Intending war rightly: Right intentions, public intentions, and consent

2016 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 634-653
Author(s):  
Eric Grynaviski

AbstractThis article defends the normative status of the right intentions requirement in just war theory. Before we turn to many ethical questions about a conflict – whether there was just cause or whether a war was fought well – we often begin by asking whether the war was rightly intended. Particularly in the contemporary world, where questions of humanitarian intentions and their place in international law is an important political issue, clarifying what we mean by right intentions and showing why they matter is politically very important. Unfortunately, despite the importance of right intentions in the history of political thought, recent discussions give the concept mixed attention, leaving it obscure and difficult to apply. The first section reviews four traditional accounts, showing their underlying (and important) differences and respective weaknesses. The second section of the article argues that these models fail because they are rooted in private instead of public reason. A model of right intentions as public intentions is described and justified, where an intention is only right when the motives that underlie it can be endorsed by the group it is supposed to aid, and the opportunities it provides that group are endorsable by the intervener.

Author(s):  
Alec D. Walen

Much contemporary just war theory is modeled on the theory of self-defense. The dominant account of rights used by people interested in the right of self-defense is doubly problematic: its internal tensions undermine the plausibility of the views people try to defend, and it is in some ways morally distorting. This book is primarily concerned with developing and then deploying a new account of rights, one that will put the discussion of the right to defend against threats on more solid footing. The introductory chapter covers four themes. First, to explain why the current state of just war theory calls for a new account of rights, the chapter traces a brief history of recent discussions of the right of self-defense. Second, the chapter describes when it is permissible to defend against threats. Third, it explains how this relates to current law and to other philosophical work on the topic. Finally, it sketches an outline of the rest of the book.


Author(s):  
Tamar Meisels ◽  
Jeremy Waldron

In this “for and against” book, Jeremy Waldron and Tamar Meisels defend competing positions on the legitimacy of targeted killing. The volume begins with a joint introduction, briefly setting out the terms of discussion, and presenting a short historical overview of the practice—i.e. what is targeted killing, and how has it been used in which conflicts and by whom. The debate opens with Meisels’ defense of targeted killing as a legitimate and desirable defensive anti-terrorism strategy, in keeping with both just war theory and international law. Meisels unreservedly defends the named killing of irregular combatants, most notably terrorists, during armed conflict. Additionally, she offers a possible moral justification for rare instances of assassination outside that framework, specifically with reference to recent cases of nuclear scientists developing weapons of mass destruction for the Iranian and Syrian governments. The debate continues with Waldron’s arguments focusing on the dangers and the inherent wrongness of governments’ having the right to maintain death lists—lists of named individuals who are to be hunted down and killed. Waldron notes the many differences between individualized targeting and ordinary combat, and he resists the attempt to assimilate targeted killing to killings in combat. Waldron also cautions us to consider carefully what a world of targeted killings will be like, the many abuses it is liable to, and why we should be very cautious, morally and strategically, in our thinking about it.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Grynaviski

States rarely declare war. For many international law scholars, just war theorists, and moral philosophers, the declaration of war is a moribund tradition that serves no important purpose. When declarations of war are defended, the argument is situated in the war powers debate about executive authority. In contrast, I argue that declaring war – making conditional and reasoned moral demands – continues to be an important requirement for just wars. States should declare war because states should make explicit (formal) moral demands before fighting. Declaring war is procedurally important because it ensures that a state makes a formal moral case, showing respect to innocent third parties whose interests are affected and providing targets the right to confront their accusers and hear evidence. While not a panacea, requiring declarations is a significant improvement on the ad hoc politics of wartime justification that plagues wars such as Iraq. Further, declarations, as ultimatums, are the only reasonable interpretation of the ‘last resort’ requirement in just war theory. A final section extends the argument to contemporary wars against non-state actors, showing that a politics of recognition underlying declarations of war may prove especially fruitful today.


Author(s):  
Jolyon Mitchell ◽  
Joshua Rey

War and Religion: A Very Short Introduction traces the history of religion and war. Is religion a force for war or a force for peace? From the crusades to Sri Lanka's civil war, religion has been involved in some of the most terrible wars in history. Yet from the Mahabharata to just war theory, religion has also provided ethical frameworks to moderate war, while some of the bravest pacifists have been deeply religious people. Ranging from ancient history to modern day conflicts, this VSI offers a nuanced view on these issues that have had such weight in the past, and which continue to shape the present and future.


Author(s):  
Alec D. Walen

This chapter argues for the extension of an idea from the previous chapter, that of a right of non-sacrifice. It argues that this right exists in certain cases of intervening agency: when the intervening agent presents the primary agent with a choice either to submit to suffering a harm or to resist, knowing that the intervening agent will then harm others. The argument proceeds in four parts. First, the chapter explains why such a case is puzzling; second, it dismisses two unsuccessful attempts to resolve the puzzle; third, it explains why intervening agency sometimes has the effect of changing the nature of the causal structure in which an agent acts, though noting as well that intervening agency is not unique in having that effect; and finally, it explores how these ideas might be relevant to just war theory and eliminative killing in that context.


Author(s):  
Fernando R. Tesón ◽  
Bas van der Vossen

We introduce general concepts of just war theory and describe different kinds of war: national self-defense, collective self-defense, and humanitarian intervention. After laying down the conditions for the justification of humanitarian intervention, we highlight some of our differences. We conclude with an outline of the international law of use of force and some jurisprudential themes that bear on the current humanitarian intervention debate.


1984 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 108-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kelley

The words “liberty” and “liberalism” have a common root, reflecting the commitment of the original or classical liberals to a free society. Over the last century, the latter term has come to represent a political position that is willing to sacrifice liberty in the economic realm for the sake of equality and/or collective welfare. As a consequence, those who wish to reaffirm the classical version of liberalism – those who advocate liberty in economic as well as personal and intellectual matters – have invented a new word from the old root; they call themselves libertarians. Both in doctrine and in etymology, then, partisans of this view define themselves by their allegiance to liberty. Yet they spend most of their day-to-day polemical energies defending property rights and the economic system of laissez-faire capitalism that is based upon such rights. Evidently there is a strong link between liberty and property at work here. What is that link?The history of political thought is full of ideas and controversies about precisely this question. My goal here is to raise the question in a specific form, one that I think captures a basic difference in approach between classical liberals and most libertarians today. The difference is not in the substance of the position – it is not a disagreement about how the ideal society would be constituted – but rather in the way the position is to be defended. The key question is: can the right to property be derived from the right to liberty?Of course a property right is a right to kind of freedom.


2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 571-591 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRIAN OREND

The introduction explains how this essay articulates the issue of ‘justice after war’ from the point of view of just-war theory, and how such a view can and ought to impact upon international law, for instance by inspiring the eventual development of a new treaty, or Geneva Convention, exclusively concerned with issues of postwar justice. In the body of the essay, attention is first given to explaining why just-war theory has traditionally ignored, or even rejected, jus post bellum. Second, argument is made as to why this ignorance and rejection must be overcome, and replaced with information and inclusion. Third, principles drawing on traditional just-war theory are constructed and defended, for jus post bellum in general and for forcible postwar regime change in particular. Finally, several remaining challenges are addressed, seeking to dissolve doubts and strengthen resolve towards working for progress on this vital and topical issue of jus post bellum.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 413-436 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauro Barelli

AbstractThe right of peoples to self-determination represents one of the most controversial norms of international law. In particular, two questions connected with the meaning and scope of this right have been traditionally contentious: first, who constitutes a ‘people’ for the purposes of self-determination, and, secondly, what does the right of self-determination actually imply for its legitimate holders. Against this unsettled background, the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) affirmed, in a straightforward manner, that indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. In light of the uncertainties that were mentioned above, it becomes necessary to clarify the actual implications of this important recognition. This article will seek to do so by discussing the drafting history of the provision on self-determination contained in the UNDRIP and positioning it within the broader normative framework of the instrument.


Author(s):  
Vladislav V. Gruzdev ◽  
Dmitriy A. Babichev ◽  
Natal'ya A. Babicheva

The article is devoted to the burning problem that arose in 2014 in the Ukraine, in the regions of Lugansk and Donetsk, and that concerns the right of the people of Donbass to self-determination. This problem is not only of a local territorial nature, but it is also one of the most complex debatable problems of international law. Since the right to self-determination contradicts the principle of territorial integrity of the state, the consideration and solution of this issue is the most burning for the whole population living on the territory of the self-proclaimed people's republics of Lugansk and Donetsk. In the article, the authors analyse the concept of "self-determination of the people" and give a generalised characteristic of it, approving that it is the right of every nation to solve the issues of state structure, political status, economic, social and cultural development independently and at its own discretion. The author also examines the historical past of the people of Donbass, where, in terms of the Republic of Donetsk and Krivoy Rog and various documentary historical and legal materials, we come to the conclusion that the population of Donbass has the right to social, economic, cultural, spiritual and other development just as all the recognised countries of the world.


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