Impeachments

Author(s):  
Richard B. Collins ◽  
Dale A. Oesterle ◽  
Lawrence Friedman

This chapter details Article XIII of the Colorado Constitution, which defines and authorizes impeachments. Section 1 provides that the house of representatives has sole power to impeach officers identified in Section 2, by majority vote of all members. The senate has sole power to try impeachments, conviction to require votes of at least two-thirds “of the senators elected.”. Section 2 provides that the governor and other state and judicial officers are subject to impeachment and removal for “high crimes or misdemeanors or malfeasance in office.” Section 3 authorizes the general assembly to pass laws for removal of “officers not liable to impeachment” for misconduct or malfeasance in office.

1954 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
John B. Whitton ◽  
J. Edward Fowler

It would appear that the treaty-making procedure, long considered too cumbersome and too difficult, has suddenly become too easy. Almost from the beginning, the system whereby one-third plus one of the Senate membership can block any treaty, has been denounced as “undemocratic,” and as “government by minority.” In fact, as late as 1945 the House of Representatives approved a Constitutional Amendment to permit the approval of any treaty by a mere majority vote of the two Houses.


1917 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 685-710
Author(s):  
Joseph Cady Allen

According to popular parlance, we elect a President and vice-president, on the Tuesday following the first Monday of November of each fourth year, by vote of the people. It is well known however that, technically speaking, we do not choose these officers on that day or at any time by popular suffrage. Instead of that, we choose in each state a committee that is called the electoral college; and these electors meet on the second Monday of January and elect the President and vice-president by ballot. The theory of the Constitution is that these electors are not to be pledged or obligated to vote for any particular person, but that they and not the people shall really make the choice.But, practically from the start, and contrary to the expectation of those who framed the Constitution, the choice of President and vice-president was seized by state legislatures and afterwards transferred to the people, through the device of appointing electors that were virtually pledged to designated candidates. So the electoral colleges have failed of their purpose and become a useless complication. And not only are they useless, but objectionable also and dangerous in many and serious ways.This paper will endeavor to show that our present system of presidential election is bad in every step of the process, viz. in a. the appointment of the electors, b. the membership and proceedings of the electoral colleges, c. the count of the vote in congress, d. the interval between the election and the time when the President takes office, and e. the election by the house of representatives in case the electors fail to give a majority vote to any candidate.


1945 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 459-463
Author(s):  
Albert B. Saye

Fully as interesting as the provisions of the proposed new constitution that will be submitted to the voters of Georgia at a special election on August 7, 1945, is the method by which the document was framed. The constitution of the state now in force, adopted in 1877 soon after the state was freed from carpet-bag rule, is a long and complicated document, filled with detailed limitations on the government, particularly in the field of finance. As a result of the inclusion of numerous provisions statutory in nature, the document has been amended three hundred and one times in a period of sixty-eight years. Recognizing the need for a new constitution, the Institute of Public Affairs of the University of Georgia drew up A Proposed Constitution for Georgia in 1931. This document proposed a thorough revision of the structure of the government, including such radical changes as the substitution of 30 districts for the existing 161 counties as the basis of representation in the General Assembly. The widespread publicity given the document served to stimulate interest in constitutional revision, and most of the press of the state, notably the Atlanta Journal, has in recent years actively supported the movement.In March, 1943, the General Assembly passed a resolution, sponsored by Governor Ellis Arnall, providing for a commission of twenty-three members to revise the constitution. The commission was to be composed of the governor, the president of the senate, the speaker of the house of representatives, three members of the senate appointed by the president, five members of the house appointed by the speaker, a justice of the supreme court designated by the court, a judge of the court of appeals designated by the court, the attorney general, the state auditor, two judges of the superior courts, three practicing attorneys-at-law, and three laymen to be appointed by the governor. The resolution provided that the report of this commission should be submitted to the General Assembly either in the form of proposed amendments to the constitution or as a proposed new constitution, to be acted upon by the General Assembly and submitted to the people for ratification or rejection.


1940 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 306-310
Author(s):  
Roscoe Baker

In 1921, the House of Representatives of the Ohio General Assembly established a committee of eight members whose duty it was to scan all bills introduced for the purpose of determining whether they were frivolous or irrelevant, not introduced in good faith, or duplications of existing law. When this committee had satisfied itself on these points, bills were to be reported back to the House with recommendations of assignment to appropriate standing committees, thus relieving the speaker of this particular duty. In 1929, the rule covering the functions of this Reference Committee was amended so as to permit it to recommend changes, combine bills, and give its approval to “the form and legal effect” of bills. Other changes in 1937 and 1939 dealt with the number of members serving on the committee, and allowed the committee eight legislative days, instead of six, for disposing of bills. The rule under which the committee now functions is as follows:“When a bill has been read the first time, it shall be referred to the Reference Committee for its consideration and report within eight legislative days after such reference. If it be apparent to said committee that any bill is of a frivolous nature, or that it was not introduced in good faith, or that it is a duplication of a House bill, or can easily be handled as an amendment to a House bill already introduced, or that it is in conflict with or a duplication of an existing statute without making proper provision for the repeal or amendment of such existing statute, said committee shall report said bill back to the House for its return to the author with a notation thereon of the reason for its return.


Author(s):  
Keith T. Poole

The chapter discusses different ways to estimate the dimensionality of roll-call voting data. These methods use data from the U.S. House of Representatives, and the author shows that there were periods when a two-dimensional representation was necessary and others when a one-dimensional representation captures all but a relatively small percentage of the variance. The author then considers data from the UN General Assembly from before the fall of the Berlin Wall, finding a communist vs. anti-communist dimension and a pro- and anti-Israel dimension, as well as data from the French National Assembly early in the 5th Republic that finds a one-dimensional representation fits nearly perfectly. The author then considers some more technical issues about best methods, concluding that there is no foolproof way of determining the “true” dimensionality of a roll-call matrix, and no substitute for substantive understanding of the politics and policy shaping the roll calls.


2013 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 147
Author(s):  
Brenda L Gunn

The majority vote by the General Assembly, which brought the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples into existence as an international instrument, was just the first step.  Now the long and difficult road of implementation begins.  Implementation requires the application of international law in a specific national context.  This article explores the potential obstacles to implement the UN Declaration in Canada and suggest avenues to overcome these obstacles.  This article concludes that the main obstacle is not a legal one, but rather a lack of political will.  Given the limited understandings of the UN Declaration as an international instrument and how international law applies in Canada, this article provides an overview of the significance of a Declaration in international law and also explains how international law applies in Canada.  The main recommendation to promote implementation is greater education on the UN Declaration.  However, there are also many actions that Indigenous peoples, lawyers and advocates can take to promote implementation in legal and political domains that are discussed at the end of the article. Le vote majoritaire de l’Assemblée générale, qui a donné naissance à la Déclaration des Nations unies sur les droits des peuples autochtones comme instrument international, était la toute première étape.  Commence maintenant le long et difficile parcours vers sa mise en œuvre.  Cette mise en œuvre requiert l’application du droit international dans un contexte national particulier.  Le présent article examine les obstacles potentiels à la mise en œuvre de la Déclaration des Nations unies au Canada et propose des avenues pour surmonter ces obstacles. Cet article conclut que le principal obstacle n’est pas de nature juridique, mais réside dans l’absence de volonté politique. Étant donné que la Déclaration des Nations unies en tant qu’instrument international et la façon dont le droit international s’applique au Canada ne sont pas bien compris, cet article offre un aperçu de la signification d’une Déclaration en droit international et explique également comment le droit international s’applique au Canada.  Pour promouvoir sa mise en œuvre, on recommande principalement une éducation accrue concernant la Déclaration des Nations unies.  Il existe en outre bon nombre de mesures que les peuples autochtones, les avocats et les défenseurs de droits peuvent prendre pour encourager sa mise en œuvre dans les milieux juridiques et politiques. Ces mesures sont abordées à la fin de l’article.


SASI ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 516
Author(s):  
Suparto Suparto

The government system in post-reform Indonesia is a presidential system with many parties. The advantage of this system is that it is more democratic because many parties are considered to accommodate the wishes and interests of people from various backgrounds through political parties, while the weakness is that it is difficult for the ruling party if it is not in the majority. The purpose of this study was to determine the implementation of a presidential system of multi-party governance in post-reform Indonesia. The results of the study are that in a presidential government system with many parties (multi-party system) such as in Indonesia, it will cause problems if no political party wins the election with a majority vote, the President must build a coalition with a number of political parties that have representatives in the House of Representatives (DPR). DPR). Since the holding of the 1999 and 2004 elections, there have been efforts to simplify political parties, by reducing the number of election participants through the electoral threshold and then changing since 2009 to reducing the number of political parties that may sit in parliament by using the minimum threshold requirement (parliamentary threshold). However, this method has not been successful because there are still relatively many political parties sitting in parliament, this is due to the parliamentary threshold that is too small. Ideally, the parliamentary threshold, which was previously 4% in the 2019 election, is raised to 8% in the 2024 election. Thus, a strong, effective and stable presidential government system with only 4 (four) to 6 (six) political parties will be realized.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 494-504

On December 18, 2019, by a majority vote, the House of Representatives impeached President Trump for abusing power by soliciting Ukrainian interference in the 2020 presidential election and then obstructing the House's impeachment investigation. The allegations against Trump rested substantially on a phone conversation between Trump and Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky on July 25, 2019. During this conversation, Trump asked Zelensky to investigate the prior conduct of Joe Biden—Trump's likely political opponent for the 2020 presidential election. While the House was conducting its impeachment investigation, the White House directed executive branch officials not to testify or to turn over documents. Less than two months after the impeachment, on February 5, 2020, the Senate voted to acquit Trump of the charges, with a majority of Senators voting in favor of acquittal.


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