Forgiving Evil

Author(s):  
Eve Garrard ◽  
David McNaughton

Are evil acts forgivable? This question lies at the intersection of theories about the nature of evil and theories about the nature of forgiveness. Since evil acts seem to be the most plausible candidates for unforgivability, we start with a brief defense of the secular deployment of the idea of evil, and then move to an overview of various theories of evil. After providing an outline of what forgiveness involves, we consider what being unforgivable might actually amount to. Four possible accounts of being unforgivable are canvassed—psychological impossibility, psychological difficulty, lack of reasons for forgiveness, and a moral prohibition on forgiveness—and their implications for the opening question are considered. We conclude that nothing so far considered rules out the moral permissibility of forgiveness for evil acts. Finally, the question of whether forgiveness would enable the evildoer’s slate to be wiped clean at last is briefly considered.

Think ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (60) ◽  
pp. 57-64
Author(s):  
C. P. Ruloff ◽  
Patrick Findler

Hsiao has recently developed what he considers a ‘simple and straightforward’ argument for the moral permissibility of corporal punishment. In this article we argue that Hsiao's argument is seriously flawed for at least two reasons. Specifically, we argue that (i) a key premise of Hsiao's argument is question-begging, and (ii) Hsiao's argument depends upon a pair of false underlying assumptions, namely, the assumption that children are moral agents, and the assumption that all forms of wrongdoing demand retribution.


Author(s):  
Lucia M. Rafanelli

This book develops a theory of the ethics of “reform intervention,” a category that includes any attempt to promote justice in a society other than one’s own. It identifies several dimensions along which reform interventions can vary (the degree of control interveners exercise over recipients, the urgency of interveners’ objectives, the costs an intervention poses to recipients, and how interveners interact with recipients’ existing political institutions) and examines how these variations affect the moral permissibility of reform intervention. The book argues that, once one acknowledges the variety of forms reform intervention can take, it becomes clear that not all of them are vulnerable to the objections usually leveled against intervention. In particular, not all reform interventions treat recipients with intolerance, disrespect recipients’ legitimate institutions, or undermine recipients’ collective self-determination. Combining philosophical analysis and discussion of several real-world cases, the book investigates which kinds of reform intervention are or are not vulnerable to these objections. In so doing, it also develops new understandings of the roles toleration, legitimacy, and collective self-determination should play in global politics. After developing principles to specify when different kinds of reform interventions are morally permissible, the book investigates how these principles could be applied in the real world. Ultimately, it argues that some reform interventions are, all things considered, morally permissible and that sometimes reform intervention is morally required. It argues we should reconceive the ordinary boundaries of political activity and begin to see the pursuit of justice via political contestation as humanity’s collective project.


Almost Over ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 142-207
Author(s):  
F. M. Kamm

Chapter 6 examines Ezekiel Emanuel’s reasons for thinking that after a “complete life” (by around age seventy-five) it can be reasonable (at least for some) to omit easy preventive measures (e.g., flu shots) that would extend life even when such life would not be worse than death. To better understand such a position the chapter makes use of the views of Susan Wolf and Bernard Williams on meaning in life and reasons to go on living, and also considers different ways of judging the worth of activities. It further compares Emanuel’s views with those of Atul Gawande, B. J. Miller, and Douglas MacLean. Finally, it considers whether Emanuel’s arguments succeed and also whether they support the moral permissibility of suicide and assisted suicide.


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (6) ◽  
pp. 424-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosa Reed-Berendt ◽  
Roz Shafran ◽  
Dawn Langdon ◽  
Deborah Christie ◽  
Rachael Hough ◽  
...  

Young people with cancer are at increased risk of psychological difficulty; yet there is little research on their experiences of low mood or depressive symptoms to help inform treatment interventions. This qualitative study explored experiences and opinions of low mood or depression in young people with cancer, how their mood related to developmental challenges, strategies used to cope, and how services could improve support. Nineteen young people diagnosed and treated for cancer completed semistructured interviews. Transcripts were thematically analyzed using the framework approach, and analysis produced eight themes, organized into three domains: “A Harder Time of Life,” “Interpersonal Impact of Cancer,” and “Learning to Understand and Describe Low Mood,” Participants interviewed experienced low mood during cancer and predominantly felt “low mood” was a helpful term to describe their emotions. There were similarities and variations in their reported mood compared with clinical depression. The developmental challenges of being a young person with cancer negatively affected their mood. Participants used a variety of different coping strategies to manage these challenges. Young people were clear that they would like others to help them understand negative emotions experienced through cancer are normal to feel and support for low mood to be accessible and available.


Author(s):  
Felix Lindner ◽  
Robert Mattmüller ◽  
Bernhard Nebel

Research in classical planning so far was mainly concerned with generating a satisficing or an optimal plan. However, if such systems are used to make decisions that are relevant to humans, one should also consider the ethical consequences generated plans can have. We address this challenge by analyzing in how far it is possible to generalize existing approaches of machine ethics to automatic planning systems. Traditionally, ethical principles are formulated in an actionbased manner, allowing to judge the execution of one action. We show how such a judgment can be generalized to plans. Further, we study the computational complexity of making ethical judgment about plans.


2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
JENNY I. KRUTZINNA

Abstract:Discussions about the ethical permissibility of pediatric cognitive enhancement frequently revolve around arguments about welfare, and often include an appeal to the child’s right to an open future. Both proponents and opponents of cognitive enhancement claim that their respective positions best serve the interests of the child by promoting an open future. This article argues that this right to an open future argument only captures some of the risks to the welfare of children, therefore requiring a broader ethical approach. Further, it suggests that a thorough moral assessment of the ends pursued is needed before concluding on the moral permissibility of cognitive enhancement in children, which ultimately hinges on the effect on the overall welfare of the child, beyond an open future.


Author(s):  
Steven Luper

This article concerns contemporary philosophical discussions of death. The philosophy of death attempts to determine what it is for people and other living things to die, how and the extent to which death and posthumous events benefit or harm those who die, and the morality of killing. The issues that arise might loosely be classified as metaphysical, prudential, and moral. The metaphysical issues concern what death is, and, by extension, what it is to be alive, what you and I are, and what the persistence conditions of living creatures are. (The former issues are covered under the Nature of Death, while the latter are covered under Life and Persistence over Time.) The prudential issues concern how and the extent to which death, posthumous events, and coming to be affect the welfare of those who die (covered under Mortal Harm and Posthumous Harm), and the time when those effects are incurred (covered under The Timing Issue). Finally, the moral issues concern how the prudential significance of death and posthumous events bear on the moral permissibility of killing. When killing is wrong, it is wrong primarily (even if not exclusively) because death harms its victims or because death is imposed on its victims without their consent, which is inconsistent with the respect they are due. Philosophers of death attempt to work out whether and how the harmfulness of dying and consent to being killed bear on the wrongness of killing. (These moral issues are covered under Killing.)


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