scholarly journals Nudging Well

2021 ◽  
pp. 132-148
Author(s):  
Neil Levy
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Higher Order Evidence ◽  
The Way

Cleaning up the epistemic environment, in the way advocated in the last chapter, is or entails nudging beliefs, and nudging is very controversial. A central reason why nudging is controversial is that nudges are believed to bypass rational cognition. This chapter describes this concern, and argues it’s misplaced. Typically (at least) nudges provide higher-order evidence in favor of the options nudged. Nudges recommend options, and agents respond to nudges as recommendations. Our responses to nudges are (usually, at least) rational responses to evidence. Once we see how nudges work through the provision of higher-order evidence, we are in a position to recognize that the cues to expertise and to reliability we examined in previous chapters work in precisely the same way: they provide genuine evidence and we respond to them in virtue of that fact.

Eliminations and Reductions I

2021 ◽  
pp. 54-94
Author(s):  
Alex Worsnip
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
The Other ◽  
Positive Case ◽  
Preface Paradox ◽  
Substantive Rationality ◽  
The Preface Paradox ◽  
Higher Order Evidence ◽  
The Way

This chapter examines and argues against attempts to eliminate the category of structural rationality or reduce it to substantive rationality. Together with the following chapter—which argues against eliminations and reductions of the converse kind—it thereby provides a positive case for dualism about rationality, according to which both kinds of rationality are genuine and neither is reducible to the other. On the way, it also argues that there are cases where being substantively rational does not suffice for being structurally rational, and examines the preface paradox and cases of misleading higher-order evidence.

Vagueness and the World

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Bacon
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Formal Models ◽  
Logical Space ◽  
The World ◽  
The Way

According to a fairly widespread assumption, there is some definite collection of completely factual or fundamental propositions upon which all truths supervene and which are unaffected by vagueness. This assumption manifests itself in formal models of vagueness as well—for example, the supervaluationist who represents propositions as sets of world-precisification pairs may divide logical space into propositions that only depend on the world-coordinate. This chapter argues that this assumption leads to paradoxes of higher-order vagueness, and, ultimately, should be rejected in favour of a weaker notion of fundamentality or factuality. It suggests an alternative picture in which there is vagueness ‘all the way down’: logical-space can be divided into basic propositions that settle all precise matters, but it is vague where those divisions lie.

Epítetos e insultos de grupo en español: Sobre una ambigüedad y sus implicaciones sintáctico-semánticas

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 161-205
Author(s):  
Andrés Saab ◽  
Eleonora Orlando
Keyword(s):  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Syntactic Ambiguity ◽  
Structural Ambiguity ◽  
Truth Conditional ◽  
Expressive Content ◽  
Conventional Implicatures ◽  
Expressive Dimension ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Proper Analysis ◽  
The Way

Abstract In this paper, we further elaborate on a syntactic ambiguity between slurs and epithets first noticed in Orlando, Eleonora & Andrés Saab. 2020b. A stereotype semantics for syntactically ambiguous slurs. Analytic Philosophy 61(2). 101–129. Here, we discuss in detail the large theoretical implications of such an ambiguity both for the proper analysis of binominal constructions in Spanish (e.g., el idiota de Juan) and for the way in which it is advisable to model the expressive content slurs and certain epithets (those deriving from slurs) have. As for the first aspect, we contend that mainstream approaches in terms of predicate inversion for binominal constructions cannot account for why slurs lose their predicative import when occurring as epithets in binominal environments. In consequence, we propose a new analysis for epithets both in simple occurrences and in binominal constructions. This analysis derives the above-mentioned ambiguity as a type of structural ambiguity, according to which certain slurs can occur in predicative and in non-predicative positions. When they occur as predicates, they have a mixed semantics (McCready, Eric. 2010. Varieties of conventional implicatures. Semantics & Pragmatics 3. 1–57) reflected both in the truth-conditional and the expressive dimensions, but when they occur as epithets, the truth-conditional dimension is lost and only the expressive content survives. As for the second aspect, we defend a stereotype semantics, according to which stereotypes are modeled as Kratzerian modal bases (i.e., set of propositions) in virtue of which stigmatizing theories of human groups are reflected in a parallel, expressive dimension of meaning. This way of modeling some kinds of expressive contents explains how different slurs and epithets manage to communicate different theories about particular human groups, which are the target of derogation.

scholarly journals The reality of fiction in a literary world: on an excerpt from Stanisław Lem’s Solaris

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-107
Author(s):  
Y. Domanskii
Keyword(s):  
Physical Reality ◽  
Literary Text ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Fictional World ◽  
Actual Reality ◽  
The World ◽  
The Way

Using an excerpt from Stanisław Lem’s Solaris, this article explores the idea that, in a literary text, a fictional world and the world of physical reality may interact to form such a reality that can paradoxically turn out to be more real than what we believe to be the actual reality. It is also shown that the fictional world realized in a literary text may bring the reader to certain conclusions about the world in which he or she lives. Thus, even if literature is in­capable of affecting reality, it can change the way the latter is perceived. A fictional world is not just a reality — it is a reality of a higher order.

scholarly journals May the four be with you: novel IR-subtraction methods to tackle NNLO calculations

2021 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
W. J. Torres Bobadilla ◽  
G. F. R. Sborlini ◽  
P. Banerjee ◽  
S. Catani ◽  
A. L. Cherchiglia ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
High Energy Physics ◽  
High Energy ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Field Theories ◽  
Quantum Field Theories ◽  
Quantum Field ◽  
Link Type ◽  
Mathematical Properties ◽  
Energy Physics ◽  
The Way

AbstractIn this manuscript, we report the outcome of the topical workshop: paving the way to alternative NNLO strategies (https://indico.ific.uv.es/e/WorkStop-ThinkStart_3.0), by presenting a discussion about different frameworks to perform precise higher-order computations for high-energy physics. These approaches implement novel strategies to deal with infrared and ultraviolet singularities in quantum field theories. A special emphasis is devoted to the local cancellation of these singularities, which can enhance the efficiency of computations and lead to discover novel mathematical properties in quantum field theories.

What role do the emotions play in cognition?

2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason L. Megill
Keyword(s):  
Face Recognition ◽  
Selective Attention ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Affective Computing ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Brain Disorders ◽  
Frame Problem ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
The Frame Problem ◽  
The Way

This paper has two aims: (1) to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and (2) to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational (HOR) theories of consciousness — as generally formulated — are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in such a manner that the following thesis arises: the emotions play a key role in shaping selective attention. This thesis is in accord with A. Damasio’s (1994) noteworthy neuroscientific work on emotion. I then begin to formulate an alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and I show how this new account has implications for the following issues: face recognition, two brain disorders (Capgras’ and Fregoli syndrome), the frame problem in A.I., and the research program of affective computing.

A Metafísica de Copleston e o Debate com Russell

2021 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 1331-1362
Author(s):  
Alexander Maar
Keyword(s):  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
Ultimate Cause ◽  
History Of ◽  
First Cause ◽  
The Way

Father Frederick Copleston is best known for his carefully crafted works History of Philosophy and Thomas Aquinas. Copleston’s most notable metaphysical thesis is his interpretation of the argument from contingency, which he sees as the superior choice for theists. He draws on Aquinas and distinguishes between causa fieri and causa esse to argue that God is a higher order (vertical) cause of contingent causal series (horizontal). Copleston presents God not as a temporal first cause, but an ontologically ultimate cause necessary to explain a contingent universe. His contribution changed the way we read Aquinas. Copleston’s willingness to debate his thesis with different philosophical perspectives is illustrated by his acceptance to discuss God’s existence with Bertrand Russell, in 1948. This BBC radio debate epitomises the dispute between theists and atheists from the 1940s onwards. I undertake to expound and comment Copleston’s contribution to metaphysics, present relevant parts of the debate and provide criticism.

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