Vague Propositions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Bacon
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Possible World ◽  
General Logic ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Fineness Of Grain

If there are vague propositions, and the vague supervenes on the precise, then vague propositions cannot be represented by sets of metaphysically possible worlds. According to an alternative, broadly supervaluationist idea, propositions are sets of world-precisification pairs. To interpret this theory non-linguistically, precisifications are understood as assigning an extension to each vague property at each possible world. However, there are many other positions on propositional fineness of grain. The chapter investigates the general logic of propositional individuation. It gives an internal definition of the broadest notion of necessity, and shows that it is at least as broad as any combination of determinacy and necessity operators. It formulates a propositions-first account of vague propositions, in which propositions are taken as primitive and not constructed out of sets of things, and presents a theory of vague propositions in which they are individuated by their role in thought.

Monadic Perception

2015 ◽  
pp. 380-392
Author(s):  
Heinrich Schepers
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
The State ◽  
Possible World ◽  
The Real ◽  
The World ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Momentary State

This chapter discusses Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s notion of monadic perception as a key component of his metaphysics. It first considers Leibniz’s thesis about monads, together with their perceptions and appetites, and his definition of perception as the representation of external variation in the internal. It then examines Leibniz’s belief that the world is a community of all compatible substances or monads, and that compatibility is the real principle underlying existence and the composition of possible worlds. The content of a monad’s perception is the momentary state of the whole world or, more precisely, the state of all the monads that are compatible with that monad. In every possible world these sequences are fully determinate. The chapter also analyzes Leibniz’s assertion that all monads are accompanied by a “manière de corps organique”.

scholarly journals Computing possible worlds in the history of modern astronomy

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 117
Author(s):  
Osvaldo Pessoa Jr. ◽  
Rafaela Gesing ◽  
Mariana Jó de Souza ◽  
Daniel Carlos de Melo Marcílio
Keyword(s):  
Computer Simulations ◽  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Computational Simulations ◽  
Consistency Check ◽  
Possible World ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Mean ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Modern Astronomy

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n1p117As part of an ongoing study of causal models in the history of science, a counterfactual scenario in the history of modern astronomy is explored with the aid of computer simulations. After the definition of “linking advance”, a possible world involving technological antecedence is described, branching out in 1510, in which the telescope is invented 70 years before its actual construction, at the time in which Fracastoro actually built the first prototelescope. By using the principle of the closest possible world (PCP), we estimate that in this scenario the discovery of the elliptical orbit of Mars would by anticipated by only 28 years. The second part of the paper involves an estimate of the probability of the previous scenario, guided by the principle that the actual world is the mean (PAM) and using computer simulations to create possible worlds in which the time spans between advances is varied according to a gamma distribution function. Taking into account the importance of the use of the diaphragm for the invention of the telescope, the probability that the telescope were built by 1538 for a branching time at 1510 is found to be smaller than 1%. The work shows that one of the important features of computational simulations in philosophy of science is to serve as a consistency check for the intuitions and speculations of the philosopher.

scholarly journals Mínimo e máximo em estruturas nominais – uma análise semântica

2019 ◽  
pp. 250-264
Author(s):  
Rui Marques
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Modal Operator ◽  
Possible World

This paper is concerned with the semantics of the portuguese phrases with the form o mínimo/máximo N (‘the minimum N’) and o mínimo/máximo de N (‘the minimum/maximum of N’). Some nouns may occur in both of these constructions, while others might occur in only one of them, and still other nouns might occur only if accompanied by a modal operator. The proposal is made that these facts can be straightforwardly explained by the hypothesis that the first and the second of these syntactic constructions have, respectively, an extensional and an intensional meaning, together with the fact that some nouns have the same denotation in any possible world, while others denote different sets of entities in different possible worlds.

scholarly journals Protection against imposing unfavorable contract terms by the dominant party in the russian legislation: issues of ensuring the balance of convenience

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirill Andreevich Pisenko ◽  
Stanislav Lvovich Botvinnik
Keyword(s):  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Philosophical Perspective ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Scientific Methods ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
Legal Method ◽  
General Logic ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Antitrust Regulation

Legal issues of counteracting the imposition of unfavorable contract terms by the dominant party raise a number of theoretical and practical problems. The authors of the article try to determine the legal nature of imposition and develop methods of comprehensive counteraction to this violation in order to ensure the balance of convenience. From the philosophical perspective and a certain worldview, the study is based on the balance of convenience regarded as the objective foundation of legal regulation. The main philosophical and scientific methods used in this article include the dialectic method, the formal-legal method, the method of legal hermeneutics, as well as the comparative-legal and empirical methods. The theoretical basis is represented by scientific works in the field of civil, administrative, entrepreneurial and procedural branches of law. The legal nature of imposition as a type of violation should be determined with due regard to the general logic of antitrust regulation. The parallel use of both public and private law necessitates the development of procedural legal means ensuring uniform law enforcement and the balance of convenience. First of all, the unity of approaches regarding legal tools of public and civil law should be concerned with the definition of features and the essence of elements compiling the imposition itself. The authors also propose approaches to the formation of an appropriate procedural model.

scholarly journals Nonexistence, Vague Existence, Merely Possible Existence

Disputatio ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (33) ◽  
pp. 427-443
Author(s):  
Iris Einheuser
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Target Object ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Plausible Assumption ◽  
De Re ◽  
Modal Semantics ◽  
Vague Existence

Abstract This paper explores a new non-deflationary approach to the puzzle of nonexistence and its cousins. On this approach, we can, under a plausible assumption, express true de re propositions about certain objects that don’t exist, exist indeterminately or exist merely possibly. The defense involves two steps: First, to argue that if we can actually designate what individuates a nonexistent target object with respect to possible worlds in which that object does exist, then we can express a de re proposition about “it”. Second, to adapt the concept of outer truth with respect to a possible world – a concept familiar from actualist modal semantics – for use in representing the actual world.

Analysing Modality

2020 ◽  
pp. 22-73
Author(s):  
Alastair Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Metaphysical Modality ◽  
Novel Theory ◽  
Reductive Theory

This chapter presents and defends the basic tenets of quantum modal realism. The first of these principles, Individualism, states that Everett worlds are metaphysically possible worlds. The converse of this principle, Generality, states that metaphysically possible worlds are Everett worlds. Combining Individualism and Generality yields Alignment, a conjecture about the nature of possible worlds that is closely analogous to Lewisian modal realism. Like Lewisian modal realism, Alignment entails that each possible world is a real concrete individual of the same basic kind as the actual world. These similarities render EQM suitable for grounding a novel theory of the nature of metaphysical modality with some unique properties. Also like Lewisian modal realism, quantum modal realism is a reductive theory: it accounts for modality in fundamentally non-modal terms. But quantum modal realism also has unique epistemological advantages over Lewisian modal realism and other extant realist approaches to modality.

Counterfactual conditionals

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Doring
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Counterfactual Conditional ◽  
Counterfactual Conditionals

‘If bats were deaf, they would hunt during the day.’ What you have just read is called a ‘counterfactual’ conditional; it is an ‘If…then…’ statement the components of which are ‘counter to fact’, in this case counter to the fact that bats hear well and sleep during the day. Among the analyses proposed for such statements, two have been especially prominent. According to the first, a counterfactual asserts that there is a sound argument from the antecedent (‘bats are deaf’) to the consequent (‘bats hunt during the day’). The argument uses certain implicit background conditions and laws of nature as additional premises. A variant of this analysis says that a counterfactual is itself a condensed version of such an argument. The analysis is called ‘metalinguistic’ because of its reference to linguistic items such as premises and arguments. The second analysis refers instead to possible worlds. (One may think of possible worlds as ways things might have gone.) This analysis says that the example is true just in case bats hunt during the day in the closest possible world(s) where they are deaf

Modal logic, philosophical issues in

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. McKay
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Natural Language ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Modal Claim ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Modal Semantics ◽  
Bull's Eye ◽  
Modal Systems ◽  
Richard Montague

In reasoning we often use words such as ‘necessarily’, ‘possibly’, ‘can’, ‘could’, ‘must’ and so on. For example, if we know that an argument is valid, then we know that it is necessarily true that if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true. Modal logic starts with such modal words and the inferences involving them. The exploration of these inferences has led to a variety of formal systems, and their interpretation is now most often built on the concept of a possible world. Standard non-modal logic shows us how to understand logical words such as ‘not’, ‘and’ and ‘or’, which are truth-functional. The modal concepts are not truth-functional: knowing that p is true (and what ‘necessarily’ means) does not automatically enable one to determine whether ‘Necessarily p’ is true. (‘It is necessary that all people have been people’ is true, but ‘It is necessary that no English monarch was born in Montana’ is false, even though the simpler constituents – ‘All people have been people’ and ‘No English monarch was born in Montana’– are both true.) The study of modal logic has helped in the understanding of many other contexts for sentences that are not truth-functional, such as ‘ought’ (‘It ought to be the case that p’) and ‘believes’ (‘Alice believes that p’); and also in the consideration of the interaction between quantifiers and non-truth-functional contexts. In fact, much work in modern semantics has benefited from the extension of modal semantics introduced by Richard Montague in beginning the development of a systematic semantics for natural language. The framework of possible worlds developed for modal logic has been fruitful in the analysis of many concepts. For example, by introducing the concept of relative possibility, Kripke showed how to model a variety of modal systems: a proposition is necessarily true at a possible world w if and only if it is true at every world that is possible relative to w. To achieve a better analysis of statements of ability, Mark Brown adapted the framework by modelling actions with sets of possible outcomes. John has the ability to hit the bull’s-eye reliably if there is some action of John’s such that every possible outcome of that action includes John’s hitting the bull’s-eye. Modal logic and its semantics also raise many puzzles. What makes a modal claim true? How do we tell what is possible and what is necessary? Are there any possible things that do not exist (and what could that mean anyway)? Does the use of modal logic involve a commitment to essentialism? How can an individual exist in many different possible worlds?

Constructing the Impossible

2021 ◽  
pp. 141-163
Author(s):  
Kit Fine
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Formal Languages ◽  
Impossible Worlds ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Limited Role ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Degree Of Acceptance ◽  
Broad Role ◽  
Natural Way

Please keep the original abstract. A number of philosophers have flirted with the idea of impossible worlds and some have even become enamored of it. But it has not met with the same degree of acceptance as the more familiar idea of a possible world. Whereas possible worlds have played a broad role in specifying the semantics for natural language and for a wide range of formal languages, impossible worlds have had a much more limited role; and there has not even been general agreement as to how a reasonable theory of impossible worlds is to be developed or applied. This chapter provides a natural way of introducing impossible states into the framework of truthmaker semantics and shows how their introduction permits a number of useful applications.

Fragmentation and Singular Propositions

2021 ◽  
pp. 183-198
Author(s):  
Robert Stalnaker
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Phenomenal Experience ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Intentional States ◽  
Singular Propositions ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori

Two puzzles are described: a problem about necessary a posteriori truths and a problem about propositional attitudes with singular propositions as their contents. Two strategies for solving them are compared. The first is the diagonalization strategy, which distinguishes possible worlds that are compatible with what is actually expressed by a given sentential clause from possible worlds that are compatible with what would be expressed by the clause if that possible world were actual. The second strategy is the fragmentation strategy, which represents the intentional states described by sentential clauses as separate nonintegrated representational states. It is argued that these are complementary, not competing, strategies. Both play a role in the solutions to the problems. In conclusion, it is suggested that these strategies can also help to clarify a number of further problems—about self-locating attitudes, about the nature of computation, and about knowledge of phenomenal experience.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document