Virtuous Agents
Chapter 3 claimed that reasons and rightness are non-perspectival. This means that they depend on facts about the whole future, and raises a puzzle about how to characterize virtuous agents. Agents cannot know which of their options is right, or any but a small proportion of their reasons for action. This chapter argues that we can account for the features of virtuous agency without having to introduce parallel perspectival concepts of reasons and rightness. It begins by characterizing good decision procedures as those which tend to result in right action. Despite our ‘cluelessness’ about token actions, we can form reasonable beliefs about the total consequences of decision procedures. It then presents a novel account of praiseworthiness, using the idea of beneficial practices of praising. Finally, it claims that virtues are traits that both tend to cause right action and are praiseworthy. Virtues are not just good, but also admirable.