scholarly journals From ‘Brexhaustion’ to ‘Covidiots’: the UK United Kingdom and the Populist Future

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Foster ◽  
Matthew Feldman

Boris Johnson’s electoral victory and the 2020 culmination of Brexit are accelerating Britain’s shift towards the right and towards open criticism of technocracy in the UK and EU. Since 2016 the UK’s political atmosphere has polarised into hostile extremes. The continuation of this toxicity beyond Brexit, the dominance of nationalist narratives as Britain’s new ‘politics of everything’ (Valluvan 2019). While the Conservative Party remains traditionally centre-right and the Brexit Party has ceased to be relevant, the UK continues to witness the growth of the far right and what is called here the ‘Radical Right’, which have been accelerating since 2016, rapidly gaining influence (Norris and Inglehart 2019: 443-472), and ‘mainstreaming’ (Miller-Idriss 2017) in the Conservative majority elected in December 2019. The past four years have seen growing British contempt for technocracy in London and Brussels, while the Leave vote has been represented as a “Will of the People” antithetical to a Remain/Revoke/Second Referendum position, often portrayed as an anti-democratic scheme by “the elite” to frustrate the will of “the people”. This ‘us and them’ populist narrative is deepening as the UK’s volatile political environment moves away from the political procedures and economic values by which the UK has operated since 1945. Since early 2020, this narrative has been significantly accelerated by Covid-19 countermeasures, with anti-EU parties and narratives on the left and right becoming anti-lockdown or anti-vaccine parties and narratives. This paper approaches the radical right as emblematic of British politics’ shift from centrism towards polarised factions defined not by party but by support or contempt for technical governance. In this paper we propose a new explanatory basis for studying the populist radical right not as a temporary phenomenon in response to specific political events and conditions, but as a fluid, amorphous, and heterogeneous set of groups, parties, and narratives whose strategies, appeal, and narratives make them extremely adaptable, and significant as a force with substantial influence of politics into the future.


2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jim Crowther

The context for this paper is the rise of populism across the UK, Europe and the US, a trend which is sweeping western liberal capitalist democracies in particular but also beyond in countries such as Turkey. Populism is used primarily as a derogatory label to demean the poor, working class groups and people with low educational attainment, as not having the experience or capacity to make wise decisions. In the UK this has led to demands for a second referendum on leaving Europe because the ‘will of the people’ was manipulated. It is also claimed that Parliament is sovereign so the decision to exit Europe should be made by its members who are better informed and can legitimately overturn the referendum decision. On the other hand, demagogues of the far right who led campaigns of disinformation and thinly veiled racist vocabulary to sway the Brexit result champion the ‘will of the people’ in disingenuous ways. If we widen our lens, there are also examples of progressive populist politics in Europe, such as Podemos in Spain, which are indicative of a counter-trend to the neoliberal model of globalization. Whilst populism is mainly used as a derogatory label, it can also be framed progressively as a response of the powerless, the poor and the ignored reacting to the limits of liberal democratic institutions in the current context. The election of Trump in the US and the Brexit result in the UK can be understood in these terms too. The repressed, overlooked or denigrated by the political and media elite, have responded at the only opportunity available to them. At the same time, the kind of social purpose adult education which aimed to engage with people in communities, on their own terms, has withered as neoliberal forms of lifelong learning and citizenship transform educational practices into ‘remoralising’ citizens to take care of themselves. In this context adult education and democracy are in crises. However, both crises can be turned towards generating productive synergies which adult educators need to connect with. This presentation seeks to explore and stimulate this debate.



1999 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 809-834 ◽  
Author(s):  
RANDALL HANSEN

The article examines the 1966–70 Labour government's decision to withdraw the right of entry from Asians with British passports who were driven out of Kenya by its ‘Africanization’ policies. It examines the decision within the context of three issues: first, the existence and status of a pledge, allegedly made by Macmillan's last Conservative government, that the Asians' right to enter the UK would be respected; second, a decline in both major parties' commitment to the Commonwealth; and, third, competing ideological strains within the Labour party. The article concentrates on the first of these issues, focusing on an as-yet-unresolved debate between Duncan Sandys and Iain Macleod, both Conservative Colonial Secretaries. Macleod argued that a solemn pledge had been given to the Asians, while Sandys and the Conservative party adamantly denied the claim. In the light of new archival evidence, the article argues that the Asians' exemption from immigration controls, which had been applied to the whole of the Commonwealth, did not result from an explicit commitment by the British government; it was rather the unintended result of the mechanism chosen to restrict Commonwealth immigration in 1962. It was a consequence, however, that was recognized by civil servants at the time of the passage of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1962, and accepted by key figures in the British cabinet, including Duncan Sandys himself. The position taken by Sandys and the majority of the Conservative party in 1968 was, behind the safety of the Official Secrets Act, a betrayal of commitments made and pledges given only a few years earlier. The article concludes by suggesting that the Kenyan Asians' crisis represented both a shift, in the two parties, away from previous commitments to the Commonwealth and, in the Labour party, the triumph of James Callaghan's strand of Labour ideology – nationalist, anti-intellectual, indifferent to arguments about international law and obligation, and firmly in touch with the social conservatism of middle- and working-class England.



2021 ◽  
pp. 2336825X2110529
Author(s):  
Alexander Alekseev

The article explores how the European populist radical right uses references to rights and freedoms in its political discourse. By relying on the findings of the existing research and applying the discourse-historical approach to electoral speeches by Marine Le Pen and Jarosław Kaczyński, the leaders of two very dissimilar EU PRR parties, the Rassemblement National and the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, the article abductively develops a functional typology of references to rights and freedoms commonly used in discourses of European PRR parties: it suggests that PRR discourses in Europe feature references to the right to sovereignty, citizens’ rights, social rights, and economic rights. Such references are used as a coherent discursive strategy to construct social actors following the PRR ideological core of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. As the PRR identifies itself with the people, defined along nativist and populist lines, rights are always attributed to it. The PRR represents itself as the defender of the people and its rights, while the elites and the aliens are predicated to threaten the people and its rights. References to rights in PRR discourses intrinsically link the individual with the collective, which allows to construct and promote a populist model of ethnic democracy.



2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nguyen Dang Dung ◽  
Nguyen Thuy Duong

Although there has not been a reform like executive and judicial power , since the “Doi Moi” reform until now, the National Assembly - the legislative branch of Vietnamese government has achieved certain successes, but to implement 2013 Constitution better, there ‘s still a lot of work to do. First of all, we have to change our awareness: Legislative power is not simply the right to adopt a law, but also the right to suspend law drafting when the laws do not express the will of the people, nor do they reflect objective movement of society. Keywords: National Assembly, legislative power, right to cease the making law.



Politics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Bale

The UK Independence Party (UKIP) is not so much a populist party that became Eurosceptic as a Eurosceptic party that became populist. However, careful tracing of a sequence that began in the late 1990s reveals that it was not UKIP but the Conservative Party that first fused populism and Euroscepticism. David Cameron’s decision in 2006 to temporarily abandon both approaches, just as Nigel Farage became UKIP’s leader, turned out, in historical institutionalist terms, to be a critical juncture. It provided UKIP with an opportunity to fill the gap, after which the Conservatives were unable, as Europe was hit by successive economic and migration crises, to regain the initiative. As a result, and as Cameron’s coalition government failed to meet its promises to control immigration, UKIP enjoyed increasing electoral success. This allowed it to exert significant, if indirect, pressure on the Tories, eventually helping to force Cameron into promising an in/out referendum – a promise that did neither him nor his party any good. The UK case, therefore, reminds us that anyone wanting to understand populist Euroscepticism needs to appreciate that the relationship between the radical right and its mainstream, centre-right counterpart is more reciprocal, and even symbiotic, than is commonly imagined.



2020 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 856-873
Author(s):  
Susan Collard ◽  
Paul Webb

Abstract Recent developments in British politics have foregrounded two issues of particular importance to Britons living overseas: their voting rights in the UK and Brexit. In light of this, the number of British expatriates registering to vote has risen sharply and provided an incentive to develop UK parties abroad. We, therefore, set out the history and organisational structures of the major British parties abroad, and report the results of a unique online survey of British expatriate citizens, which tests whether ‘Votes for Life’ and Brexit have significantly impacted on their political preferences. We find that latter has done so, but the former has not. In view of this, the historically embedded expectations of a general expatriate preference for the Conservative Party no longer apply to those based in EU countries. In the wake of Brexit, this group appears to have swung decisively against the party and turned towards Labour and the Liberal Democrats. This suggests that the likelihood of the current Conservative administration introducing legislation to extend expatriate Britons’ voting rights, as pledged in the Queen’s Speech of December 2019, is remote, raising existential questions for the future of UK parties abroad.



Author(s):  
Louis Talay

Abstract It has been argued that far-right populist parties (FRPP) distinguish themselves from other parties on the right of the political spectrum through their strong association with nationalism, anti-elitism, authoritarianism and historical mythologizing. These features typically manifest in discourse that attempts to justify exclusionist immigration and asylum policies by presenting Islam as an existential threat to predominantly white societies. This paper seeks to establish whether a conservative party that has never been considered populist could possess the same features as an FRPP by comparing three selected discursive texts – one from mainstream conservative party leader John Howard and two from prominent European FRPP leaders. The analysis revealed that the key difference between the three leaders was Howard’s failure to satisfy the authoritarianism criterion, which was interpreted as a decisive factor in his party’s moderate guise. This suggests that some mainstream parties may be more ideologically extremist than they are perceived to be.



Soundings ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (73) ◽  
pp. 12-23
Author(s):  
Bill Schwarz

An oligarchic Jacobinism – with Boris Johnson as champion of the people – seems to be finding resonance with the wider UK electorate, a meeting of opposites in which class hatreds reverberate with class deference. The seriousness of the current attack on democratic processes derives from the fact that the principal agent dedicated to eviscerating the institutions of the state is located inside the Conservative Party. Johnson's cabinet is dominated by the 'Britannia Unchained' authors and the European Research Group Spartans. This is the end of the 'good chaps' Tory party, and the beginning of a consolidation of a peculiarly English form of authoritarian populism. The construction of a democratic opposition to this lurch to the right requires the broadest possible alliance.



2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Věra Stojarová

AbstractThe paper looks at the political party scene in Visegrad countries before and after the influx of refugees and compares how much the negative reactions were instrumentalised not only by the extremist and radical right parties but by the newly emerged populist formations as well as the well-established mainstream parties across the whole political spectra. Until the “migration crisis”, the far right parties focused mainly on Roma issue, anti-Semitism, anti-communism, anti-establishment and used anti-NATO, anti-EU, anti-German, anti-Czech, anti-Slovak or anti-Hungarian card. Since 2015, the parties re-oriented against immigrants, more precisely against the Muslims presenting them as a threat and also increased their criticism on the EU. However, the mainstream parties also accepted far right topics and actively promoted them. The result is then mainstreaming of xenophobia, nationalism and marginalization of far right parties as their flexible voters move to the populist subjects.



Author(s):  
Amira Elnokaly ◽  
Benjamin A.J. Martin

Purpose – In October 2011 the Government brought in measures to reduce the revenue provided by the Feed in Tariff (FIT) system. This change came under a lot of opposition due to the potential affects that it would have upon the industry. The purpose of this paper is to explore the potential benefits of the FIT and the impact that the Governments Comprehensive Spending Review had upon the industry and its uptake by the householders. Design/methodology/approach – For the study and to calculate the benefits of the FIT, a predictive modelling tool was built that could calculate the potential income and savings for a household. A photovoltaic (PV) installation was then monitored for over a year and the results of the predictive modelling tool were compared to actual results produced from the system to show how accurate the modelling tool was. The impacts of the Governments comprehensive spending review and the potential impacts in the industry were then calculated and discussed. Findings – The FIT is still a good incentive for people investing in PV. However, the reduction in the FIT may impact the “Rent a Roof” system and this in turn will impact most heavily on lower income families. The research also concluded that the changes in the political agenda have had a major impact on the FIT for both the industry and the community. Thus, the solar FITs will continue to be an attractive incentive in place to pay for heating through renewable means and thus ensuring reducing the own carbon footprint. Concomitantly, well-developed ownership schemes need to be put in place. Originality/value – The reduction in the FIT was the right move by the Government as it should prevent the increase in energy bill prices which will affect the people without PV at this point in time. It also has been set so that it is still generous enough to encourage the industry and stimulate installation as there is still profit but not in a way that should put people off. The UK may just have to take time to realise that the FITs are still a good deal after the very generous tariff that preceded them.



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