scholarly journals Computing possible worlds in the history of modern astronomy

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 117
Author(s):  
Osvaldo Pessoa Jr. ◽  
Rafaela Gesing ◽  
Mariana Jó de Souza ◽  
Daniel Carlos de Melo Marcílio

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n1p117As part of an ongoing study of causal models in the history of science, a counterfactual scenario in the history of modern astronomy is explored with the aid of computer simulations. After the definition of “linking advance”, a possible world involving technological antecedence is described, branching out in 1510, in which the telescope is invented 70 years before its actual construction, at the time in which Fracastoro actually built the first prototelescope. By using the principle of the closest possible world (PCP), we estimate that in this scenario the discovery of the elliptical orbit of Mars would by anticipated by only 28 years. The second part of the paper involves an estimate of the probability of the previous scenario, guided by the principle that the actual world is the mean (PAM) and using computer simulations to create possible worlds in which the time spans between advances is varied according to a gamma distribution function. Taking into account the importance of the use of the diaphragm for the invention of the telescope, the probability that the telescope were built by 1538 for a branching time at 1510 is found to be smaller than 1%. The work shows that one of the important features of computational simulations in philosophy of science is to serve as a consistency check for the intuitions and speculations of the philosopher.

Author(s):  
Alastair Wilson

This chapter presents and defends the basic tenets of quantum modal realism. The first of these principles, Individualism, states that Everett worlds are metaphysically possible worlds. The converse of this principle, Generality, states that metaphysically possible worlds are Everett worlds. Combining Individualism and Generality yields Alignment, a conjecture about the nature of possible worlds that is closely analogous to Lewisian modal realism. Like Lewisian modal realism, Alignment entails that each possible world is a real concrete individual of the same basic kind as the actual world. These similarities render EQM suitable for grounding a novel theory of the nature of metaphysical modality with some unique properties. Also like Lewisian modal realism, quantum modal realism is a reductive theory: it accounts for modality in fundamentally non-modal terms. But quantum modal realism also has unique epistemological advantages over Lewisian modal realism and other extant realist approaches to modality.


Author(s):  
Heinrich Schepers

This chapter discusses Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s notion of monadic perception as a key component of his metaphysics. It first considers Leibniz’s thesis about monads, together with their perceptions and appetites, and his definition of perception as the representation of external variation in the internal. It then examines Leibniz’s belief that the world is a community of all compatible substances or monads, and that compatibility is the real principle underlying existence and the composition of possible worlds. The content of a monad’s perception is the momentary state of the whole world or, more precisely, the state of all the monads that are compatible with that monad. In every possible world these sequences are fully determinate. The chapter also analyzes Leibniz’s assertion that all monads are accompanied by a “manière de corps organique”.


Author(s):  
Joseph Melia

The concept of Possible worlds arises most naturally in the study of possibility and necessity. It is relatively uncontroversial that grass might have been red, or (to put the point another way) that there is a possible world in which grass is red. Though we do not normally take such talk of possible worlds literally, doing so has a surprisingly large number of benefits. Possible worlds enable us to analyse and help us understand a wide range of problematic and difficult concepts. Modality and modal logic, counterfactuals, propositions and properties are just some of the concepts illuminated by possible worlds. Yet, for all this, possible worlds may raise more problems than they solve. What kinds of things are possible worlds? Are they merely our creations or do they exist independently of us? Are they concrete objects, like the actual world, containing flesh and blood people living in alternative realities, or are they abstract objects, like numbers, unlocated in space and time and with no causal powers? Indeed, since possible worlds are not the kind of thing we can ever visit, how could we even know that such things exist? These are but some of the difficult questions which must be faced by anyone who wishes to use possible worlds.


2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 561-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHAD VANCE

AbstractThe classical conception of God is that of a necessary being. On a possible worlds semantics, this entails that God exists at every possible world. According to the modal realist account of David Lewis, possible worlds are understood to be real, concrete worlds – no different in kind from the actual world. But, modal realism is equipped to accommodate the existence of a necessary being in only one of three ways: (1) By way of counterpart theory, or (2) by way of a special case of trans-world identity for causally inert necessary beings (e.g. pure sets), or else (3) causally potent ones which lack accidental intrinsic properties. I argue that each of these three options entails unacceptable consequences – (1) and (2) are incompatible with theism, and (3) is incompatible with modal realism. I conclude that (at least) one of these views is false.


Kant Yearbook ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Osvaldo Ottaviani

AbstractThis paper moves from a disagreement with those interpreters who explain Kant’s doctrine of real possibility in terms of possible worlds. It seems to me that a possible world framework is too much indebted to the Leibnizian metaphysics of modality and, therefore, cannot serve to make sense of Kant’s theses. Leibniz’s theory of possibility, indeed, has been deeply criticized in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (CPR). Interestingly enough, however, Kant’s principal argument for rejecting that the field of what is possible is greater than the field of what is real was already anticipated by Leibniz. However, Leibniz employed it to demonstrate that there cannot be more than one actual world only (the others being purely possible ones). Moving from this fact, I argue that there is a certain tension between what Leibniz says about the actual world and his commitment to a plurality of possible worlds conceived as ideas in God’s mind. The first part of my paper is devoted to show that such a tension can be traced back to Leibniz’s claims about the relation between the possible and the real. In the second part, then, I maintain that Kant’s theory of real possibility grows from a dissatisfaction with (and a rejection of) Leibniz’s attempted solution to the problem of characterizing a kind of possibility narrower than the merely logical one and, nonetheless, not identical with existence. Finally, I present a short account of Kant’s theory of real possibility, based on the notion of transcendental conditions as conditions of possibility of experience, showing how it works in the case of the forms of intuition.


2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (Supplement_B) ◽  
pp. B33-B36
Author(s):  
Anastase Dzudie ◽  
Epie Njume ◽  
Liliane Kuate Mfekeu ◽  
Armel Djomou ◽  
Hamadou Ba ◽  
...  

Abstract The multi-country May Measurement Month (MMM) screening campaign aims to raise awareness on blood pressure (BP) and hypertension in individuals and communities, and measure BP, ideally, of those who had no BP measurement in the preceding year. We here report key findings from the Cameroon arm of MMM 2019. An opportunistic sample of adults (≥18 years) was included from 5 May to 5 June 2019 across 15 sites (markets, churches, homes, motor parks, workplaces, and hospitals/clinics). Data collection, cleaning, the definition of hypertension, and statistical analysis followed the standard protocol. The mean age of the 30 187 participants screened was 36.9 (SD: 14.9) years, 50.4% were female (5% of whom were pregnant), and 94.4% were screened out of the hospital/clinic settings. After multiple imputation of missing data, 6286 (20.8%) had hypertension, 24.0% were taking antihypertensive medication, and 705 (11.2%) of all participants with hypertension had controlled BP. In linear regression models adjusted for age, sex, and antihypertensive medicines use, a previous diagnosis of hypertension, a history of stroke, and use of antihypertensive medicines were significant predictors of systolic and diastolic BP levels. BPs were also significantly higher when measured in public outdoors, public indoors (diastolic BP only), workplaces, and other unspecified areas compared to hospitals/clinic settings. MMM19 is the largest ever BP screening campaign in a single month, in Cameroon and despite the limitations resulting from non-random sample selection, the opportunistic screening allows access to awareness and screening for hypertension out of the hospital/clinic settings.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. e22-e22
Author(s):  
Ezatolah Abbasi ◽  
Ahad Ghazavi ◽  
Kamran Dehghan ◽  
Mahsa Soleimani

Introduction: Infantile colic affects 5% to 19% of infants. Objectives: This study aimed to investigate the relationship between infantile colic crying and migraine in parents. Patients and Methods: In this study, the infants referred to Urmia health centers with 4 to 12 weeks old were investigated. According to the definition of infantile colic and questioning the parents, those infants were identified who cried at least three hours a day, at least three days a week, for at least 3 weeks. By filling out a questionnaire on infantile colic and migraine in parents, the relationship between migraine in parents and colic in infants was examined. Results: In this study, 195 infants aged 4 to 12 weeks were included. Around 107 (54.9%) were male. The mean age of infants was 6.50 ± 2.10 weeks. Of the 195 infants, 65 (33.3%) had colic, 32 (49.2%) were male and 33 (50.8%) were female (P = 0.26). Around 47 (24.1%) of parents had migraine and 148 (75.9%) had no history of migraine. Of 65 infants with colic, 38 (58.5%) had migraine parents and 27 (41.5%) had no history of parental migraine. Of 130 infants without colic, 9 (6.9%) of the parents had a history of migraine and 121 (93.1%) of them had no migraine (P = 0.001). Of 65 infants with colic, 31 of the mothers had migraine, since of 130 infants without colic, none of their mothers complained about migraine (P = 0.001). Conclusion: Infantile colic was significantly associated with parental migraine and it could be an early sign of disease in infants.


Anafora ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-164
Author(s):  
Hossein Pirnajmuddin ◽  
Sara Saei Dibavar

John Updike’s Rabbit, Run addresses the human condition under the reign of capital in the context of a society in transition toward a neoliberal state. By depicting a protagonist preoccupied with desire and consciousness through recounting his immediate experiences, the narrative delineates the confusion inherent in the capitalistic state for the protagonist in search of a way out toward self-actualization. Through the application of possible world theory, it is argued that the imbalance between Rabbit’s counterfactual possible worlds and his actual world accounts for the failure he experiences in his quest. As such, the possible worlds’ disequilibrium, we argue, ultimately leads to Rabbit’s bitter failure in his search; too many possible worlds in their counterfactual state produce a kind of counter-reality where there are too many fantasy/wish worlds, but few obligation worlds, a situation that leads to all the inevitable consequences we witness at the end of Book One of the Rabbit tetralogy.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaas J. Kraay

God is traditionally taken to be a perfect being, and the creator and sustainer of all that is. So, if theism is true, what sort of world should we expect? To answer this question, we need an account of the array of possible worlds from which God is said to choose. It seems that either there is (a) exactly one best possible world; or (b) more than one unsurpassable world; or (c) an infinite hierarchy of increasingly better worlds. Influential arguments for atheism have been advanced on each hierarchy, and these jointly comprise a daunting trilemma for theism. In this paper, I argue that if theism is true, we should expect the actual world to be a multiverse comprised of all and only those universes which are worthy of creation and sustenance. I further argue that this multiverse is the unique best of all possible worlds. Finally, I explain how his unconventional view bears on the trilemma for theism.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaas J. Kraay

God is traditionally taken to be a perfect being, and the creator and sustainer of all that is. So, if theism is true, what sort of world should we expect? To answer this question, we need an account of the array of possible worlds from which God is said to choose. It seems that either there is (a) exactly one best possible world; or (b) more than one unsurpassable world; or (c) an infinite hierarchy of increasingly better worlds. Influential arguments for atheism have been advanced on each hierarchy, and these jointly comprise a daunting trilemma for theism. In this paper, I argue that if theism is true, we should expect the actual world to be a multiverse comprised of all and only those universes which are worthy of creation and sustenance. I further argue that this multiverse is the unique best of all possible worlds. Finally, I explain how his unconventional view bears on the trilemma for theism.


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