Epistemic Gain

Author(s):  
Neil Tennant

Core Logic avoids the Lewis First Paradox, even though it contains ∨-Introduction, and a form of ∨-Elimination that permits core proof of Disjunctive Syllogism. The reason for this is that the method of cut-elimination will unearth the fact that the newly combined premises form an inconsistent set. A new formal-semantical relation of logical consequence, according to which B is not a consequence of A,¬A, is available as an alternative to the conventionally defined relation of logical consequence. Nevertheless we can make do with the conventional definition, and still show that (Classical) Core Logic is adequate unto it. Although Core Logic eschews unrestricted Cut, nevertheless (i) Core Logic is adequate for all intuitionistic mathematical deduction; (ii) Classical Core Logic is adequate for all classical mathematical deduction; and (iii) Core Logic is adequate for all the deduction involved in the empirical testing of scientific theories.

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tore Fjetland Øgaard

AbstractThis paper gives an account of Anderson and Belnap’s selection criteria for an adequate theory of entailment. The criteria are grouped into three categories: criteria pertaining to modality, those pertaining to relevance, and those related to expressive strength. The leitmotif of both this paper and its prequel is the relevant legitimacy of disjunctive syllogism. Relevant logics are commonly held to be paraconsistent logics. It is shown in this paper, however, that both E and R can be extended to explosive logics which satisfy all of Anderson and Belnap’s selection criteria, provided the truth-constant known as the Ackermann constant is available.   One of the selection criteria related to expressive strength is having an “enthymematic” conditional for which a deduction theorem holds. I argue that this allows for a new interpretation of Anderson and Belnap’s take on logical consequence, namely as committing them to pluralism about logical consequence.


Etyka ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 241-250
Author(s):  
Anna Jedynak

The starting point of the investigations undertaken in the article is the thesis of empirical indeterminacy of scientific theories. According to this thesis the same set of empirical data can be differently explained by different theories, none of which will be found compelling. The reason for that is that no specific theory is a logical consequence of observational statements. This thesis can be so generalized as to include systems of value as well. Theoretical statements serve as justification of observational statements, although the former are not entailed by the latter. Similarly with judgements of value: they justify moral norms but are not entailed by them. Consequently the same obligations can be justified on the grounds of different systems of value. Systems of value are not therefore determined by moral obligations and have the same function in ethics as theory does in science. Systems of value remain, however, radically different from scientific theories because the relations that bind observational statements with scientific observations are quite different from those that bind moral norms with human behaviour in ethics.


1978 ◽  
Vol 23 (6) ◽  
pp. 473-473
Author(s):  
DAVID L. KRANTZ
Keyword(s):  

Paragraph ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Williams

This article charts differences between Gilles Deleuze's and Gaston Bachelard's philosophies of science in order to reflect on different readings of the role of science in Deleuze's philosophy, in particular in relation to Manuel DeLanda's interpretation of Deleuze's work. The questions considered are: Why do Gilles Deleuze and Gaston Bachelard develop radically different philosophical dialectics in relation to science? What is the significance of this difference for current approaches to Deleuze and science, most notably as developed by Manuel DeLanda? It is argued that, despite its great explanatory power, DeLanda's association of Deleuze with a particular set of contemporary scientific theories does not allow for the ontological openness and for the metaphysical sources of Deleuze's work. The argument turns on whether terms such as ‘intensity’ can be given predominantly scientific definitions or whether metaphysical definitions are more consistent with a sceptical relation of philosophy to contemporary science.


2002 ◽  
Vol 153 (7) ◽  
pp. 249-250
Author(s):  
Fritz Marti

Looking back on the last quarter of the 20th century, we see that the most striking changes in forest management have come about following large and frequent catastrophes. Management– concerned solely with wood production in former times – is oriented more towards retaining stability of the stands nowadays. In addition, the aspect of tending and improving the environment continues to gain ground. The growing gap between expenditure and profit is particularly acute in Glarner mountain forest areas. The extension of promotional silvicultural measures, which widely determines today's management, is to be seen as a logical consequence.


The concept of a law of nature, while familiar, is deeply puzzling. Theorists such as Descartes think a divine being governs the universe according to the laws which follow from that being’s own nature. Newton detaches the concept from theology and is agnostic about the ontology underlying the laws of nature. Some later philosophers treat laws as summaries of events or tools for understanding and explanation, or identify the laws with principles and equations fundamental to scientific theories. In the first part of this volume, essays from leading historians of philosophy identify central questions: are laws independent of the things they govern, or do they emanate from the powers of bodies? Are the laws responsible for the patterns we see in nature, or should they be collapsed into those patterns? In the second part, contributors at the forefront of current debate evaluate the role of laws in contemporary Best System, perspectival, Kantian, and powers- or mechanisms-based approaches. These essays take up pressing questions about whether the laws of nature can be consistent with contingency, whether laws are based on the invariants of scientific theories, and how to deal with exceptions to laws. These twelve essays, published here for the first time, will be required reading for anyone interested in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and the histories of these disciplines.


Author(s):  
Rosanna Keefe ◽  
Jessica Leech

According to an increasingly popular view, the source of logical necessity is to be found in the essences of logical entities. One might be tempted to extend the view further in using it to tackle fundamental questions surrounding logical consequence. This chapter enquires: how does a view according to which the facts about logical consequence are determined by the essences of logical entities look in detail? Are there any more or less obvious problems arising for such a view? The chapter uncovers a prima facie result in favour of logical pluralism. However, it then goes on to raise some concerns for this result. It argues that, considered generally, it is difficult to see how essence could do all of the requisite work alone. The chapter also shows how considering things from the perspective of disputes between particular rival logics makes an interesting and important difference to the picture of things presented by the essentialist account.


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