“Kant’s Great Service to Philosophy”
This chapter introduces the purposiveness theme from Kant’s Critique of Judgment. It argues that Kant’s innovation consists in the claim that purposiveness defines the space of judgment and that purposiveness plays a much larger role in Kant’s philosophy than is usually assumed. It begins by considering Kant’s theory of judgment in the first Critique, arguing that the problem of purposiveness is already present there in a nascent form. It then turns to the third Critique, arguing that internal purposiveness (an organic model) has priority over external purposiveness (a designer-artifact model) in connection with judgment’s powers, exploring Kant’s conception of internal purposiveness of form. The concept of a natural purpose (Naturzweck) is central for understanding Kant’s expanded understanding of conceptual form. The chapter also discusses Kant’s antinomy of teleological judgment and argues against the need for positing the idea of an intuitive understanding in the resolution of that antinomy. The chapter concludes by responding to an initial objection against Hegel’s claim that purposiveness is constitutive—namely, a worry about hylozoism.