Publicity and the Development of Bentham’s Theory of Value

Author(s):  
Gerald J. Postema

Bentham was tempted to think of the welfare of the community as a grand composite of the pleasures and pains of individuals and he suggested that it is possible to construct a powerful ethical deliberating machine capable of churning out precise, determinate, and publicly verifiable judgments and prescriptions for all moral occasions (the “felicific calculus”). Yet, he also articulated a sophisticated critique of the assumptions on which this model rests. Although pleasure and pain must ultimately anchor all moral judgments, he insisted that the language of the ordinary business of utilitarian moral deliberation, policy making, and law making must be fully public. Despite his criticisms of the quale conception of pleasure, Bentham did not abandon rationality or the principle of utility. Proper utilitarian reasoning still, in Bentham’s view, involved “calculation”—that is, tracing out the consequences of all the options for action, laws, or institutions, consequencesassessed in terms of their impact on the welfare of all the members of the community in view. But these calculations need not fit the simple model, in fact, they must not, since the simple model cannot meet the demands of moral reasoning, in particular the demands of publicity. Bentham’s universal consequentialism took for its core theory of value concerns about expectations and interests, rather than immediate sensings of pleasure or pain.

Author(s):  
Yana Breindl

Technical skills are increasingly necessary to successfully intervene in policy-making, especially when dealing with technical matters such as Internet or telecommunications regulation. Skills are rooted in experience and cultural practices. Dahlgren's concept of civic cultures is used in this chapter to investigate the cultural underpinnings of the emergent European digital rights movement that has repeatedly targeted EU legislation on copyright enforcement, software patents, and the Internet. The values and identity of the movement are investigated along with the way knowledge and information are processed and trust established through repeated practices in a variety of online and offline spaces. The analysis illustrates how digitally skilled actors can substantially affect policy-making by disrupting the course of parliamentary law-making at the European level. However, technical skills need to be complemented by social and political competencies to gain access and provide convincing input to political institutions that increasingly rely on extra-institutional expertise.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 497-510
Author(s):  
Heng Li ◽  
Yu Cao

Abstract What influences how people render their moral judgment? Focusing specifically on the conceptual metaphors “moral is upright” and “immoral is tilted”, we sought to investigate whether physical slant can influence people’s harsh moral judgment. Experiment 1 induced physical slant by having participants complete the questionnaire at a tilt table. We observed a significant effect with participants who experienced physical slant rendering a less severe moral judgment than did those who wrote their responses at a level table. Using a new manipulation of physical slant and a larger, more diverse sample, Experiment 2 asked participants to complete the questionnaires with rotated text or normal text. We observed a difference between the two groups: compared to participants who read the normal text, those with a visual experience of slant lessened the severity of their moral judgments. Taken together, the results showed that the consequence of tilted experience exerts downstream effects on moral reasoning, which suggests that incidental bodily experience affects how people render their decisions.


1988 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 271-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles B. White

The role of age and education in adult moral reasoning was examined utilizing Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental stage theory of moral development and the most recent Standard Scoring System for assessing moral judgments. Individual interviews utilizing standard Kohlberg moral dilemmas were conducted with 195 adults ranging in age from nineteen to eighty-two years and in years of education from three to twenty-five years. Results indicated no overall significant effect for age of reasoner, no significant effect for sex, and a significant effect for education ( p < .01). However, the effect of age was significant in the group with eighteen or more years of education, but not in the group with less than eighteen years of education.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toby Svoboda

Moral error theorists hold that morality is deeply mistaken, thus raising the question of whether and how moral judgments and utterances should continue to be employed. Proposals include simply abolishing morality (Richard Garner), adopting some revisionary fictionalist stance toward morality (Richard Joyce), and conserving moral judgments and utterances unchanged (Jonas Olson). I defend a fourth proposal, namely revisionary moral expressivism, which recommends replacing cognitivist moral judgments and utterances with non-cognitivist ones. Given that non-cognitivist attitudes are not truth apt, revisionary expressivism does not involve moral error. Moreover, revisionary expressivism has the theoretical resources to retain many of the useful features of morality, such as moral motivation, moral disagreement, and moral reasoning. Revisionary expressivism fares better than the three major alternatives in both avoiding moral error and preserving these useful features of morality. I also show how this position differs from the “revolutionary expressivism” of Sebastian Köhler and Michael Ridge.


2016 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 45-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emilia KORKEA-AHO

AbstractThe EU’s openness towards stakeholders is central to the legitimacy of its law-making. With the rapid globalisation of EU legislative activities, openness towards actors from third countries requires analysis. With reference to the notion of ‘lobbying’, this article outlines a framework for identifying the role of third country actors in EU policy processes. The two arguments brought forward suggest that third country lobbying is facilitated by the openness of Union law- and policy-making, and that third country actors contribute to EU decision-making at all stages. The article concludes with a set of questions that third country lobbying raises concerning the EU’s legitimate law-making authority in Europe and beyond.


1977 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 215-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J. Haier

The empirical relationships between Kohlberg's model of moral reasoning and Hogan's model of moral character were examined in 132 college students to test the hypothesis that moral judgments are a reflection of the structure of moral character. No relationships were found between measures of moral reasoning and measures of moral character. Kohlberg's measure of moral reasoning, however, was related to an alternative measure of moral reasoning ( r = .51, p < .01); moral character measures of empathy ( r = .40, p < .01) and socialization ( r = −.44, p < .01) were related to the use of marijuana as predicted. It was concluded that moral reasoning and moral character are empirically independent domains.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H.B. McAuliffe ◽  
Michael E. McCullough

We offer a friendly criticism of May's fantastic book on moral reasoning: It is overly charitable to the argument that moral disagreement undermines moral knowledge. To highlight the role that reasoning quality plays in moral judgments, we review literature that he did not mention showing that individual differences in intelligence and cognitive reflection explain much of moral disagreement. The burden is on skeptics of moral knowledge to show that moral disagreement arises from non-rational origins.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 81-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
S.V. Molchanov ◽  
O.V. Almazova

The paper presents results of an empirical study of adolescents' concepts of responsibility in different types of moral dilemmas characterized by violations of moral norms. The study proved that the type of moral dilemma and the context of interaction of its participants determine the adolescents' readiness to recognize the responsibility of the main character of the dilemma for violating the norm. In dilemmas of asocial type adolescents are more willing to recognize the responsibility of the offender whose behavior leads to obvious damage for one of the participants in the interaction. As for prosocial dilemmas and dilemmas of confronting norms, adolescents tend to deny the responsibility of the offender. The paper provides a comparative analysis of empirically identified types of adolescent concepts of responsibility, including the differentiated responsibility with egoistic orientation, high responsibility, low responsibility and ‘polar’ responsibility. The authors highlight the ambiguity of the relationship between adolescents’ evaluation of behavior, their readiness to recognize responsibility in moral transgression, and their judgment about the necessity of punishment. The paper concludes with the discussion concerning the relationship between the level of development of moral judgments/moral reasoning and the concepts of responsibility in adolescents.


2017 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Rajesh Chakrabarti ◽  
Kaushiki Sanyal

This introductory chapter is a scene setter, aimed at public policy scholars and practitioners alike. It provides an outline and brief description of the book and provides a background for its subject matter. It provides a dipstick literature review of the existing literature on social movements and external influences on the policy process. It summarizes the key theoretical models of policy making in the international literature for understanding the policy process and provides a brief review of the policy making process in India, as well as a description, in some detail, of the various stages of law-making in the country. The exposition of the various stages of law-making provides an overview of the influence that various stakeholders in the policy process—the media, judiciary, civil society, and so on—can exert in the process.


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 64-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Sher

My aim in this essay is to explore the implications of the fact that even our most deeply held moral beliefs have been profoundly affected by our upbringing and experience—that if any of us had had a sufficiently different upbringing and set of experiences, he almost certainly would now have a very different set of moral beliefs and very different habits of moral judgment. This fact, together with the associated proliferation of incompatible moral doctrines, is sometimes invoked in support of liberal policies of toleration and restraint, but the relevance of these considerations to individual moral deliberation has received less attention. In Sections II through V, I shall argue that this combination of contingency and controversy poses a serious challenge to the authority of our moral judgments. In Section VI, I shall explore a promising way of responding to this challenge.


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