Perception, Especially Perception through Language

Author(s):  
Ruth Garrett Millikan

Perceptual processing is translation of patterns in the data of sense into cognitive understanding without uniceptual inference. Understanding language differs from ordinary perceptual processing in that the signs it translates are detached rather than attached. This similarity is obscured because ordinary uses of the verbs of perception do not track a kind of psychological processing. Their use is mostly factive, which encourages overlooking the fallibility of perception. One result is the mistaken view that perceptual illusions are an anomaly and that perception is cognitively impenetrable. The assumption that each of the senses has its own proprietary level of perception and the assumption that differences in the result of perceptual processing are always accompanied by differences in perceptual experience are questioned. Finally, a number of intuitive objections to the idea that understanding language is a form of perceptual processing are discussed.

In my essay, ‘The Silence of the Senses’ (2004, revised 2013) I argued that perceptual experience has no representational content, or at least none if you exclude the content of a perceiver’s, or experiencer’s responses to his experience, e.g., in a case of perceiving, recognizing...


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norbert Vanek ◽  
Marton Soskuthy ◽  
Asifa Majid

Recent research shows that speakers of most languages find smells difficult to abstract and name. Can verbal labels enhance the human capacity to learn smell categories? Few studies have examined how verbal labeling might affect non-visual cognitive processes, and thus far very little is known about word-assisted odor category learning. To address these gaps, we tested whether different types of training change learning gains in odor categorization. After four intensive days of training to categorize odors that were co-presented with arbitrary verbal labels, people who learned odor categories with odor-label pairs that were more consistent were significantly more accurate than people with the same perceptual experience but who had odor-label pairs that were less consistent. Both groups’ accuracy scores improved, but the learning curves differed. The context of consistent linguistic cuing supported a steady increase in correct responses from the onset of training. However, inconsistent linguistic cuing delayed the start of approximating to target odor categorization. These results show that associations formed between odors and novel verbal labels facilitate the formation of odor categories. We interpret this as showing a causal link between language and olfactory perceptual processing in supporting categorization.


Author(s):  
Georges Dicker

This chapter critically analyzes Locke’s views on “sensitive knowledge.” Its main theses are: (1) Locke sometimes confuses the legitimate question (Q1), “When we perceive a body, how can we know that we aren’t hallucinating instead?” with the faulty “veil-of-perception” question, (Q2) “How do we know bodies exist, since we can’t perceive them?” (2) When Locke does mention (Q1), he sometimes just dismisses it, because he holds that simple ideas of sensation are by definition produced by bodies. (3) At other times, Locke humors the skeptic, and offers a defense of the senses, in the form of an inference to the best explanation. (4) It’s doubtful that he could successfully rule out other possible explanations of our perceptual experience, like Descartes’s deceiver scenario and its contemporary variants. (5) There are reasons for this weakness, and they carry over to any attempt to defeat skepticism by an inference to the best explanation.


2009 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 529-533 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Bargary ◽  
Kylie J. Barnett ◽  
Kevin J. Mitchell ◽  
Fiona N. Newell

Although it is estimated that as many as 4% of people experience some form of enhanced cross talk between (or within) the senses, known as synaesthesia, very little is understood about the level of information processing required to induce a synaesthetic experience. In work presented here, we used a well-known multisensory illusion called the McGurk effect to show that synaesthesia is driven by late, perceptual processing, rather than early, unisensory processing. Specifically, we tested 9 linguistic-color synaesthetes and found that the colors induced by spoken words are related to what is perceived (i.e., the illusory combination of audio and visual inputs) and not to the auditory component alone. Our findings indicate that color-speech synaesthesia is triggered only when a significant amount of information processing has occurred and that early sensory activation is not directly linked to the synaesthetic experience.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-80
Author(s):  
Gianfranco Soldati

This paper deals with the nature of perceptual appearances. It argues that they are objective relational properties of external objects. In perceptual experience, we are acquainted with such appearances. These are not sense data, as usually understood, and they are not identical to the properties we attribute to external objects through the usage of qualitative concepts such as ‘red’, ‘square’ and ‘sweet.’ We use such concepts in order to describe properties that are manifest in perception, not in order to describe appearances. One and the same property, such as the bent shape of a stick, can appear in different ways in different contexts. None of those ways is more or less appropriate, because things simply appear the way they do. The choice of a certain context determines the normal conditions for the possession of qualitative concepts. Standard perceptual illusions are perceptual experiences. They mislead us, not because they are incorrect, but because they prompt us to use concepts that are not appropriate under the obtaining conditions.


Author(s):  
Casey O'Callaghan

Crossmodal perceptual illusions such as ventriloquism, the McGurk effect, the rubber hand, and the sound-induced flash demonstrate that one sense can causally impact perceptual processing and experience that is associated with another sense. This chapter argues that such causal interactions between senses are not merely accidental. Interactions between senses are part of typical perceptual functioning. Unlike synesthesia, they reveal principled perceptual strategies for dealing with noisy, fallible sensory stimulation from multiple sources. Recalibrations resolve conflicts between senses and weight in deference to the more reliable modality. Coordination between senses thus improves the coherence and the reliability of human perceptual capacities. Therefore, some perceptual processes of the sort relevant to empirical psychology are multisensory.


1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 956-957
Author(s):  
Glyn W. Humphreys ◽  
M. Jane Riddoch

We discuss the difficulty of measuring the perceptual experience of colour, supporting Palmer's assertion that neuropsychological disorders of colour processing can be informative in this respect. We point out that some disorders seem to affect the perceptual experience of colour over and above the perceptual processing of colour, providing direct insights into the neural mechanisms supporting perceptual experience.


Author(s):  
Michael A. Cohen ◽  
Kevin Ortego ◽  
Andrew Kyroudis ◽  
Michael Pitts

AbstractTo identify the neural correlates of perceptual awareness, researchers often compare the differences in neural activation between conditions in which an observer is or is not aware of a stimulus. While intuitive, this approach often contains a critical limitation: In order to link brain activity with perceptual awareness, observers traditionally report the contents of their perceptual experience. However, relying on observers’ reports is problematic because it is difficult to know if the neural responses being measured are associated with conscious perception or with post-perceptual processes involved in the reporting task (i.e., working memory, decision-making, etc.). To address this issue, we combined a standard visual masking paradigm with a recently developed “no-report” paradigm in male/female human participants. In the visual masking paradigm, observers saw images of animals and objects that were visible or invisible depending on their proximity to masks. Meanwhile, on half of the trials, observers reported the contents of their perceptual experience (i.e., report condition), while on the other half of trials they refrained from reporting about their experiences (i.e., no-report condition). We used electroencephalography (EEG) to examine how visibility interacts with reporting by measuring the P3b event related potential (ERP), one of the proposed canonical “signatures” of conscious processing. Overall, we found a robust P3b in the report condition, but no P3b whatsoever in the no-report condition. This finding suggests that the P3b itself is not a neural signature of conscious processing and highlights the importance of carefully distinguishing the neural correlates of perceptual awareness from post-perceptual processing.Significance statementWhat are the neural signatures that differentiate conscious and unconscious processing in the brain? Perhaps the most well-established candidate signature is the P3b event-related potential (ERP), a late slow wave that appears when observers are aware of a stimulus, but disappears when a stimulus fails to reach awareness. Here, however, we found that the P3b does not track what observers are perceiving but instead tracks what observers are reporting. When observers are aware of simple visual stimuli, the P3b is nowhere to be found unless observers are reporting the contents of their experience. These results challenge the well-established notion of the P3b as a neural marker of awareness and highlight the need for new approaches to the neuroscience of consciousness.


Author(s):  
Dr.Sumedh Wasnik ◽  
Tanuja Naik ◽  
Anita Ghodke ◽  
Vaibhav Sulakhe

Cosmetology deals with various aspect of beauty. Beauty is the quality of being physically attractive, the qualities in a person or a thing that give pleasure to the senses or the mind. It is the quality or aggregate of qualities in a person or thing that gives pleasure to the senses or pleasurably exalts the mind or spirit. Beauty is the quality present in a thing or person that gives intense pleasure or deep satisfaction to the mind, whether arising from sensory manifestations (as shape, colour, sound, etc.), a meaningful design or pattern, or something else. It pleases the aesthetic senses, especially the sight. Beauty of person gives perceptual experience of pleasure or satisfaction. According to Ayurveda, the concept of beauty includes physical, mental, social and spiritual elements. Ayurveda is the science of health care and healing, works on four levels body, Breath, mind and spirit. When these are in perfect harmony, a person radiates with inner and outer beauty. In fact, the concept of beauty and cosmetics is as old as mankind and civilization. Ama (toxic materials) inside our body make a person ugly and diseased and Sodhana i.e. Panchakarma (purification) is the best therapeutic intervention to eliminate body toxins. Being Ayurveda as a life science and tradition of India, soon India will be the global cosmetic industry’s capital because of advantages of Ayurveda and Ayurvedic medicines.


Author(s):  
Keith A. Wilson

Many philosophers and scientists take perceptual experience, whatever else it involves, to be representational. In ‘The Silence of the Senses’, Charles Travis argues that this view involves a kind of category mistake, and consequently, that perceptual experience is not a representational or intentional phenomenon. The details of Travis’s argument, however, have been widely misinterpreted by his representationalist opponents, many of whom dismiss it out of hand. This chapter offers an interpretation of Travis’s argument from looks that it is argued presents a genuine and important challenge to orthodox representational views of experience. Whilst this challenge may not (pace Travis) be insurmountable, it places a substantial burden upon the representationalist to explain not only how experiences come to have the contents that they do (the individuation question), but how those contents come to feature in our conscious mental lives (the availability question).


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document