anything that corrupts these natural processes and impulses are said to contravene right reason. Ultimately, the author believes that theoretical discourse concerning the essential interplay between political ethics and human nature should include consideration of Hobbes alongside Aristotle, David Hume, and others.


Author(s):  
Claudia Blöser

Abstract This chapter discusses accounts of hope found in the works of important Enlightenment thinkers: René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, Baruch de Spinoza, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant. The paper’s guiding questions are: Where are discussions of hope located within these thinkers’ works? Do the authors provide an account of what hope is? Do they ascribe a certain function to hope? Most authors of the Enlightenment, with the exception of Kant, write about hope in the context of a general account of the passions. Their characterization of hope closely resembles the “standard definition” of hope in contemporary debates. According to this definition, hope consists of a desire and a belief in the possibility, but not the certainty, of the desired outcome. It turns out, however, that Descartes, Hobbes, and Hume advocate a stronger evidential condition for hope than is common today: According to their view, we do not hope for what we take to be merely possible, no matter how unlikely it is; we hope for what we take to be more likely. Kant’s account differs from the other ones in important respects: He does not treat hope as an affect and he does not require a probability estimate, but grounds hope in faith.


2021 ◽  
pp. 163-240
Author(s):  
Guy Elgat

In this chapter, a detailed reconstruction of Friedrich Nietzsche’s genealogy of guilt is provided. The following notions are examined: internalization of cruelty, the ethics of custom, the debtor-creditor relationship, the creation of the “sovereign individual,” free will, and the notion of Christian guilt. One of the main claims made is that Nietzsche’s genealogy can be seen to go deeper than Rée’s in that it provides us with a genealogy of social and mental structures that Rée’s genealogy presupposes. On the other hand, as the chapter argues, at various crucial junctions, Nietzsche can be read as helping himself to a Rée-ian form of explanation. Before turning to Nietzsche’s genealogy of guilt in his On the Genealogy of Morals and other writings, the chapter examines his earlier critique of Schopenhauer in Human, All Too Human and his critique of the idea of causa sui in Beyond Good and Evil.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Youpa Andrew

This book offers a reading of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. Specifically, it is a philosophical exposition of his masterpiece, the Ethics, that focuses on his moral philosophy. Central to the reading I defend is the view that there is a way of life that is best for human beings, and what makes it best is that it is the way of life that is in agreement with human nature. I begin this study with Spinoza’s theory of emotions, and I do so because it is one of two doctrines that fundamentally shape the structure and content of his vision of the way of life that is best. The other is his view that striving to persevere in being is the actual essence of a finite thing (3p7). Together these make up the foundation of Spinoza’s moral philosophy, and it is from these two doctrines that his moral philosophy emerges. In saying this I am not denying that his substance monism, the doctrines of mind-body parallelism and identity, the tripartite theory of knowledge, and his denial of libertarian free will, among others, also belong to the foundation of his moral philosophy. Each of these contributes in its way to the portrait of the best way of life, and they play important roles in the chapters that follow. But it is his theory of emotions and the theory of human nature on which it rests that are chiefly responsible for the structure and content of his moral philosophy....


2021 ◽  
pp. 30-49
Author(s):  
Bruce Ledewitz

The usual explanations of the breakdown in American public life fail to account for our current condition. They do, however, point to an underlying national spiritual crisis. The economy has not actually performed that badly. Big money is not that influential. The pathologies of social media are symptoms of our problems, not sources. Even racism is only a part of our national distress. Both sides claim the unreasonableness of the other side is the problem. These opponents have weakened the institutions of government. Some observers have given up trying to explain our condition, pointing to human nature, when human nature should be constant, or to historical cycles that simply occur. Our crisis is part of the failure of the Enlightenment and capitalism to sustain meaningful human life in secular society. The problem is the Death of God.


1986 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 91-91
Author(s):  
Edward Craig

David Hume (1711–1776) was born in Scotland and attended Edinburgh University. In 1734, after a brief spell in a merchant's office in Bristol, he went to France to write A Treatise of Human Nature, published anonymously in 1739 (Books I and II) and 1740 (Book III). An Abstract, also anonymous and written as if by someone other than the author of the Treatise, appeared about the same time, and provides an invaluable account, in a brief compass, of what Hume thought most important about the Treatise. The Treatise was not well received, and Hume was unsuccessful in his candidature for the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. He rewrote Book I of the Treatise, adding a controversial discussion of miracles and providence; and a revision of this was published as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1748. His Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, which was a rewriting of Book III of the Treatise, was published in 1751, and his Dissertation on the Passions, corresponding to Book II of the Treatise, but with significant omissions, such as the account of the psychological mechanism of sympathy, in 1757. In 1752 he had been made keeper of the Advocates' Library at Edinburgh, and wrote his History of England which, at the time, brought him more approbation than his philosophy. During this time, he wrote the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, published posthumously in 1779. In 1763 he became secretary to the British Embassy in Paris. He returned to London in 1766, and a year later was Undersecretary of State. In 1769 he returned to Edinburgh and worked on final editions of his writings, and on an autobiography, dated 18 April 1776, a few months before his death.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document