Double Negation

Unsaying God ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 23-72
Author(s):  
Aydogan Kars

This chapter introduces the contours of the classical Ismāʿīlī negative theology of the divine essence. The apophatic path developed by Ismāʿīlī scholars had distinct cosmological markers and a logical structure that enabled the performative self-cancellation of discourse about the inaccessible divine essence. Respecting their diversity, and without essentializing or dehistoricizing them, we can highlight three general features that widely circulated among Ismāʿīlī thinkers until the Mongol invasion: (1) They put the divine essence beyond the divine word, which lies beyond the first creation, the universal intellect. (2) The relative oneness of the divine word can be transcended only by two negations. The first one negates the positive ground and relationality, and the second cancels all (positive and negative) discursivity in order to indicate the beyond of the relative oneness beyond creation. (3) The absolute oneness of God is unknowable, beyond the impenetrable oneness of the divine word.

2019 ◽  
pp. 158-176
Author(s):  
Ohad Nachtomy

The chapter starts with Leibniz’s characterization of God, the most perfect Being, as infinite in a hypercategorematic sense—i.e. a being beyond any determination. In contrast to this, creatures are determinate beings; they are determinate and thus limited and particular expressions of the divine essence. However, for Leibniz, creatures are also infinite; thus, creatures are seen as infinite and limited. This leads to taking creatures to be infinite in kind, in distinction from the absolute and hypercategorematic infinity of God. The author presents three lines of argument to substantiate this point: (1) understanding creatures as entailing a particular sequence of perfections and imperfections; (2) understanding creatures under the rubric of an intermediate degree of infinity and perfection that, in 1676, Leibniz calls maximum or infinite in kind; and (3) observing that primitive force, a defining feature of created substance, may be seen as infinite in a metaphysical sense.


2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-41
Author(s):  
Rico Gutschmidt

Abstract Scepticism and negative theology are best understood not as theoretical positions, but rather as forms of philosophical practice that performatively undermine our knowledge claims or our seeming understanding of God. In particular, I am arguing that both scepticism and negative theology invoke the failure of the attempt to understand the absolute, be it God or the notion of absolute objectivity. However, with reference to L. A. Paul’s notion of epistemically transformative experience, I am arguing that we still understand something about the absolute through the experience of failing to think it. This, of course, is a non-propositional form of understanding, and I am arguing that there is something about the finitude of the human condition that can only be understood through a transformative philosophical experience with respect to the absolute.


Unsaying God ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 73-128
Author(s):  
Aydogan Kars

In the centuries following al-Kindī, Muslim philosophers developed a coherent family of apophatic theological positions on the divine essence and its accessibility. The recurring aspects of this philosophical apophaticism were (1) a negative theology of divine attributes that reads them as negations, (2) the unknowability of the divine essence, closely connected with an Aristotelian version of the Neoplatonic distinction between discursive thought [dianoia] and non-discursive intellection [noēsis], (3) the necessary dissimilarity of God as the first cause of everything else, and (4) a philosophical hermeneutics that protects divine oneness and dissimilarity. Most of these aspects were established in conversation with the Muʿtazilites. As early as al-Kindī, Muslim philosophers adopted such a philosophical apophaticism of the divine nature, which later would take diverse forms, while preserving strategic resemblances.


Unsaying God ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Aydogan Kars

This chapter introduces the framework and the content of the book and discusses the basic conceptual problems revolving around “negative theology.” It argues that we should not only move from “negative theology” to “negative theologies” in order to approach Islamic intellectual landscapes, but we should also qualify the particular question of theology we are examining. Discussions of negative theology as such tend to confuse divine attributes and the divine essence and reduce apophaticism into a hunt for negative particles and statements. The chapter narrows down the scope of the book to the negative theologies of the divine essence. It also presents justifications for its boundaries and its linguistic preferences, and it defines some technical terms that appear throughout the book. It provides a conceptual introduction to negative theology and a compass to the subsequent chapters of the book.


1970 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antoni Gonzalo Carbó

Resumen: La capacidad visionaria que se traduce en valoración consciente de la Imagen como tal, es discernible en toda la obra de Ibn ʿArabī. Según el gran maestro andalusí, el conocimiento más elevado de la desnudez absoluta de la Esencia divina está más allá de toda imagen (la Entbildung del Maestro Eckhart o el Bildlosigkeit de Enrique Suso). Si en contexto de la mística renana del siglo XIII el Maestro Eckhart habla de la «imagen sin imagen» (bîld âne bîld) de Dios, un siglo antes el gran místico persa Farīd al-Dīn ʿAṭṭār se refiere a la Realidad divina en similares términos a las teofanías akbaríes más allá de las formas o de las imágenes: no-imagen (per. naqš-bi-naqš, bi-ṣūra, bi-nišān; cf. el Bildlosigkeit de Enrique Suso), i.e., la imagen original del mundo Invisible. Según Ibn ʿArabī, Él está más allá de cualquier representación, pero también más allá incluso de la ausencia de representación. Las teofanías más allá de las imágenes, que revelan la esencia divina en su completa desnudez, exigen la aniquilación del sujeto, la abolición provisional del yo, que, en el fondo de la experiencia, ignora incluso que está viendo a Dios. Solo puede aprehender ese portentoso hecho una vez que retorna a su conciencia ordinaria: «Si Me encuentras no Me verás, mas Me verás si Me pierdes»; «El que me ve y sabe que me ve, no me ve». El conocimiento supremo de Dios coincide con la ignorancia absoluta del propio yo, estando reservado para quien, sumido en la noche de su nada original, ha olvidado incluso su propio ser. La poesía de Mallarmé y de Rilke nos sirven para introducir, en el contexto de la espiritualidad islámica que nos ocupa, dos temas relacionados con la teología negativa: en primer lugar, el sentido simbólico que en el sufismo la blancura tiene como expresión del mundo invisible, y en segundo lugar, y estrechamente afín con el anterior, la trascendencia, abstracción e ignorancia que, en la mística de Ibn ʿArabī, van vinculadas a las teofanías más allá de las imágenes en el marco de la visión suprema del Increado. Su traslación al arte lo encontramos en los recursos a la pantalla vacía de imágenes en el cine de Robert Bresson o en la extinción de la imagen en el de Abbas Kiarostami.Abstract: The visionary ability that translates into a conscious appraisal of the Image as such, can be discerned in all of the works of Ibn ʿArabī. According to this great Andalusian master, the highest knowledge of the absolute nakedness of the divine essence lies beyond all images (e.g., in the Entbildung of Meister Eckhart or the Bildlosigkeit of Henry Suso). If in the context of the Rhineland mysticism of the thirteenth century, Meister Eckhart speaks of the «image without image» (bîld âne bîld) of God, a century earlier the great Persian mystic Farīd al-Dīn ʿAṭṭār refers to the divine Reality in terms similar to the akbarian theophanies beyond form and image: the non-image (in Persian, naqš-bi-naqš, bi-ṣūra, bi-nišān; cf. the Bildlosigkeit of Henry Suso), i.e., the original image of the invisible world. According to Ibn ʿArabī, He is beyond all representation, but also beyond even the absence of representation. Theophanies beyond images, which reveal the divine essence in its complete nakedness, demand the annihilation of the subject, the provisional abolition of the self, which, in the depths of experience, does not know even that it looks upon God. One only apprehends this prodigious fact on returning to ordinary consciousness: «If you find Me you will not see Me, but you will see Me if you lose Me»; «He who sees me and knows that he sees me, does not see me». The supreme knowledge of God coincides with absolute ignorance of the self. It is reserved for those who, immersed in the night of their original nothingness, have forgotten even their own being. In the context of Islamic spirituality as it concerns us here, the poetry of Mallarmé and Rilke serves to introduce two subjects related to negative theology: the first is the symbolic meaning that whiteness takes on in Sufism as an expression of the invisible world; and the second, which is closely connected to the first, is that transcendence, abstraction and ignorance, in the mysticism of Ibn ʿArabī, are linked to the theophanies beyond images in the framework of a supreme vision of the Uncreated. This vision is translated into art through the use of the blank screen, emptied of images, in the cinema of Robert Bresson and also through the extinction of the image in the cinema of Abbas Kiarostami.


Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 542
Author(s):  
Irina Sakhno

This article examines Kazimir Malevich’s Suprematist art in the context of negative (apophatic) theology, as a crucial tool in analyzing both the artist’s theoretical conclusions and his new visual optics. Our analysis rests on the point that the artist intuitively moved towards recognizing the ineffability of the multidimensional universe and perceiving God as the Spiritual Absolute. In his attempt to see the invisible in the formulas of Emptiness and Nothingness, Malevich turned to the primary forms of geometric abstraction—the square, circle and cross—which he endows with symbolic concepts and meanings. Malevich treats his Suprematism as a method of perceiving the ineffability of the Absolute. With the Black Square seen as a face of God, the patterns of negative theology rise to become the philosophical formula of primary importance. Malevich’s Mystical Suprematism series (1920–1922) confirms the presence of complex metaphysical reflection and apophatic thought in his art. Not only does the series contain icon paraphrases and the Christian symbolism of the cross and mandorla, but it also advances the formulas of the apophatic faith of the modern times, since Suprematism presents primary forms as the universals of “the face of the future” and the energy of the non-objective art.


1995 ◽  
Vol 88 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ehud Z. Benor

The theory of religious language advocated by the twelfth-century philosopher-jurist Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) contains an apparent paradox. Maimonides’ radical stance regarding the absolute unknowability of God leads him to an austere theology of negation, which appears to be incongruous with his representation of God as a moral agent or intellect. Through analysis of the functions of meaning and reference in Maimonides’ theory of language, as well as his explicit or implicit distinctions between literal, metaphoric, and symbolic uses of language in theological discourse, I argue that the purpose of the Maimonidean theology of negation is to establish the reference of the name “God,” thereby making possible a rationally disciplined constructivist theology. This article shows how Maimonides sought to include a certain type of religious anthropomorphism in a theology that upholds the wholly other nature of God.


1992 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-67
Author(s):  
J. A. McLean

Theology is intrinsic to the Bahá’í revelation. While community attitudes have tended to view the discipline of theology somewhat suspiciously, the term and field of “Bahá’í theology” remain valid and are indispensable. One can distinguish source theology or revelation theology, contained in holy writ, from derivative theology (commentary), which is more relative and subjective. The relativity of religious truth, while it plays a useful role in deabsolutizing dogmatism and in promoting interreligious dialogue, is itself relative and currently runs the risk of becoming another absolute. Bahá’í theology is both apophatic (negative) and cataphatic (affirmative). An abstruse, apophatic negative theology of a hidden God is explicit as background to Bahá’í theology. Apophasis rejects defining God and honors God by remaining silent about the divine essence. If apophasis does speak of God, it does so by via negativa, by describing God through a process of elimination of what God is not, rather than making affirmations about what God is. The main substance of Bahá’í theology, however, is manifestation theology or theophanology, that is, a theology calculated upon an understanding of the metaphysical reality and teachings of the divine Manifestation. This manifestation theology is cataphatic. Cataphasis dares to speak about God but recognizes that God transcends the human analogies used to describe divinity. Bahá’í theology is, moreover, based in faith rooted in the person of Bahá’u’lláh and his divine revelation, has a strong metaphysical bias, eschews dogmatism, and welcomes diversity.


1996 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 355-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
John N. Jones

In recent decades, the theology of Dionysius the Areopagite (pseudo-Dionysius) has recaptured the attention of a number of scholars. These scholars address Dionysius's importance for the history of philosophy, for Christian aesthetics and liturgical and biblical symbols, and for postmodern theology. Much of this attention focuses on the brief and historically influentialThe Mystical Theology, written ca. 500 CE. For scholars, however, this text, like the God of which it speaks, seems to embody contradictions. I s there a consistent logic in the text, or is it deliberately inconsistent? In this essay, I shall analyze passages throughout the Dionysian corpus in order to interpret the sometimes dense expressions ofMystical Theologyand uncover the logical structure of Dionysius's negative theology. I shall suggest that Dionysius's primary task is to deny that God is a particular being. By identifying the patterns of language used to speak of beings, Dionysius can identify both affirmative and negative language that avoids such patterns and hence is appropriate for speech about God. This interpretation demands close attention to the distinction between particular assertions or denials and the assertion or denial of all beings. By focusing on this distinction and on the higher status of negative over affirmative theology, I shall show, against the dominant trend in Dionysian scholarship, that this negative theology logically coheres; it is neither self-negating nor logically contradictory.


Author(s):  
Jens Halfwassen

Aristotle construed metaphysics primarily in terms of ontology, whereas Plato had developed a different approach to the philosophy of principles. The main task of the metaphysical theory of principles is the quest for the absolute. For Plato, however, the absolute is the one; and this idea – most influentially advocated by Plotinus – is the foundation of a tradition that construes metaphysics mainly in terms of henology. The central aspects of this doctrine are the idea of the transcendence of the absolute one, the perspective of negative theology, and – in Plotinus – a genuinely philosophical kind of mysticism.


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