Are We All Compressed Developers?

2020 ◽  
pp. 205-229
Author(s):  
D. Hugh Whittaker ◽  
Timothy J. Sturgeon ◽  
Toshie Okita ◽  
Tianbiao Zhu

Compressed-development influences increasingly flow from developing to developed countries. Reversing our lens to look at the United States and Japan, we observe that the technological and organizational changes that have spurred compressed development in recent developers are also responsible for changes in industry structure, rising inequality, and employment duality in developed economies. A ‘Red Queen’ effect sees developed countries running faster and undertaking parallel socioeconomic changes to stay in the same privileged place. In some ways ‘we are all compressed developers now’. Looking ahead, and returning to our dyadic pairs, the chapter further considers how the ‘digital economy’ may affect developing–developed country interrelations, and whether we are finally entering an age of ‘great convergence’ with the rise of China and a more multipolar economic and geopolitical structure.

Author(s):  
I. Danilin

The “technological war” between the United States and China that started in 2017–2018 raises a number of questions about the future role of technological development as a factor in relations between superpowers. Analysis shows that for the United States this conflict is caused by changing balance of risks and benefits of the liberal model of globalization due to the rise of China`s power and growing geopolitical tensions between the two nations. In this context, emerging, especially digital, technologies appear to be a new battlefield between superpowers. Within the realist framework, actors consider emerging technologies as a key factor for strengthening their global postures. This, among other things, contributes to securitized technological agenda and strengthens its geopolitical dimension. Neo-technonationalism has become the platform that integrates different processes and goals into new U.S. policy. Although historically neo-technonationalism took its roots in Asia, the evolving market situation prompted the United States to rethink existing approaches and to upgrade the techno-nationalist dimension of its policy. Considering similar policies of China and the EU (i. e. the European digital sovereignty policy), this trend shapes new realities of technological “blocs”, the struggle for expansion of technological platforms, and technological conflicts. Taking into account prospective development needs of the global economy and future specification of mutual interest areas, as new digital technologies mature, the ground for normalizing the dialogue between the superpowers will emerge. However, at least in the U.S.–China case, this issue will be complicated by geopolitical contradictions that leave little room for any serious compromise.


Author(s):  
Paul K. MacDonald ◽  
Joseph M. Parent

This chapter asks the central question, outlines the three main arguments, and explains the value added of the work. It underscores why the question matters to theories of international politics and policy debates on the rise of China and the decline of the United States. It also defines decline and retrenchment,relates retrenchment to a spectrum of grand strategies, and provides a map of the rest of the book.


2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 444-464
Author(s):  
Sovinda Po ◽  
Christopher B. Primiano

In this article, drawing from both interviews and secondary sources, we examine why Cambodia welcomes the rise of China when other states appear to be less enthusiastic. Despite the alarm in the region at China’s assertiveness, Cambodia, unlike some other nation states, has chosen to bandwagon with China. While some states in the region are pursuing a mixed strategy of economic engagement with China on the one hand and security alignment with the United States on the other (i.e. hedging), which allows such states to be on good terms with both the United States and China, Cambodia has embraced China almost exclusively. Situating the issue within the IR literature of bandwagoning, balancing, and hedging, this article presents four variables explaining the motivations behind Cambodia’s bandwagoning policy towards China. Towards the end, we offer some suggestions for Cambodia to move forward.


2019 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-362
Author(s):  
Tsuyoshi Kawasaki

An unprecedented geopolitical landscape, driven by the reduction of Arctic ice and the rise of China as “a Polar power,” is emerging. What does this mean for Canada, and how should Canada respond to it in a systematic and strategic manner? We need a coherent and holistic conceptual framework to answer these key policy questions. Yet, the current literatures do not offer us such a concept. In an attempt to fill the void, this article presents a vision that conceives of Canada as “a peninsula state” exposed to great power politics in its vicinity, involving China as a rising power as well as the United States and Russia as resident powers. Furthermore, it argues that Canada should be prepared for three kinds of strategic dynamics as it enters the game of great power politics: theatre-linkage tactics and wedge-driving tactics vis-à-vis China and Russia, as well as quasi-alliance dilemma with the United States. Moreover, in order for Canada to cope with this complex international environment effectively, this article calls for creating a cabinet-level unit to coordinate various federal bureaucracies’ foreign and security policies.


2009 ◽  
Vol 16 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 41-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alice Lyman Miller

AbstractAmerican public discourse today about the rise of China and its implications for the United States frequently draws on broad themes and parallels from Chinese history, both to explicate China's present and to project its future. These themes and parallels draw on a picture of the Chinese past that, as recently as twenty-five years ago, was embraced by many (though by no means all) professional historians and propagated by some of them as the best means to understand contemporary China. But since the 1970s, the community of historians of China has produced work that severely undermines longstanding conventional judgments of China's past. As a consequence, the historical themes and parallels that once were thought useful in illuminating interpretation of contemporary China have been stood on their head.


Author(s):  
Nasa'i Muhammad Gwadabe

The apparent eroding in the hegemonic power of the United States and the sustained growth of China has triggered debate as to whether the rise of China will be peaceful or conflictual. Structural realism posits that the world is characterised by the anarchic ordering principle in which there is no central authority sitting above the states. Therefore, the absence of a “leviathan” on the international system automatically makes every state equal on the system which created an atmosphere of competition for the maximisation of power for survival. On a similar line of reasoning, the Power Transition theory as a variant theory within realism postulates that when the international system is structured based on the principle of hierarchy, peace will reign. It means that when international relations are regulated and influenced by a dominant power, the international system becomes stable. But the emergence of a dissatisfied powerful nation to challenge the hegemon usually ends up in war. Based on this assumption, Power Transition theorists argued that the rise of China to rival the dominance of the United States could not be peaceful. The Power Transition theory has influenced many academics to have the belief that the two nations will end up in “Thucydides’ Trap”. This belief has aggravated the matter beyond the reasonable level and has instilled panic in the mind of foreign policymakers which could jeopardise world peace and international cooperation. Hence, this paper aims to critically evaluate the deficiency of the Power Transition theory in the 21st century in explaining the current United States-China relations and the prospect of peace or war between the two nations using process tracing. Accordingly, in this paper, it is argued that in the 21st century, an armed confrontation between the United States and China is highly unlikely. Because in today’s world, nations (including the United States and China) are intertwined by the forces of globalisation which created inexorable economic interdependence. Additionally, there is rapid advancement in military technology and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction which came with the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Consequently, there is a need to revisit the Power Transition theory to accommodate contemporary factors. The inclusion of the current variables into the Theory will make it applicable and adequately fit in the discourse of international relations and global politics of the 21st-century international system.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lian Degui

The roots of US policy toward China are laid in the geopolitical thinking mode of its strategic culture. This mode of thinking first originated in Britain and later evolved into geopolitics. Bearing such thoughts, the United States sees China as a country at the southeastern rim of the Eurasian continent, and the rise of China is a threat to its dominance as a maritime state in the Eurasian continent. No matter the rotation of governing parties in the United States, containing the development of China is not merely an expedient for electoral politics but an inevitable choice for maritime states to contain continental states and an objectively necessary national security strategy aimed at retaining the global hegemony of the United States. As China further develops, such intention will become more and more apparent. In order to achieve the goal of slowing down China’s development pace and maintaining US’s political dominance over Eurasia, it seems that the United States has to build a maritime alliance system. The alliance between Japan and the United States will be further strengthened since Japan is a strategic pivot of this system. However, Japan’s perception of interests and strategic thinking are not fully aligned with those of the United States, and as a result, Japan will choose strategies with a certain degree of autonomy, thus eventually limiting the implementation of US’s geopolitical strategies. From the viewpoints of power transfer, geopolitics and ideology for the confrontation between maritime and continental states, this paper focuses on the limitations of the geopolitical thinking behind US’s policy-making toward China and the relatively autonomous strategy of Japan to analyze the status quo and underlying trends of China–US–Japan relations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (04) ◽  
pp. 19-27
Author(s):  
Weixing CHEN

The rise of China has shaken, to some extent, the pillars sustaining the US dominance in the world. Facing structural challenges from China, the United States has responded on three levels: political, strategic and policy. The Donald Trump administration has adopted a hard-line approach while attempting to engage China at the structural level. The China–US relationship is entering uncertain times, and the reconstruction of the relationship could take a decade.


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