Conclusion
This concluding chapter sums up the main claims defended in the book, and explains how those claims relate to some of the sources of philosophical interest in means–ends coherence mentioned in the introduction. Although means–ends coherence can’t be traced to some social rule or convention, it can be explained in terms of the constitutive aims of the very attitudes the requirement governs. These constitutive aims—given how we’re understanding them in terms of sthe success conditions of the relevant attitudes—would not raise the same metaphysical, epistemological, and motivational worries that led antirealists like Mackie to doubt that moral requirements are part of the fabric of the universe. Matters would be different if we understood means–ends coherence such that we ought not be means–ends incoherent in the same sense in which we ought not intentionally cause human suffering for fun—in that both would be contrary to the “ought” of practical reason. Then it would be unclear why skepticism about the latter claim about what we ought not do wouldn’t also involve us in skepticism about the former.