The Neuroscientific Non-Challenge to Meaning, Morals, and Purpose

Stephen J. Morse argues that neuroscience raises no new challenges for the existence, source, and content of meaning, morals, and purpose in human life, nor for the robust conceptions of agency and autonomy underpinning law and responsibility. Proponents of revolutionizing the law and legal system make two arguments. The first appeals to determinism and the person as a “victim of neuronal circumstances” (VNC) or “just a pack of neurons” (PON). The second defend “hard incompatibilism. ” Morse reviews the law’s psychology, concept of personhood, and criteria for criminal responsibility, arguing that neither determinism nor VNC/PON are new to neuroscience and neither justifies revolutionary abandonment of moral and legal concepts and practices evolved over centuries in both common law and civil law countries. He argues that, although the metaphysical premises for responsibility or jettisoning it cannot be decisively resolved, the hard incompatibilist vision is not normatively desirable even if achievable.