Conclusion

2020 ◽  
pp. 216-218
Author(s):  
John Brunero

This concluding chapter sums up the main claims defended in the book, and explains how those claims relate to some of the sources of philosophical interest in means–ends coherence mentioned in the introduction. Although means–ends coherence can’t be traced to some social rule or convention, it can be explained in terms of the constitutive aims of the very attitudes the requirement governs. These constitutive aims—given how we’re understanding them in terms of sthe success conditions of the relevant attitudes—would not raise the same metaphysical, epistemological, and motivational worries that led antirealists like Mackie to doubt that moral requirements are part of the fabric of the universe. Matters would be different if we understood means–ends coherence such that we ought not be means–ends incoherent in the same sense in which we ought not intentionally cause human suffering for fun—in that both would be contrary to the “ought” of practical reason. Then it would be unclear why skepticism about the latter claim about what we ought not do wouldn’t also involve us in skepticism about the former.

Author(s):  
Owen Ware

Kant’s arguments for the reality of human freedom and the normativity of the moral law continue to inspire work in contemporary moral philosophy. Many prominent ethicists invoke Kant, directly or indirectly, in their efforts to derive the authority of moral requirements from a more basic conception of action, agency, or rationality. But many commentators have detected a deep rift between the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason, leaving Kant’s project of justification exposed to conflicting assessments and interpretations. In this major re-reading of Kant, Owen Ware defends the controversial view that Kant’s mature writings on ethics share a unified commitment to the moral law’s primacy. Using both close analysis and historical contextualization, Owen Ware overturns a paradigmatic way of reading Kant’s arguments for morality and freedom, situating them within Kant’s critical methodology at large. The result is a novel understanding of Kant that challenges much of what goes under the banner of Kantian arguments for moral normativity today.


1990 ◽  
Vol 1 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 46-47
Author(s):  
Jim Dreaver

Enlightenment has often been spoken of as the "ultimate cure" for human suffering. Yet what does it mean to be enlightened? D. T. Suzuki, the scholar who did so much to introduce Zen to the West, defined it this way: "Enlightenment is the thunder-and lightning discovery that the universe and oneself are not remote and apart, but an intimate, palpitating Whole."


1997 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 122-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
David O. Brink

Whether morality has rational authority is an open question insofar as we can seriously entertain conceptions of morality and practical reason according to which it need not be contrary to reason to fail to conform to moral requirements. Doubts about the authority of morality are especially likely to arise for those who hold a broadly prudential view of rationality. It is common to think of morality as including various other-regarding duties of cooperation, forbearance, and aid. Most of us also regard moral obligations as authoritative practical considerations. But heeding these obligations appears sometimes to constrain the agent's pursuit of his own interests or aims. If we think of rationality in prudential terms–as what would promote the agent's own interests–we may wonder whether moral conduct is always rationally justifiable. Indeed, we do not need to think of rationality in exclusively prudential terms to raise this worry. The worry can arise even if there are impartial reasons–that is, nonderivative reasons to promote the welfare of others.


Author(s):  
François Schroeter ◽  
Karen Jones ◽  
Laura Schroeter

The first part of this introductory chapter introduces and discusses four core theses of moral rationalism: (i) the psychological thesis that reason is the source of moral judgment, (ii) the metaphysical thesis that moral requirements are constituted by the deliverances of practical reason, (iii) the epistemological thesis that moral requirements are knowable a priori, and (iv) the normative thesis that moral requirements entail valid reasons for action. The chapter sketches different—stronger and weaker—versions of each thesis, and tentatively examines whether specific versions of the different theses can be recombined into attractive rationalist packages, in which the various strands are mutually supporting. The chapter’s second part provides an overview of the contributions included in this volume.


2003 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hui-Ching Chang

This ethnographic study explores how people in Taipei, the capital city of Taiwan, engage words as cultural performance, whether they are spoken, written, or manifest themselves as cultural artifacts. Informed by their depth philosophical contemplation about the boundary between the universe and language, and made possible through their unique linguistic constructions, many Chinese treat various forms of expression as art and signs of wisdom, whether for expressions of solemnity, playfulness, or humor. Through poems, common sayings, matched couplets, chengyu, and so on, words entertain and enrich social life, help relieve human suffering, connect one life to another, and instill modern everyday encounters with a dash of traditional cultural ethos. This artistic endeavor also offers explanations for Chinese indirectness, as shades of meanings are seen as displays of varying degrees of engagement to cultural performances. Interview accounts and data collected through participant observation during several field trips conducted in Taiwan were analyzed to show how words participate in and give meaning to the construction of Taiwanese interpersonal life.


This volume of thirteen original essays investigates the four core theses of moral rationalism: (i) the psychological thesis that reason is the source of moral judgement; (ii) the metaphysical thesis that moral requirements are constituted by the deliverances of practical reason; (iii) the epistemological thesis that moral requirements are knowable a priori; and (iv) the normative thesis that moral requirements entail valid reasons for action. The essays explore a variety of interpretations of these core theses, offer new arguments in their favour, and explore challenges to the rationalist project. The five essays in Part I (“Normativity”) offer contemporary defences or reconstructions of Kant’s attempt to ground the normative thesis, that moral requirements entail valid reasons for action (thesis iv), in the nature of practical reason and practical rationality. Some, but not all, rely on constructivist commitments about the metaphysical dependence of moral requirements on practical reason (thesis ii). The four essays in Part II (“Epistemology and Meaning”) consider the viability of claims to a priori moral knowledge (thesis iii). The authors of all four essays are sympathetic to a realist moral metaphysics and thus forgo the straightforward constructivist road to a priority. The four essays in Part III (“Psychology”) each grapple with the implications for rationalism of the role of emotions and unconscious processes in moral judgement and action (thesis i). The volume demonstrates that moral rationalism identifies not a single philosophical position but rather a family of philosophical positions, which resemble traditional rationalism, as exemplified by Kant, to varying degrees.


2020 ◽  
pp. 187-214
Author(s):  
Helga Varden

It is our capacity to act truly freely that makes it possible for us to be morally responsible for our actions. It is what sets us apart from all other living creatures we have encountered so far in the universe and enables us to be autonomous, self-governing through practical reason. In turn, understanding Kant’s conception of freedom requires us to pay close attention to his distinction between internal freedom (virtue or first-personal ethics) and external freedom (right or justice). It is this complex idea of human freedom that informs all Kant’s practical works, regardless of whether the work in question focuses on ethics (virtue), religion, politics, right (justice), history, education, or anthropology—just as it centrally informs the structure of and theory presented in this book. ...


Author(s):  
Krzysztof Bolejko ◽  
Andrzej Krasinski ◽  
Charles Hellaby ◽  
Marie-Noelle Celerier
Keyword(s):  

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst Heinrich Philipp August Haeckel ◽  
Joseph McCabe

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document