Emerson’s Memory Loss

Author(s):  
Christopher Hanlon

This chapter examines Emerson’s 1870–71 lecture series Natural History of Intellect, which formed as Emerson’s experience of memory loss became profound, and registers its author’s shifting protocols for producing texts as he contended with changing patterns of cognition. Natural History of Intellect reflects upon Emerson’s increasing reliance upon his daughter, Ellen Tucker Emerson, who assisted Emerson as he lectured and who eventually reshaped Emerson’s manuscript materials. Entering into conversation with other literary historians who challenge an account of Emerson’s thought that enshrines Emersonian individualism to the exclusion of more communal dimensions of transcendentalism, this chapter contends that the lecture series theorizes the terms of his collaboration with Ellen in ways that break with Emerson’s earlier tendency to lionize insular consciousness and to isolate the body from the mind, offering instead an account of first-person thought as if always interpenetrated with the thinking of other people.

1859 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 381-457 ◽  

The necessity of discussing so great a subject as the Theory of the Vertebrate Skull in the small space of time allotted by custom to a lecture, has its advantages as well as its drawbacks. As, on the present occasion, I shall suffer greatly from the disadvantages of the limitation, I will, with your permission, avail myself to the uttermost of its benefits. It will be necessary for me to assume much that I would rather demonstrate, to suppose known much that I would rather set forth and explain at length; but on the other hand, I may consider myself excused from entering largely either into the history of the subject, or into lengthy and controversial criticisms upon the views which are, or have been, held by others. The biological science of the last half-century is honourably distinguished from that of preceding epochs, by the constantly increasing prominence of the idea, that a community of plan is discernible amidst the manifold diversities of organic structure. That there is nothing really aberrant in nature; that the most widely different organisms are connected by a hidden bond; that an apparently new and isolated structure will prove, when its characters are thoroughly sifted, to be only a modification of something which existed before,—are propositions which are gradually assuming the position of articles of faith in the mind of the investigators of animated nature, and are directly, or by implication, admitted among the axioms of natural history.


Panggung ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Acep Iwan Saidi ◽  
Agung Eko Budiwaspada

ABSTRACTThis research is entitled “Visualization and Transformation of Embodiment in the Film of Planes Animation”. As an animation film, Planes is interesting because it is using inanimate objects, in this case the planes, as characters. This fact indicates that the character transformation is done by an animator, from the character of inanimate objects in to live character. By using the methods of structural and semiotic analysis, found that the transformation is done not only for personification (it is made as if the inanimate objects becomes alive). In the Planes, “the living things” not only exist in the mind as imagination, but it is exist out of the mind, as an autonomous reality. Based on that, Planes is the animation film which opens space for creating a new myth in the history of culture. Like the fable as a myth in the tradition of primary orality, Planes allows the formation of myth in digital oral tradition.Key Words: Transformation, visualization, embodiment, personification, metaphor, tradition, myth ABSTRAKPenelitian ini bertajuk “Visualisasi dan Transformasi Kebertubuhan dalam Film Animasi Planes”.Sebagai film animasi, Planes menarik karena menggunakan benda-benda mati, dalam hal ini pesawat, sebagai tokoh cerita. Fakta ini mengindikasikan dilakukannya transformasi karakte r ole h animator, yakni dari karakte r “yang mati” ke “yang hidup”.Dengan menggunakan metode analisis structural dan semiotik, ditemukan bahwa transformasi tersebut dilakukan melampaui sarana retorika personifikasi (membuatseolah- olah yang mati menjadi hidup).Di dalam Planes, “yang hidup” itu tidak berada di dalam pikiran dan imajinasi apresiator sebagai yang seolah-olah, melainkan hadir di luar pikiran, berdiri sendiri sebagai realita sotonom. Berdasarkan hal itu, Planes merupakan film animasi yang membuka ruang bagi terciptanya mitos baru dalam sejarah cerita. Jika fable merupakan mitos dalam tradisi kelisanan primer, Planes memungkinkan terbentuknya mitos dalam tradisi lisan digital.Kata kunci: transformasi, visualisasi, kebertubuhan, personifikasi, metafora, tradisi, mitos.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
George Scialabba

A merry review of A Natural History of Beer, by Rob DeSalle and Ian Tattersall. George Scialabba summarizes their erudite telling of beer’s story, including its major historical moments and the science of its components: yeasts, hardness and softness, breeding and genetic modification. In closing, he touches on beer’s effect on the body and mind, and its future.


Health ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Peter Adamson

This introduction to the volume gives an overview of the chapters, setting out a case for integrating the history of philosophy with the history of medicine and sketching some of the key philosophical issues that arise around the concept of health. These include the difficulty of defining “health,” the mind-body relationship, and questions about how philosophy informs medical science and practice. A central idea is that the concept of health operates at two levels, the mental and the physical (or the soul and the body), so that ethical virtue and physical well-being have often been seen as parallel or mutually dependent.


2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 544-556 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bracha Hadar

This article explores the history of the exclusion/inclusion of the body in group analytic theory and practice. At the same time, it aims to promote the subject of the body in the mind of group analysts. The main thesis of the article is that sitting in a circle, face-to-face, is a radical change in the transition Foulkes made from psychoanalysis to group analysis. The implications of this transition have not been explored, and in many cases, have been denied. The article describes the vicissitudes of relating group analysis to the body from the time of Foulkes and Anthony’s work until today. The article claims that working with the body in the group demands that the conductor gives special attention to his/her own bodily sensations and feelings, while at the same time remaining cognizant of the fact that each of the participants is a person with a physical body in which their painful history is stored, and that they may be dissociated because of that embodied history. The thesis of the article is followed by a clinical example. The article ends with the conclusion that being in touch with one’s own body demands a lot of training.


1990 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Starobinski

In one of his Cahiers, Paul Valéry has the note. Somatism (heresy of the end of time),Adoration, cult of the machine for living.† Have we come to the end of time? The heresy anticipated by Valéry has almost become the official religion. Everything is related to the body, as if it had just been rediscovered after being long forgotten; body image, body language, body consciousness, liberation of the body are the passwords. Historians, prey to the same infection, have begun inquiring into what previous cultures have done with the body, in way of tattooing, mutilation, celebration all the rituals related to the various bodily functions.2 Past writers from Rabelais to Flaubert are ransacked for evidence, and immediately it becomes apparent that we are far from being the first discoverers of bodily reality. That reality was the first knowledge to enter human understanding: ‘They knew that they were naked’ (Genesis 3.7). From then on, it has impossible to ignore the body.


1902 ◽  
Vol 70 (459-466) ◽  
pp. 74-79

I have found it necessary in labelling a series of models of the malaria parasite in the Central Hall of the Natural History Museum to use as simple and clear a terminology as possible. I think that this terminology will be found useful by others who are perplexed by such terms as “sporozoites,” “blasts,” “ookinetes,” “schizonts,” “amphionts,” and “sporonts”—terms which have their place in schemes dealing with the general morphology and life-history of the group Sporozoa, but are not, as experience shows, well suited for immediate use in describing and referring to the stages of the malaria parasite. It is necessary to treat the malaria parasite from the point of view of malaria; that is to say, to consider its significant phases to be those which it passes in the human blood. In reality its mature condition and most important motile, as well as its most prolific reproductive, phases are passed in the body of the mosquito.


Philosophy ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 53 (203) ◽  
pp. 33-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noel Fleming

1. ‘“But aren't you saying that all that happens is that he moans, and that there is nothing behind it?” I am saying that there is nothing behind the moaning’ (‘Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data”’, The Philosophical Review, July 1968, 302). This passage seems to me to epitomize a conception of the mind and its relation to the body found in the later work of Wittgenstein. It will be convenient to write as if this is his view of the mind. He suggests elsewhere that he is not advancing philosophical theses in his later work; so maybe this view is not a philosophical thesis in some relevant sense; or maybe Wittgenstein is not wholly consistent; or maybe he puts it forward only dialectically, and in other philosophical contexts would have espoused other views of the mind as much as he espouses this one. In any case, what does this one amount to? ‘There is nothing behind the moaning.’ What does this mean?


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