Multiculturalism backlash and anti-establishment politics

Author(s):  
Donatella della Porta ◽  
Pietro Castelli Gattinara ◽  
Konstantinos Eleftheriadis ◽  
Andrea Felicetti

Chapter 6 focuses on a collective actor that has played a crucial role in migration and identity politics across Europe, at least since the early 1990s: the contemporary far right. Relying on frame analysis of web portals, social media pages, blogs, and websites of far-right collective actors in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, we investigate the narrative they constructed on Charlie Hebdo and uncover the patterns of interaction existing between them and other actors, within and across national settings. The empirical analysis shows that the European far right effectively mobilized as a collective actor in the shadow of the January attacks. On the one hand, the Charlie Hebdo juncture brought forth issues that are deeply intertwined with far-right politics, and highly embedded in their agendas. On the other, the far right recognized itself in the collective struggle of opposing multiculturalism and Islamization, and of representing the will of the people against corrupt political elites, at the national and transnational levels.

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jim Crowther

The context for this paper is the rise of populism across the UK, Europe and the US, a trend which is sweeping western liberal capitalist democracies in particular but also beyond in countries such as Turkey. Populism is used primarily as a derogatory label to demean the poor, working class groups and people with low educational attainment, as not having the experience or capacity to make wise decisions. In the UK this has led to demands for a second referendum on leaving Europe because the ‘will of the people’ was manipulated. It is also claimed that Parliament is sovereign so the decision to exit Europe should be made by its members who are better informed and can legitimately overturn the referendum decision. On the other hand, demagogues of the far right who led campaigns of disinformation and thinly veiled racist vocabulary to sway the Brexit result champion the ‘will of the people’ in disingenuous ways. If we widen our lens, there are also examples of progressive populist politics in Europe, such as Podemos in Spain, which are indicative of a counter-trend to the neoliberal model of globalization. Whilst populism is mainly used as a derogatory label, it can also be framed progressively as a response of the powerless, the poor and the ignored reacting to the limits of liberal democratic institutions in the current context. The election of Trump in the US and the Brexit result in the UK can be understood in these terms too. The repressed, overlooked or denigrated by the political and media elite, have responded at the only opportunity available to them. At the same time, the kind of social purpose adult education which aimed to engage with people in communities, on their own terms, has withered as neoliberal forms of lifelong learning and citizenship transform educational practices into ‘remoralising’ citizens to take care of themselves. In this context adult education and democracy are in crises. However, both crises can be turned towards generating productive synergies which adult educators need to connect with. This presentation seeks to explore and stimulate this debate.


2016 ◽  
pp. 26-36
Author(s):  
Tadeusz Chrobak

Štefan Polakovič - slovak ideologue and theoretician of the nationŠtefan Polakowice is a leading representative of the philosophy of the people inSlovakia. The opinions of Š. Polakovič about the nation changed. In the early period of creativeness he characterized the nation in terms of the organism. In his late works he was examining the substance of the nation in terms of atomism and moderate individualism. The fundamental metaphysical thesis about the existence of the nation is the one that the nation, just like a man, is a creation of God. Hence, the nation has the tasks to be accomplished designated by God. It is the duty of creative members of the nation to recognize the will of God in relation to the nation. Š. Polakovič in connection with the diversity concept of the nation recognized the need for existence of philosophical science of the nation - nationology. Nationology is to examine fundamental issues metaphysical, epistemological and axiological of the nation as being incomparable with any other object. Štefan Polakovič - słowacki ideolog i teoretyk naroduŠtefan Polakovič jest czołowym przedstawicielem filozofii narodu na Słowacji. Poglądy Š. Polakovicia na naród zmieniały się. We wczesnym okresie twórczości naród charakteryzował on w kategoriach organizmu. W późnej twórczości analizował istotę narodu w kategoriach atomizmu i umiarkowanego indywidualizmu. Zasadniczą tezą metafizyczną dotyczącą istnienia narodu jest twierdzenie, że naród, tak jak człowiek, jest tworem Boga. Stąd też naród ma zadania do zrealizowania, wyznaczone mu przez Boga. Obowiązkiem twórczych członków narodu jest rozpoznanie woli Boga w stosunku do narodu. Š. Polakovič w związku z różnorodnością koncepcji narodu uznał, że konieczna jest filozoficzna nauka o narodzie – nacjologia. Nacjologia ma badać fundamentalne zagadnienia metafizyczne, epistemologiczne i aksjologiczne narodu, jako bytu nieporównywalnego z żadnym innym obiektem.


2021 ◽  
pp. 003232172198915
Author(s):  
Giorgos Venizelos

This article investigates the curious non-emergence of populism in contemporary Cyprus despite the deep financial crisis and profound political disillusionment – conditions that are treated as necessary and sufficient. Putting emphasis on Cyprus’ key historical particularities, the article inquires into the ways Cyprus’ political past, and the subsequent salient ‘national question’, produce ambiguous notions of ‘the people’ on the one hand, and impede the potentials for a ‘populist moment’ on the other hand. By assessing the performative dynamics of oppositional parties in Cyprus, the empirical analysis suggests that the absence of populism is rooted in the following factors: First, nationalist discourse prevails over, and significantly weakens, populist discourse. Second, self-proclaimed challenger parties served ‘old wine in new bottles’ further undermining their position and claims. The failure of populism to take root in Cyprus, brings to the fore important theoretical insights relevant to the non-emergence of populism even under favourable conditions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Foster ◽  
Matthew Feldman

Boris Johnson’s electoral victory and the 2020 culmination of Brexit are accelerating Britain’s shift towards the right and towards open criticism of technocracy in the UK and EU. Since 2016 the UK’s political atmosphere has polarised into hostile extremes. The continuation of this toxicity beyond Brexit, the dominance of nationalist narratives as Britain’s new ‘politics of everything’ (Valluvan 2019). While the Conservative Party remains traditionally centre-right and the Brexit Party has ceased to be relevant, the UK continues to witness the growth of the far right and what is called here the ‘Radical Right’, which have been accelerating since 2016, rapidly gaining influence (Norris and Inglehart 2019: 443-472), and ‘mainstreaming’ (Miller-Idriss 2017) in the Conservative majority elected in December 2019. The past four years have seen growing British contempt for technocracy in London and Brussels, while the Leave vote has been represented as a “Will of the People” antithetical to a Remain/Revoke/Second Referendum position, often portrayed as an anti-democratic scheme by “the elite” to frustrate the will of “the people”. This ‘us and them’ populist narrative is deepening as the UK’s volatile political environment moves away from the political procedures and economic values by which the UK has operated since 1945. Since early 2020, this narrative has been significantly accelerated by Covid-19 countermeasures, with anti-EU parties and narratives on the left and right becoming anti-lockdown or anti-vaccine parties and narratives. This paper approaches the radical right as emblematic of British politics’ shift from centrism towards polarised factions defined not by party but by support or contempt for technical governance. In this paper we propose a new explanatory basis for studying the populist radical right not as a temporary phenomenon in response to specific political events and conditions, but as a fluid, amorphous, and heterogeneous set of groups, parties, and narratives whose strategies, appeal, and narratives make them extremely adaptable, and significant as a force with substantial influence of politics into the future.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omen Sahabi ◽  
Ilya Nacho

In today's political climate, there appears to be a greater focus on what would be good for people who belong to a particular gender, race, religion or sexual orientation. As a result of this, what would benefit people in general no longer has the same level of importance. An Obsession, It wouldn't be accurate to say that this is something that relates to people on both sides of the political spectrum, though. This is something that someone is more likely to be on board with if they are on the left. However, as the horseshoe theory points out; the further someone goes on either side of the spectrum, the closer their views will be. When this takes places, what someone on the far-left says might sound different to what someone on the far-right comes out with, but that will be about as far as it will go. In Group Preference, One way of looking at the lefts obsession with identity politics would be to say that this is a form of tribalism. There is then no reason for someone from one group to assimilate with the members of another group. Also, by putting everyone into different groups, it makes it a lot harder for people to put their differences aside. In order for this to happen, people need to focus on what they have in common and not on what separates them from others. Two Groups, When someone has bought into this way of looking at the world, there will be people who oppress others and then there will be the people who are oppressed by others. This is something that is completely black and white. The biggest oppressors are often said to be white men, and this means that just about everything one else is kept down by these people. White women, on the other hand, are also seen as being oppressed, but they are still seen as having it easier than women who are not white. Taken To the Extreme Consequently, there are a number of people who believe that all the problems in the world would disappear is white men were removed from the planet. Ironically, this approach has a lot in common with how those on the far-right think- especially white supremacists.


2012 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Dietrich

AbstractIn modern democracies, moral experts play an increasingly important role in law-making. Apart from the question of which competences characterize moral experts, their influence on the legitimacy of democratic procedures must be discussed. On the one hand, the contribution of moral experts promises to improve the quality of decision making. On the other hand, however, moral experts cannot claim to represent the will of the people. In this essay, at first a concept of the moral expert will be sketched which does without the assumption of a privileged access to 'moral truths'. Then a procedural understanding of democratic legitimacy without epistemic components will be defended. Finally there will be a distinction between the purely consultative and the quasi-legislative tasks of ethics committees. Whereas councelling by moral experts does not influence the legitimacy of democratic procedures, giving them quasilegislative functions is connected to risks in this respect.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 497-511 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cathy Gormley-Heenan ◽  
Arthur Aughey

For those who spoke on behalf of Leave voters, the result on 23 June 2016 meant the people of the United Kingdom were taking back ‘control’ or getting their ‘own country back’. However, two parts of the United Kingdom did not vote Leave: Scotland and Northern Ireland. Here, the significant counterpoint to ‘taking back control is “waking up in a different country”’, and this sentiment has unique political gravity. Its unique gravity involves two distinct but intimately related matters. The first concerns the politics of identity. The vote was mainly, if not entirely, along nationalist/unionist lines, confirming an old division: unionists were staking a ‘British’ identity by voting Leave, and nationalists an Irish one by voting Remain. The second concerns borders. The Good Friday/Belfast Agreement of 1998 meant taking the border out of Irish politics. Brexit means running the border between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom across the island as a sovereign ‘frontier’. Although this second matter is discussed mainly in terms of the implications for free movement of people and goods, we argue that it is freighted with meanings of identity. Brexit involves a ‘border in the mind’, those shifts in self-understanding, individually and collectively, attendant upon the referendum. This article examines this ‘border in the mind’ according to its effects on identity, politics and the constitution, and their implications for political stability in Northern Ireland.


Pólemos ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-383
Author(s):  
Carlo Pelloso

AbstractCurrent Western constitutional systems, for quite a few practical reasons, seem to be a sick body that deserves and needs a soft euthanasia, rather than useless palliative care. On the one hand, the words ‘election’ and ‘democracy’ are currently considered synonymous: yet, when the supporters of the American and French revolutions proposed the technique of representation as a means to implement ‘the will of the people,’ there were no parties, no statutes concerning universal franchise, no mass-media, and no Internet. On the other hand, classical Athens has taught us that democracy is more than voting and something different from representation. This contribution argues that merging the radical ideas flourished in the past with the digital culture embedded in the present shall help wipe out the contemporary crisis under the banner of a new e-δημοκρατία.


2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-138
Author(s):  
Łukasz Danel

The article is dedicated to the 2016 United Kingdom European Union Referendum (known as the Brexit Referendum) that took place on 23 June 2016 and resulted in the majority of the votes cast being in favor of leaving the EU. As a consequence, on 31 January 2020, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland officially withdrew from the European Union. The purpose of this article is to try to make an interpretation of Brexit by attempting to answer a question of which of these two factors — Euroscepticism or nationalism — more heavily determined the will of the people and influenced the result of the referendum. Euroscepticism has accompanied the British from the very moment their country became part of the united Europe. The importance of nationalism in turn, analyzed as both English nationalism and British nationalism, has increased significantly in recent years. Using the collected research material, the author will try to prove the thesis that, in fact, these two factors are inextricably linked and it is very difficult to examine them separately. Euroscepticism, so deeply rooted in the British society, seems to have been — especially in recent years — the driving force of English and British nationalism.


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