“Kant’s Great Service to Philosophy”

2020 ◽  
pp. 23-64
Author(s):  
Karen Ng

This chapter introduces the purposiveness theme from Kant’s Critique of Judgment. It argues that Kant’s innovation consists in the claim that purposiveness defines the space of judgment and that purposiveness plays a much larger role in Kant’s philosophy than is usually assumed. It begins by considering Kant’s theory of judgment in the first Critique, arguing that the problem of purposiveness is already present there in a nascent form. It then turns to the third Critique, arguing that internal purposiveness (an organic model) has priority over external purposiveness (a designer-artifact model) in connection with judgment’s powers, exploring Kant’s conception of internal purposiveness of form. The concept of a natural purpose (Naturzweck) is central for understanding Kant’s expanded understanding of conceptual form. The chapter also discusses Kant’s antinomy of teleological judgment and argues against the need for positing the idea of an intuitive understanding in the resolution of that antinomy. The chapter concludes by responding to an initial objection against Hegel’s claim that purposiveness is constitutive—namely, a worry about hylozoism.

2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samantha Matherne

AbstractIn theCritique of Pure Reason, Kant describes schematism as a ‘hidden art in the depths of the human soul’ (A141/B180–1). While most commentators treat this as Kant's metaphorical way of saying schematism is something too obscure to explain, I argue that we should follow up Kant's clue and treat schematism literally asKunst. By letting our interpretation of schematism be guided by Kant's theoretically exact ways of using the termKunstin theCritique of Judgmentwe gain valuable insight into the nature of schematism, as well as its connection to Kant's concerns in the thirdCritique.


2002 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 109-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelly D. Sorensen

If there is to be any progress in the debate about what sort of positive moral status Kant can give the emotions, we need a taxonomy of the terms Kant uses for these concepts. It used to be thought that Kant had little room for emotions in his ethics. In the past three decades, Marcia Baron, Paul Guyer, Barbara Herman, Nancy Sherman, Allen Wood and others have argued otherwise. Contrary to what a cursory reading of the Groundwork may indicate, Kant thinks the emotions play an important role in the moral life. I want to extend the work of Baron, Guyer, Herman, Sherman and Wood in three ways. First, I will set out in a diagram Kant's taxonomy of feelings and emotions. Agreement on such a taxonomy should make it easier to evaluate debates about Kant and the emotions. Second, I will focus on a certain subclass of emotions – reason-caused affects – that have previously received little attention, even from these Kant scholars. Third, these scholars base much of their defence of Kant on his later works – especially the Metaphysics of Morals (1797) and the Anthropology (1798) – but Kant's fairly rich taxonomy of the emotions, including reason-caused affects, is clearly in place at least as early as the Critique of Judgment (1790). I believe that the Critique of Judgment is an importantly ignored resource for understanding the moral role of the emotions for Kant. The third Critique makes positive, philosophically interesting claims about the emotions and morality. Kant emphasizes certain roles for emotions in this work that he develops to the same extent nowhere else. Nevertheless, the Critique of Judgment goes all but unmentioned by many who write on these issues. In what follows, I will defend as many of my claims as possible using the third Critique.


2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 108-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan P Schwartz

This essay explores the phenomenon of common sense through a contextual analysis of Hannah Arendt’s political application of Kant’s Critique of Judgment. I begin by tracing the development of Arendt’s thinking on judgment and common sense during the 1950s which led her to turn to the third Critique. I then consider the justification of her move by examining the philosophical context and political applications of the third Critique, arguing that within it Kant made an original and profound discovery: that the phenomenon of common sense contains a hidden faculty that may anchor moral and political judgments. I conclude by arguing that Arendt was on firmer ground than is often thought in adapting Kantian common sense to politics, a fact that may afford new possibilities for the practice of moral and political thought.


1969 ◽  
Vol 2 (02) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer MENSCH

Although scholarly attention has been mostly paid to the many connections existing between Kant and the exactsciences, the landscape of Kant studies has begun to noticeably change during the last decade, with many new pieces devoted to a consideration of Kant’s relation to the life sciences of his day. It is in this vein, for example, that investigators have begun to discussthe importance of Kant’s essays on race for the development of Anthropology as an emerging field. The bulk of the contributions to this recent trend, however, have focused on Kant’s remarks on organic life in the Critique of Judgment, such that Kant’s “theoryof biology” is now seen to be firmly located in that text. Amidst such consolidation, there are a few pieces that have begun to address Kant’s appeal to organic vocabulary within the context of his theory of cognition, though these too remain dominated by the interpretive template set by the third Critique. My own strategy in this essay will be different. Kant did indeed borrow fromthe life sciences for his model of the mind, but in a manner that would reject a naturalized account. His preference for epigenesis as a theory of organic generation needs to be carefully distinguished, therefore, from the use he would make of it when discussinga metaphysical portrait of reason.


2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 63-77
Author(s):  
Andrija Soc

The main topic of this paper is Kant?s position with respect to whether rebellion of citizens against their sovereign is justified. The first part of the paper introduces the social contract theory and considers three well-known answers to this question - Hobbes?s Locke?s and Rousseau?s. In the second part I deal with Kant?s views relying on those of his works where the relation between government and citizens is the chief subject. It is usually thought that Kant believes that rebellion, or revolution against sovereign is unjustified, or even contradictory. In the third part of the paper I try to outline an alternative interpretation that ascribes him the positive attitude towards revolution in certain contexts, and to which I arrive by using mainly the textual evidence present in the Critique of Judgment.


2010 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-23
Author(s):  
Joachim Küpper

Der Aufsatz diskutiert die Frage nach der Relation von Kants ästhetischer Theorie zur Philosophie der Aufklärung anhand zweier zentraler Komplexe der Kritik der Urteilskraft: Zur Analytik des Erhabenen wird vertreten, daß sich aus Kants Argumenten heraus die Auffassung entwickeln konnte, die Erfahrung des (spezifisch modernen) Kunstschönen sei ein Vehikel, den Menschen mit einem Bewußtsein seiner selbst als rationalem Wesen auszustatten. Zum Komplex der ›ästhetischen Ideen‹ wird argumentiert, daß sich bei Kant der Gedanke von der Erfahrung des Kunstschönen als einer Kompensation des Rationalitätsdrucks der im 18. Jahrhundert einsetzenden Moderne entwickelt. This paper seeks to examine the relation between Kant’s aesthetic theory and the philosophy of Enlightenment. My study will focus on two central aspects from the Critique of Judgment: In connection with the Analytic of the Sublime, I will argue that Kant’s discussion of the concept enabled the development of the opinion that experiencing the specifically modern artistic beauty works as a means to equip us with an awareness of ourselves as beings equipped with reason. The second aspect I want to discuss is that of the aesthetic ideas. I will show that in the Third Critique, the idea of experiencing artistic beauty functions as a compensation for the pressure of rationality that sets in together with modernity in the 18th century.


2015 ◽  
Vol 64 (157) ◽  
pp. 53-69
Author(s):  
Tugba Ayas Onol

<p>The paper elaborates the theory of imagination in Immanuel Kant’s <em>Critique of Pure Reason</em> and <em>Critique of Judgment</em>. From the first <em>Critique</em> to the third <em>Critique</em>, the imagination emerges under different titles such as reproductive, productive or transcendental imagination. The paper shall try to decide whether its <em>functions</em> suggested in the first <em>Critique</em> and its performance in the third <em>Critique</em> are <em>contradictory or developmental</em> with respect to Kant’s critical philosophy. Thus, it will examine of the power and the scope of the imagination in the first<em> Critique</em> and of its status and performance in the third <em>Critique. </em></p><p> </p>


1967 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 177-179
Author(s):  
W. W. Shane

In the course of several 21-cm observing programmes being carried out by the Leiden Observatory with the 25-meter telescope at Dwingeloo, a fairly complete, though inhomogeneous, survey of the regionl11= 0° to 66° at low galactic latitudes is becoming available. The essential data on this survey are presented in Table 1. Oort (1967) has given a preliminary report on the first and third investigations. The third is discussed briefly by Kerr in his introductory lecture on the galactic centre region (Paper 42). Burton (1966) has published provisional results of the fifth investigation, and I have discussed the sixth in Paper 19. All of the observations listed in the table have been completed, but we plan to extend investigation 3 to a much finer grid of positions.


1966 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 227-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Brouwer

The paper presents a summary of the results obtained by C. J. Cohen and E. C. Hubbard, who established by numerical integration that a resonance relation exists between the orbits of Neptune and Pluto. The problem may be explored further by approximating the motion of Pluto by that of a particle with negligible mass in the three-dimensional (circular) restricted problem. The mass of Pluto and the eccentricity of Neptune's orbit are ignored in this approximation. Significant features of the problem appear to be the presence of two critical arguments and the possibility that the orbit may be related to a periodic orbit of the third kind.


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