The Market Economy

2020 ◽  
pp. 119-138
Author(s):  
Kevin Vallier

The market economy can create trust for the right reasons. Markets and property rights promote social and political trust in the real world by creating social cohesion through exchange and generating economic growth. Markets also arise from private property rights, which are publicly justified based on the essential role private property rights play in protecting individual rights and the rights of associations. This includes private property rights in capital, that is, productive property, which means that a broadly market-based economy will be a central feature in any society that maintains high levels of social and political trust in the right ways.

Author(s):  
Vyacheslav Vovk

Russia is a resource-rich country, and great changes are being made today in order that land and its resources are used for the benefit of any citizen of our state. Under the circumstances government supervision (control) over the optimal use of territories gets the essential role. The rights that are contained in land reform give owners, landowners, land users, and employers extensive powers concerning independent land management.


2020 ◽  
pp. 57-64
Author(s):  
L.D. Rudenko ◽  
O.L. Orlov

The article has substantiated the process of the de facto replacement of the right of private property by the rights of use; distinguished stages in the development of the private property institution in Ukraine; specified grounds for the emergence and termination of the right of private property and the rights of use; refined sense and scope of responsibility of the private owner and the holder;identified the main instrument of substitution of the right of private property by the rights of use; traced preconditions for passing inconsistent judgements on property protection by the ECHR; and analyzed possible consequences of further substitution of the right of private property by the rights of use. Regard to findings of the study it was considered about instability of the private property institution; identity between unofficial grounds for the termination of the right of private property and unofficial grounds for the emergence of the rights of use; existence of the direct threat to owner status in Ukraine; absence of legal grounds for increasing the sense of owner responsibility, including taxation of the private property; transformation of the feudal law into the modern rights of use combined with the right of possession; possibility of establishing a real type of polity and prospects for its development by ways of regulation of the ownership relations. The article has also considered about creating preconditions for restoring the feudal law and replacing democratic polity by a monarchy in Ukraine and other countries owing to severe restrictions on the right of private property, above all, through taxation of the privateproperty, and its de facto replacementby the rights of use.


Author(s):  
Thomas Apolte

Creation of ownership structures under private law as well as market liberalization can be seen as central to transformation. This chapter examines how private property rights, among others, encourage economic efficiency, strengthen economic competition, make businesses subject to the discipline of the market, and create a capital market. The emergence and development of a property rights structure at a given point in time is always also the result of a conflictual history. One of the advantages of a developed market economy is that conflictual resource acquisition lies in the past and has ceased to play a significant role in the recognition of the existing distribution of wealth. It is astonishing how little conflict was caused by post-socialist privatization.


Author(s):  
Dian Khoreanita Pratiwi ◽  

The state is responsible for protecting the entire Indonesian nation through the implementation of housing and settlement areas so that people are able to live and live in decent and affordable houses in a healthy, safe, harmonious and sustainable environment throughout Indonesia. Article 28H paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution stipulates that everyone has the right to live in physical and spiritual prosperity, to have a place to live, and to have a good and healthy environment and have the right to obtain health services. Then Article 28H paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution states that everyone has the right to have private property rights and these property rights may not be taken over arbitrarily by anyone. The research method used is empirical juridical research, which is to see the extent of the government's ability to provide housing for the poor. As for the results of the research, that the implementation of government programs in meeting housing needs for the poor, where the government has launched several programs, which include the construction of flats, special houses, assistance for the construction of infrastructure, facilities and utilities, housing financing assistance, and self-help housing stimulus assistance. Even though there have been many programs, not all residents have a decent place to live.


Author(s):  
Christina Scriven

A large literature on institutions has developed that claims that institutions influence long-run growth and development; thus, it becomes critical to carefully examine what institutions influence which outcomes to better understand factors that influence long-run economic growth across countries. Douglass North terms institutions as the rules of the game and this paper will work to further examine these rules by looking at private property rights institutions, which are the rules and regulation protecting citizens against the power of the government and elites , and contracting institutions, which are the rules and regulations governing contracts between ordinary citizens. The paper Unbundling Institutions , published in the Journal of Political Economy by Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson in 2005, seeks to conceptualize the different factors within the institutional framework and provide some semblance of which of these factors provide the most relevant analysis. The paper finds that property rights institutions have a strong influence on long-run economic growth, investment, and financial development, while contracting institutions have a more limited impact on those same factors. My presentation will give a concise background on the development of the new institutional approach and explain the reasoning for the conceptual divide between property rights and contracting institutions. Using a two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) approach and the instrumental variable approach, the presentation will address issues of causality and correlation. Identifying the link to the policy arena will provide context as to why this area is of particular importance.


2007 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maja Drakic

In reality privatization has never occurred according to the handbook rules of ordinary market transactions. Not even in advanced market economies can privatization transactions be described by the Walrasian or Arrowian, or Leontiefian equilibrium models, or by the equilibrium models of the game theory. In these economies transactions of privatization take place in a fairly organic way ? which means that those are driven by the dominance of private property rights and in a market economy. But despite this fact Western privatization also some peculiar features as compared to ordinary company takeovers, since the state as the seller may pursue non ? economic goals. Changes in the dominant form of property change positions and status of many individuals and groups in the society. That?s why privatization can even less be explained by ordinary market mechanisms in transition countries where privatizing state-owned property have happened in a mass scale and where markets and private property rights weren't established at the time process of privatization began. In this paper I?ll discuss and analyze the phenomenon of privatization in context of different economic theories arguing that empirical results go in favor of the public choice theory (Buchanan, 1978), theory of "economic constitution" (Brennan and Buchanan 1985), (Buchanan and Tullock, 1989), and theory of "collective action" (Olson, 1982). These theories argues that transition from one economic system into another, for example transition from collectivistic, socialistic system into capitalism and free market economy with dominant private property, will not happen through isolated changes of only few economic institutions, no matter how deep that changes would be. In other words privatization can not give results if it's not followed by comprehensive change of economic system because privatized companied wouldn't be able to operate in old environment.


1983 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 132-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Mack

An ongoing tension exists within the Lockean tradition in political philosophy between the claim that each individual is the “Proprietor of his own Person” and the claim that nature is “that which God gave to Mankind in common.” The former claim points to a realm of discrete individual entitlements only formally equal in the sense of each individual having jurisdiction over his own person and not over any other person, while the latter points either to a collective entitlement to nature or to individual entitlements to substantively equal shares of nature. Were the two realms, that of persons and that of extra-personal nature, separate and independent, no tension would arise from the union of these two claims. But the realms are manifestly interconnected. Individuals acquire, use, labor upon, invest their time and energy on, and transform, more or less in accordance with their purposes, elements of extra-personal nature. And Locke and his followers believe that at least certain of these interactions with segments of nature give rise to individual property rights to the segments thereby appropriated, labored upon, transformed, or whatever. The traditional bridging notion is each person's right to his own labor which is seen as part of each person's proprietorship over himself. According to this tradition, if the right of each individual over his own person is to be respected, individual titles to appropriated, labored upon, or transformed nature must also be respected.The task for anyone seeking to embrace all the strands within this Lockean heritage is to reconcile, a) this right to one's own labor and the (or some) system of private property rights tied to it (which system will include historical entitlement principles for legitimating later property configurations) plus the right of self-ownership (or some equivalent) which lies behind the right to one's own labor, with b) some distributionist ideal, at least with regard to natural resources.


1993 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H. Riker ◽  
David L. Weimer

All our previous political experience, and especially, of course, the experience of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, offers little hope that democracy can coexist with the centralized allocation of economic resources. Indeed, simple observation suggests that a market economy with private property rights is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the existence of a democratic political regime. And this accords fully with the political theory of liberalism, which emphasizes that private rights, both civil and economic, be protected and secure. At the same time, our previous experience also indicates that market economies are more successful than centrally planned economies not only in producing, but also in distributing, both private and collective goods. This economic experienee is supported by neoclassical economic theory, which treats clearly defined and secure rights to private property as essential to a market economy.


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