An Expressivist Account of the Differences between Aesthetic and Moral Judgments

Dangerous Art ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 122-143
Author(s):  
James Harold
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
The Face ◽  
Aesthetic Judgments

This chapter begins with five more or less familiar ways of distinguishing between aesthetic and moral judgments. These distinctions are far from perfect—they allow of exceptions—but they constitute a reasonable guide. Then the chapter introduces two new distinctions from an expressivist framework. The first is the fact that aesthetic reasoning, but not moral reasoning, involves a particular kind of non-valenced judgment. The second is that aesthetic judgments, but not moral judgments, are recalcitrant in the face of conflicting higher-order judgments. The chapter concludes that expressivism offers a reasonably clear basis for distinguishing between moral and aesthetic judgments.

scholarly journals Alzheimer’s Disease Progressively Reduces Visual Functional Network Connectivity

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Jie Huang ◽  
Paul Beach ◽  
Andrea Bozoki ◽  
David C. Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Visual Cortex ◽  
Lower Order ◽  
Resting State ◽  
Visual Processing ◽  
Network Connectivity ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Functional Network ◽  
Functional Networks ◽  
The Face ◽  
Processing Network

Background: Postmortem studies of brains with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) not only find amyloid-beta (Aβ) and neurofibrillary tangles (NFT) in the visual cortex, but also reveal temporally sequential changes in AD pathology from higher-order association areas to lower-order areas and then primary visual area (V1) with disease progression. Objective: This study investigated the effect of AD severity on visual functional network. Methods: Eight severe AD (SAD) patients, 11 mild/moderate AD (MAD), and 26 healthy senior (HS) controls undertook a resting-state fMRI (rs-fMRI) and a task fMRI of viewing face photos. A resting-state visual functional connectivity (FC) network and a face-evoked visual-processing network were identified for each group. Results: For the HS, the identified group-mean face-evoked visual-processing network in the ventral pathway started from V1 and ended within the fusiform gyrus. In contrast, the resting-state visual FC network was mainly confined within the visual cortex. AD disrupted these two functional networks in a similar severity dependent manner: the more severe the cognitive impairment, the greater reduction in network connectivity. For the face-evoked visual-processing network, MAD disrupted and reduced activation mainly in the higher-order visual association areas, with SAD further disrupting and reducing activation in the lower-order areas. Conclusion: These findings provide a functional corollary to the canonical view of the temporally sequential advancement of AD pathology through visual cortical areas. The association of the disruption of functional networks, especially the face-evoked visual-processing network, with AD severity suggests a potential predictor or biomarker of AD progression.

Publicity and the Development of Bentham’s Theory of Value

2019 ◽  
pp. 72-93
Author(s):  
Gerald J. Postema
Keyword(s):  
Simple Model ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Deliberation ◽  
Core Theory ◽  
Theory Of Value ◽  
Law Making

Bentham was tempted to think of the welfare of the community as a grand composite of the pleasures and pains of individuals and he suggested that it is possible to construct a powerful ethical deliberating machine capable of churning out precise, determinate, and publicly verifiable judgments and prescriptions for all moral occasions (the “felicific calculus”). Yet, he also articulated a sophisticated critique of the assumptions on which this model rests. Although pleasure and pain must ultimately anchor all moral judgments, he insisted that the language of the ordinary business of utilitarian moral deliberation, policy making, and law making must be fully public. Despite his criticisms of the quale conception of pleasure, Bentham did not abandon rationality or the principle of utility. Proper utilitarian reasoning still, in Bentham’s view, involved “calculation”—that is, tracing out the consequences of all the options for action, laws, or institutions, consequencesassessed in terms of their impact on the welfare of all the members of the community in view. But these calculations need not fit the simple model, in fact, they must not, since the simple model cannot meet the demands of moral reasoning, in particular the demands of publicity. Bentham’s universal consequentialism took for its core theory of value concerns about expectations and interests, rather than immediate sensings of pleasure or pain.

Losing your footing, losing your morality

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 497-510
Author(s):  
Heng Li ◽  
Yu Cao
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Visual Experience ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Tilt Table ◽  
Conceptual Metaphors ◽  
Bodily Experience ◽  
Downstream Effects ◽  
Normal Text ◽  
Sample Experiment

Abstract What influences how people render their moral judgment? Focusing specifically on the conceptual metaphors “moral is upright” and “immoral is tilted”, we sought to investigate whether physical slant can influence people’s harsh moral judgment. Experiment 1 induced physical slant by having participants complete the questionnaire at a tilt table. We observed a significant effect with participants who experienced physical slant rendering a less severe moral judgment than did those who wrote their responses at a level table. Using a new manipulation of physical slant and a larger, more diverse sample, Experiment 2 asked participants to complete the questionnaires with rotated text or normal text. We observed a difference between the two groups: compared to participants who read the normal text, those with a visual experience of slant lessened the severity of their moral judgments. Taken together, the results showed that the consequence of tilted experience exerts downstream effects on moral reasoning, which suggests that incidental bodily experience affects how people render their decisions.

Age, Education, and Sex Effects on Adult Moral Reasoning

1988 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 271-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles B. White
Keyword(s):  
Moral Development ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Scoring System ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Stage Theory ◽  
Sex Effects ◽  
Individual Interviews ◽  
Effect Of Age

The role of age and education in adult moral reasoning was examined utilizing Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental stage theory of moral development and the most recent Standard Scoring System for assessing moral judgments. Individual interviews utilizing standard Kohlberg moral dilemmas were conducted with 195 adults ranging in age from nineteen to eighty-two years and in years of education from three to twenty-five years. Results indicated no overall significant effect for age of reasoner, no significant effect for sex, and a significant effect for education ( p < .01). However, the effect of age was significant in the group with eighteen or more years of education, but not in the group with less than eighteen years of education.

scholarly journals Why Moral Error Theorists Should Become Revisionary Moral Expressivists

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toby Svoboda
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Moral Disagreement ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Better Than

Moral error theorists hold that morality is deeply mistaken, thus raising the question of whether and how moral judgments and utterances should continue to be employed. Proposals include simply abolishing morality (Richard Garner), adopting some revisionary fictionalist stance toward morality (Richard Joyce), and conserving moral judgments and utterances unchanged (Jonas Olson). I defend a fourth proposal, namely revisionary moral expressivism, which recommends replacing cognitivist moral judgments and utterances with non-cognitivist ones. Given that non-cognitivist attitudes are not truth apt, revisionary expressivism does not involve moral error. Moreover, revisionary expressivism has the theoretical resources to retain many of the useful features of morality, such as moral motivation, moral disagreement, and moral reasoning. Revisionary expressivism fares better than the three major alternatives in both avoiding moral error and preserving these useful features of morality. I also show how this position differs from the “revolutionary expressivism” of Sebastian Köhler and Michael Ridge.

scholarly journals GROUNDS OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY: A Response

Legal Theory ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 13 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 315-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Finnis
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Sound Theory ◽  
Questions And Answers ◽  
The Face ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
Good For

Linking theses of Plato, Wittgenstein, and Weber, section I argues that identification of central cases and settling of focal meanings depend upon the theorist's purpose(s) and, in the case of theory about human affairs—theory adequately attentive to the four irreducible orders in which human persons live and act—upon the purposes for which we intelligibly and intelligently act. Among these purposes, primacy (centrality) is to be accorded (by acknowledgement, not fiat) to purposes which are, as best the theorist can judge, reasonable and fit to be adopted by anyone, the theorist included. Section II defends the reasonableness (and hence entitlement to universal assent) of practical and moral judgments, against Michael Perry's ultimately nihilist claims that egoism's challenge to moral normativity has gone unanswered and that “reason for A” does not entail “reason for” anyone else. Section III takes up Steven Smith's suggestion that such subjectivism is encouraged by the talk in Natural Law and Natural Rights of “pursuing goods,” talk which (he argues) is individualistic and neglectful of (other) persons, inimical to an understanding of friendship, and impotent in the face of egoism. Here as elsewhere the key is to grasp that understanding any basic or intrinsic human good is to understand it as good for anyone like me and thus—since as I instantiate and embody a universal, viz. human being—as a good common to (good for) anyone and everyone. Section IV argues that common good (which includes respect for human rights, and the Rule of Law) gives reason for exercise and acceptance of authority, and for allegiance, even (and in a sense, especially) in time of breakdown. Section V argues that natural law theory is no more dependent on affirming God's existence than any other theory is, in any of the four orders of theory, but equally that is not safe for atheists. For, like any other sound theory, it suggests and is consistent with questions and answers about its grounds, in this case about the source of its normativity and of the human nature that its normative universals presuppose and affirm; and the answers are those argued for, too abstemiously, in the last chapter of NLNR and, more adequately, in the equivalent chapter of Aquinas.

Moral Reasoning and Moral Character: Relationships between the Kohlberg and the Hogan Models

1977 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 215-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J. Haier
Keyword(s):  
College Students ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Character ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Alternative Measure ◽  
Empirical Relationships

The empirical relationships between Kohlberg's model of moral reasoning and Hogan's model of moral character were examined in 132 college students to test the hypothesis that moral judgments are a reflection of the structure of moral character. No relationships were found between measures of moral reasoning and measures of moral character. Kohlberg's measure of moral reasoning, however, was related to an alternative measure of moral reasoning ( r = .51, p < .01); moral character measures of empathy ( r = .40, p < .01) and socialization ( r = −.44, p < .01) were related to the use of marijuana as predicted. It was concluded that moral reasoning and moral character are empirically independent domains.

Effect of Distributed Attached Mass on the Vibration of Sandwich Panel Using Higher Order ESL Theory

2012 ◽  
Vol 488-489 ◽  
pp. 35-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shahab Tafazoli ◽  
S.M.R. Khalili
Keyword(s):  
Free Vibration ◽  
Natural Frequency ◽  
Material Properties ◽  
Sandwich Panel ◽  
Sandwich Panels ◽  
Single Layer ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Design Parameters ◽  
Attached Mass ◽  
The Face

In this paper, effects of adding a distributed attached mass added to the face sheets of sandwich panels on free vibration of the system are investigated. Higher order equivalent single layer (ESL) theory is expanded and used. Mass Inertias of the distributed attached mass are taking into account. Various design parameters including geometrical and material properties, such as density, thickness of the attached mass and the panel are investigated to show the decreasing effect on the fundamental natural frequency of the system due to the adding of the distributed attached mass.

scholarly journals FACE-TO-FACE VERSUS THREADED DISCUSSIONS: THE ROLE OF TIME AND HIGHER-ORDER THINKING

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Katrina A. Meyer
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processing ◽  
Higher Order Thinking ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Online Discussions ◽  
Course Evaluations ◽  
Threaded Discussions ◽  
Face To Face ◽  
Experience Of Time ◽  
The Face

This study compares the experiences of students in face-to-face (in class) discussions with threaded discussions and also evaluates the threaded discussions for evidence of higher-order thinking. Students were enrolled in graduate-level classes that used both modes (face-to-face and online) for course-related discussions; their end-of-course evaluations of both experiences were grouped for analysis and themes constructed based on their comments. Themes included the “expansion of time,” “experience of time,” “quality of the discussion,” “needs of the student,” and “faculty expertise.” While there are advantages to holding discussions in either setting, students most frequently noted that using threaded discussions increased the amount of time they spent on class objectives and that they appreciated the extra time for reflection on course issues. The face-to-face format also had value as a result of its immediacy and energy, and some students found one mode a better “fit” with their preferred learning mode. The analysisof higher-order thinking was based on a content analysis of the threaded discussions only. Each posting was coded as one of the four cognitive-processing categories described by Garrison and colleagues: 18% were triggering questions, 51% were exploration, 22% were integration, and 7% resolution. A fifth category – social – was appropriate for 3% of the responses and only 12% of the postings included a writing error. This framework provides some support for the assertion that higher-order thinking can and does occur in online discussions; strategies for increasing the number of responses in the integration and resolution categories are discussed.

scholarly journals Moral Reasoning Performance Determines Epistemic Peerdom

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H.B. McAuliffe ◽  
Michael E. McCullough
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Review Literature ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Disagreement ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Friendly Criticism

We offer a friendly criticism of May's fantastic book on moral reasoning: It is overly charitable to the argument that moral disagreement undermines moral knowledge. To highlight the role that reasoning quality plays in moral judgments, we review literature that he did not mention showing that individual differences in intelligence and cognitive reflection explain much of moral disagreement. The burden is on skeptics of moral knowledge to show that moral disagreement arises from non-rational origins.

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