Conclusion

Author(s):  
Michelle Murray

This chapter summarizes the book’s main argument, outlines its contribution to international relations scholarship, and applies the argument to current debates about the rise of China. Two positions dominate current debates about US foreign policy and the rise of China: engagement, which calls for integrating China deeply into the global economy and institutional architecture of the international order; and containment, which sees security competition as an inevitable outgrowth of Chinese power, and calls for the United States to preemptively increase its military presence in the region. This chapter argues that by focusing narrowly on China’s economic and military interests, the current debate misses an important aspect of China’s rise because it fails to consider the social motivations of rising great powers. Building on the core argument of this book, it suggests that only by accepting China’s recognition-claims can the United States facilitate China’s peaceful rise. The chapter concludes by exploring how the United States might navigate a foreign policy that both approaches China as a recognized partner in leading the international order and also protects its regional and global interests—and if such recognition is even possible.

Author(s):  
I. Danilin

The “technological war” between the United States and China that started in 2017–2018 raises a number of questions about the future role of technological development as a factor in relations between superpowers. Analysis shows that for the United States this conflict is caused by changing balance of risks and benefits of the liberal model of globalization due to the rise of China`s power and growing geopolitical tensions between the two nations. In this context, emerging, especially digital, technologies appear to be a new battlefield between superpowers. Within the realist framework, actors consider emerging technologies as a key factor for strengthening their global postures. This, among other things, contributes to securitized technological agenda and strengthens its geopolitical dimension. Neo-technonationalism has become the platform that integrates different processes and goals into new U.S. policy. Although historically neo-technonationalism took its roots in Asia, the evolving market situation prompted the United States to rethink existing approaches and to upgrade the techno-nationalist dimension of its policy. Considering similar policies of China and the EU (i. e. the European digital sovereignty policy), this trend shapes new realities of technological “blocs”, the struggle for expansion of technological platforms, and technological conflicts. Taking into account prospective development needs of the global economy and future specification of mutual interest areas, as new digital technologies mature, the ground for normalizing the dialogue between the superpowers will emerge. However, at least in the U.S.–China case, this issue will be complicated by geopolitical contradictions that leave little room for any serious compromise.


Author(s):  
G. John Ikenberry

This chapter examines the types of challenges that rising states might bring to struggles over international order with a view to the distinctive character of the American-led liberal order and the ways in which this existing order creates constraints and incentives for a rising China. This is contextualized by the geopolitical setting in which China is situated. The chapter argues that even as China faces constraints on the pursuit of a revisionist agenda, it finds incentives to operate within a liberal-oriented international order. China and the United States seem destined to clash over the terms of order in East Asia. But it is a clash that will unfold in a different world-historical setting than past power transitions. The rise of China may bring to an end the era of American hegemony—but it will be harder for China to end the liberal world order that the American era wrought.


2012 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 41-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Beckley

Two assumptions dominate current foreign policy debates in the United States and China. First, the United States is in decline relative to China. Second, much of this decline is the result of globalization and the hegemonic burdens the United States bears to sustain globalization. Both of these assumptions are wrong. The United States is not in decline; in fact, it is now wealthier, more innovative, and more militarily powerful compared to China than it was in 1991. Moreover, globalization and hegemony do not erode U.S. power; they reinforce it. The United States derives competitive advantages from its hegemonic position, and globalization allows it to exploit these advantages, attracting economic activity and manipulating the international system to its benefit. The United States should therefore continue to prop up the global economy and maintain a robust diplomatic and military presence abroad.


1995 ◽  
pp. 523-542
Author(s):  
Erich Weede

Currently there is a unipolar distribution of power. The United States reigns supreme. Russia's economic power will remain insufficient to underwrite a renewed attempt to establish global leadership. While the European Community still commands sufficient resources for exercising global leadership, it lacks the political foundation for unitary action. Moreover, the European addiction to the welfare state undermines European competitiveness. Japan is too much of a "trading state" and unlikely to become a first-rate military power, before she is overtaken by China in economic size. So, count Russia, Europe and Japan out as conceivable challengers to United States hegemony. China is the only plausible candidate. Its economic growth rate is nothing less than spectacular. Moreover, the Chinese government seems capable of extracting the necessary resources for waging a hegemonic rivalry from a society that is likely to remain quite poor for at least another generation. There are a number of conceivable scenarios for the emerging American-Chinese relationship. The future will depend on the relative speed of the American decline and the rise of China as well as on the openness of the global economy. The more open the global economy, the better the prospects for rising per capita incomes in China become, the better the prospects for some mellowing or even democratization of the Chinese regime. Only if the West sticks together under American leadership and if creeping capitalism in China leads to creeping democratization later, is hegemonic rivalry likely to remain benign and peaceful.


Author(s):  
Paul K. MacDonald ◽  
Joseph M. Parent

This chapter asks the central question, outlines the three main arguments, and explains the value added of the work. It underscores why the question matters to theories of international politics and policy debates on the rise of China and the decline of the United States. It also defines decline and retrenchment,relates retrenchment to a spectrum of grand strategies, and provides a map of the rest of the book.


2020 ◽  
pp. 205-229
Author(s):  
D. Hugh Whittaker ◽  
Timothy J. Sturgeon ◽  
Toshie Okita ◽  
Tianbiao Zhu

Compressed-development influences increasingly flow from developing to developed countries. Reversing our lens to look at the United States and Japan, we observe that the technological and organizational changes that have spurred compressed development in recent developers are also responsible for changes in industry structure, rising inequality, and employment duality in developed economies. A ‘Red Queen’ effect sees developed countries running faster and undertaking parallel socioeconomic changes to stay in the same privileged place. In some ways ‘we are all compressed developers now’. Looking ahead, and returning to our dyadic pairs, the chapter further considers how the ‘digital economy’ may affect developing–developed country interrelations, and whether we are finally entering an age of ‘great convergence’ with the rise of China and a more multipolar economic and geopolitical structure.


2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 444-464
Author(s):  
Sovinda Po ◽  
Christopher B. Primiano

In this article, drawing from both interviews and secondary sources, we examine why Cambodia welcomes the rise of China when other states appear to be less enthusiastic. Despite the alarm in the region at China’s assertiveness, Cambodia, unlike some other nation states, has chosen to bandwagon with China. While some states in the region are pursuing a mixed strategy of economic engagement with China on the one hand and security alignment with the United States on the other (i.e. hedging), which allows such states to be on good terms with both the United States and China, Cambodia has embraced China almost exclusively. Situating the issue within the IR literature of bandwagoning, balancing, and hedging, this article presents four variables explaining the motivations behind Cambodia’s bandwagoning policy towards China. Towards the end, we offer some suggestions for Cambodia to move forward.


2019 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-362
Author(s):  
Tsuyoshi Kawasaki

An unprecedented geopolitical landscape, driven by the reduction of Arctic ice and the rise of China as “a Polar power,” is emerging. What does this mean for Canada, and how should Canada respond to it in a systematic and strategic manner? We need a coherent and holistic conceptual framework to answer these key policy questions. Yet, the current literatures do not offer us such a concept. In an attempt to fill the void, this article presents a vision that conceives of Canada as “a peninsula state” exposed to great power politics in its vicinity, involving China as a rising power as well as the United States and Russia as resident powers. Furthermore, it argues that Canada should be prepared for three kinds of strategic dynamics as it enters the game of great power politics: theatre-linkage tactics and wedge-driving tactics vis-à-vis China and Russia, as well as quasi-alliance dilemma with the United States. Moreover, in order for Canada to cope with this complex international environment effectively, this article calls for creating a cabinet-level unit to coordinate various federal bureaucracies’ foreign and security policies.


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