Essentialism and Logical Consequence

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosanna Keefe ◽  
Jessica Leech
Keyword(s):  
Logical Consequence ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Logical Pluralism ◽  
Logical Necessity ◽  
Popular View

According to an increasingly popular view, the source of logical necessity is to be found in the essences of logical entities. One might be tempted to extend the view further in using it to tackle fundamental questions surrounding logical consequence. This chapter enquires: how does a view according to which the facts about logical consequence are determined by the essences of logical entities look in detail? Are there any more or less obvious problems arising for such a view? The chapter uncovers a prima facie result in favour of logical pluralism. However, it then goes on to raise some concerns for this result. It argues that, considered generally, it is difficult to see how essence could do all of the requisite work alone. The chapter also shows how considering things from the perspective of disputes between particular rival logics makes an interesting and important difference to the picture of things presented by the essentialist account.

Shadows of Syntax

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jared Warren
Keyword(s):  
Logical Pluralism ◽  
Mathematical Truth ◽  
Ontological Commitments ◽  
Linguistic Rules ◽  
Linguistic Conventions ◽  
Popular View ◽  
Big Picture ◽  
Epistemology Of Logic ◽  
And Mathematics ◽  
Algorithmic Process

What is the source of logical and mathematical truth? This volume revitalizes conventionalism as an answer to this question. Conventionalism takes logical and mathematical truth to have their source in linguistic conventions. This was an extremely popular view in the early 20th century, but it was never worked out in detail and is now almost universally rejected in mainstream philosophical circles. In Shadows of Syntax, Jared Warren offers the first book-length treatment and defense of a combined conventionalist theory of logic and mathematics. He argues that our conventions, in the form of syntactic rules of language use, are perfectly suited to explain the truth, necessity, and a priority of logical and mathematical claims. In Part I, Warren explains exactly what conventionalism amounts to and what linguistic conventions are. Part II develops an unrestricted inferentialist theory of the meanings of logical constants that leads to logical conventionalism. This conventionalist theory is elaborated in discussions of logical pluralism, the epistemology of logic, and of the influential objections that led to the historical demise of conventionalism. Part III aims to extend conventionalism from logic to mathematics. Unlike logic, mathematics involves both ontological commitments and a rich notion of truth that cannot be generated by any algorithmic process. To address these issues Warren develops conventionalist-friendly but independently plausible theories of both metaontology and mathematical truth. Finally, Part IV steps back to address big picture worries and meta-worries about conventionalism. This book develops and defends a unified theory of logic and mathematics according to which logical and mathematical truths are reflections of our linguistic rules, mere shadows of syntax.

scholarly journals Model-Theoretic Accounts of Logical Consequence - Themes from Etchemendy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Kasper Højbjerg Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Model Theory ◽  
Logical Consequence ◽  
Kripke Semantics ◽  
Logical Necessity ◽  
Representational Model ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
In Virtue Of

<p>This thesis is a discussion and continuation of a project started by John Etchemendy with his criticism of Tarski's account of logical consequence. To this end the two central concepts of the thesis are those of an interpretational and representational model-theoretic account of logical consequence, respectively.  The first chapter introduces Etchemendy's criticism of Tarski's account of logical consequence, a criticism which turns essentially on an interpretation of Tarski according to which his proposed account gives rise to a purely interpretational model-theoretic account of logical consequence. Consequently there must be a representational aspect to our model-theoretic definition of logical consequence.  The second chapter introduces Etchemendy's notion of logical consequence: that of being truth preserving in virtue of the semantics of the involved terms. While this notion is representational, we argue that Etchemendy's notion of a categorematic treatment of terms reintroduces an interpretational aspect back into the model theory. The chapter investigates the resulting notion, compares it to other notions in the literature, and presents certain results that can be proved, under certain conditions, about this notion in relation to the notion of being truth preserving in virtue of the semantics of all terms.  Chapter three of the thesis is concerned with the question of how a standard model, seen as a domain and an interpretation function, manages to capture the different notions of model-theoretic consequence. As we explain, this question is most pressing when we want our models to both represent and interpret, and we will present a theory which allows us to see the models as both representing non-actual possibilities as well as provide interpretations for the terms.  The fourth chapter applies the lessons of the preceeding chapters to argue that Kripke Semantics can be seen as capturing the notion of being truth preserving in all possibilities under all interpretations of the non-logical terminology in the case where our language is augmented with an operator, ⃞, to represent logical necessity. We will argue this point by contrasting it with, though not necessarily disagreeing with, claims made by various authors to the effect that Kripke Semantics is not the appropriate semantics when our language contains an operator for logical necessity.</p>

scholarly journals The Subject Matter of Logic: Explaining what logic is about

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Olsen
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Logical Consequence ◽  
Logical Pluralism ◽  
Modern Logic ◽  
Formal Systems ◽  
Dead End ◽  
Established Fact ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Philosophical Debates

<p><b>Logics are formal systems with many different applications. The boundary between logics and other formal systems, like mathematics, is unclear. One way of clarifying this boundary is by appealing to the subject matter; defining their purpose, for instance, showing how the truth of the premises guarantees the conclusion, demonstrating reasoning, or modelling an argument. </b></p><p>There are two contemporary philosophical debates where the subject matter of logic is relevant. The first is that of logical pluralism, which needs a way to determine whether a logic is correct. The second is the argument that the normativity of logic supplies a mechanism for determining whether a logic is correct. In these debates, the subject matter of logic is relevant, but not discussed. And it does not need to be because the participants implicitly agree that the answer is validity. They also agree that this does not advance the debate. </p><p>Validity is a dead-end because it only transforms the question. Logicians clarify validity by giving a definition. But it is a well-established fact that there is more than one way of defining a relation of logical consequence. So, how does one determine whether a given definition is correct? Or to put it another way, how does one know whether that definition captures validity? On this point, opinions are deeply divided. Moreover, there is no clear strategy for resolving the difference of opinion. MacFarlane comments that appeals to intuitions about validity are prevalent in these debates. Furthermore, he remarks, these intuitions are a product of education. </p><p>In many parts of the advanced literature, logicians agree that the subject matter of logic is validity. But this explanation won't do as an introduction for a beginner. As Newton-Smith says, this 'has the fault of explaining the obscure in terms of the equally obscure.' Instead, teachers must give what Mates calls 'an informal and intuitive account of the matters with which logic is primarily concerned.' </p><p>The constraints on introductory explanations provide an opportunity to investigate the subject matter of logic in a novel way and perhaps reveal the source of intuitions about validity, which might, in turn, shed light on questions of pluralism and normativity. My thesis examines the way that teachers introduce the subject matter of logic to beginners. </p><p>I begin by exploring a slice of history and a tradition of logic instruction. I argue that a reliance on this tradition leads to flawed teaching in the modern context. After that, I examine modern introductory texts and the strategies they use to present the subject matter of logic. I draw several lessons from this examination. </p><p>I conduct three interviews with Gillian Russell, Dave Ripley, and Johan van Benthem in which I ask philosophic and pedagogic questions directed by each of their interests. These dialogues are illuminating on their own. But brought together they show the interaction between the teacher's theory of the subject matter of logic and the practice of introductory logic teaching. </p><p>After this investigation into modern logic pedagogy, I present a framework for a solution to the pedagogic problem. It is a framework because there is no single best way to introduce logic to a beginner. But it is possible to develop a guiding structure. The solution which I present relies on a widely accepted 'trivial' form of pluralism and a kind of relativism which I introduce, and argue for, in this thesis. This discussion also includes practical suggestions for developing introductory logic courses.</p>

scholarly journals Philosophical Problems of Foundations of Logic

Studia Humana ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-26
Author(s):  
Alexander S. Karpenko
Keyword(s):  
Logical Consequence ◽  
Logical Pluralism ◽  
Logical System ◽  
Modern Logic ◽  
Logical Constants

Abstract In the paper the following questions are discussed: (i) What is logical consequence? (ii) What are logical constants (operations)? (iii) What is a logical system? (iv) What is logical pluralism? (v) What is logic? In the conclusion, the main tendencies of development of modern logic are pointed out.

scholarly journals The Subject Matter of Logic: Explaining what logic is about

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Olsen
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Logical Consequence ◽  
Logical Pluralism ◽  
Modern Logic ◽  
Formal Systems ◽  
Dead End ◽  
Established Fact ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Philosophical Debates

<p><b>Logics are formal systems with many different applications. The boundary between logics and other formal systems, like mathematics, is unclear. One way of clarifying this boundary is by appealing to the subject matter; defining their purpose, for instance, showing how the truth of the premises guarantees the conclusion, demonstrating reasoning, or modelling an argument. </b></p><p>There are two contemporary philosophical debates where the subject matter of logic is relevant. The first is that of logical pluralism, which needs a way to determine whether a logic is correct. The second is the argument that the normativity of logic supplies a mechanism for determining whether a logic is correct. In these debates, the subject matter of logic is relevant, but not discussed. And it does not need to be because the participants implicitly agree that the answer is validity. They also agree that this does not advance the debate. </p><p>Validity is a dead-end because it only transforms the question. Logicians clarify validity by giving a definition. But it is a well-established fact that there is more than one way of defining a relation of logical consequence. So, how does one determine whether a given definition is correct? Or to put it another way, how does one know whether that definition captures validity? On this point, opinions are deeply divided. Moreover, there is no clear strategy for resolving the difference of opinion. MacFarlane comments that appeals to intuitions about validity are prevalent in these debates. Furthermore, he remarks, these intuitions are a product of education. </p><p>In many parts of the advanced literature, logicians agree that the subject matter of logic is validity. But this explanation won't do as an introduction for a beginner. As Newton-Smith says, this 'has the fault of explaining the obscure in terms of the equally obscure.' Instead, teachers must give what Mates calls 'an informal and intuitive account of the matters with which logic is primarily concerned.' </p><p>The constraints on introductory explanations provide an opportunity to investigate the subject matter of logic in a novel way and perhaps reveal the source of intuitions about validity, which might, in turn, shed light on questions of pluralism and normativity. My thesis examines the way that teachers introduce the subject matter of logic to beginners. </p><p>I begin by exploring a slice of history and a tradition of logic instruction. I argue that a reliance on this tradition leads to flawed teaching in the modern context. After that, I examine modern introductory texts and the strategies they use to present the subject matter of logic. I draw several lessons from this examination. </p><p>I conduct three interviews with Gillian Russell, Dave Ripley, and Johan van Benthem in which I ask philosophic and pedagogic questions directed by each of their interests. These dialogues are illuminating on their own. But brought together they show the interaction between the teacher's theory of the subject matter of logic and the practice of introductory logic teaching. </p><p>After this investigation into modern logic pedagogy, I present a framework for a solution to the pedagogic problem. It is a framework because there is no single best way to introduce logic to a beginner. But it is possible to develop a guiding structure. The solution which I present relies on a widely accepted 'trivial' form of pluralism and a kind of relativism which I introduce, and argue for, in this thesis. This discussion also includes practical suggestions for developing introductory logic courses.</p>

scholarly journals Model-Theoretic Accounts of Logical Consequence - Themes from Etchemendy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Kasper Højbjerg Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Model Theory ◽  
Logical Consequence ◽  
Kripke Semantics ◽  
Logical Necessity ◽  
Representational Model ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
In Virtue Of

<p>This thesis is a discussion and continuation of a project started by John Etchemendy with his criticism of Tarski's account of logical consequence. To this end the two central concepts of the thesis are those of an interpretational and representational model-theoretic account of logical consequence, respectively.  The first chapter introduces Etchemendy's criticism of Tarski's account of logical consequence, a criticism which turns essentially on an interpretation of Tarski according to which his proposed account gives rise to a purely interpretational model-theoretic account of logical consequence. Consequently there must be a representational aspect to our model-theoretic definition of logical consequence.  The second chapter introduces Etchemendy's notion of logical consequence: that of being truth preserving in virtue of the semantics of the involved terms. While this notion is representational, we argue that Etchemendy's notion of a categorematic treatment of terms reintroduces an interpretational aspect back into the model theory. The chapter investigates the resulting notion, compares it to other notions in the literature, and presents certain results that can be proved, under certain conditions, about this notion in relation to the notion of being truth preserving in virtue of the semantics of all terms.  Chapter three of the thesis is concerned with the question of how a standard model, seen as a domain and an interpretation function, manages to capture the different notions of model-theoretic consequence. As we explain, this question is most pressing when we want our models to both represent and interpret, and we will present a theory which allows us to see the models as both representing non-actual possibilities as well as provide interpretations for the terms.  The fourth chapter applies the lessons of the preceeding chapters to argue that Kripke Semantics can be seen as capturing the notion of being truth preserving in all possibilities under all interpretations of the non-logical terminology in the case where our language is augmented with an operator, ⃞, to represent logical necessity. We will argue this point by contrasting it with, though not necessarily disagreeing with, claims made by various authors to the effect that Kripke Semantics is not the appropriate semantics when our language contains an operator for logical necessity.</p>

Social Capital and the Demand for Regulation in Russia

2014 ◽  
pp. 77-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Menyashev
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Russian Regions ◽  
Strong State ◽  
Popular View

There is a popular view in Russian studies arguing that underdevelopment of Russian civil society is partly responsible for the failure of liberal idea in Russia. Fragmented society sees no alternative to massive government regulation, that is why support of strong state is so high. If this logic is true, the differences in civicness across urban societies should show up in liberal parties support. This paper estimates this effect using social capital framework and drawing upon the data from Russian regions.

Russia in international capital movement: Turn of tendencies

2017 ◽  
pp. 148-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Bulatov
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Structure ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Capital Movement ◽  
International Capital ◽  
Capital Outflow ◽  
The Past ◽  
Russian Economy ◽  
National Capital ◽  
Future Situation ◽  
International Capital Movement

The paper deals with the past, current and future situation in Russian capital outflow and inflow. The specific features of the past situation (2001-2013) were as follows: big scale of Russian participation in international capital movement; turnover of national capital between Russia and offshores; stable surplus of capital outflow over inflow; inadequacy of industrial structure of capital inflow to Russian needs. The current situation is characterized by such new features as radical cut in volumes of capital outflow and inflow, some decrease in its level of offshorization. In the mid-term the probability of continuation of current trends is high. In the long-term the mode of Russian participation in international capital movement will prima facie depend on prospects of realization of systematic reforms in the Russian economy.

Dyadic Obligations over Complex Actions as Deontic Constraints in the Situation Calculus

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Claßen ◽  
James Delgrande
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Deontic Logic ◽  
Action Theory ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Situation Calculus ◽  
Artificial Agents ◽  
Planning Techniques ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
Reasoning About Action ◽  
The Given

With the advent of artificial agents in everyday life, it is important that these agents are guided by social norms and moral guidelines. Notions of obligation, permission, and the like have traditionally been studied in the field of Deontic Logic, where deontic assertions generally refer to what an agent should or should not do; that is they refer to actions. In Artificial Intelligence, the Situation Calculus is (arguably) the best known and most studied formalism for reasoning about action and change. In this paper, we integrate these two areas by incorporating deontic notions into Situation Calculus theories. We do this by considering deontic assertions as constraints, expressed as a set of conditionals, which apply to complex actions expressed as GOLOG programs. These constraints induce a ranking of "ideality" over possible future situations. This ranking in turn is used to guide an agent in its planning deliberation, towards a course of action that adheres best to the deontic constraints. We present a formalization that includes a wide class of (dyadic) deontic assertions, lets us distinguish prima facie from all-things-considered obligations, and particularly addresses contrary-to-duty scenarios. We furthermore present results on compiling the deontic constraints directly into the Situation Calculus action theory, so as to obtain an agent that respects the given norms, but works solely based on the standard reasoning and planning techniques.

A ciência e a superação das desigualdades

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-74
Author(s):  
Galileu Galilei Medeiros de Souza
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Rio De Janeiro ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Sao Paulo ◽  
Scientific Activity ◽  
São Paulo ◽  
Isaac Newton ◽  
Positive Science ◽  
Popular View ◽  
Science Philosophy

Resumo: O artigo é um ensaio sobre como a atividade científica poderia ser influenciada por uma proposta ética voltada para a superação das desigualdades. A questão subjacente a este estudo tematiza a possível contraposição entre a ética, que parece ser inteiramente vinculada à liberdade humana e seus processos de escolha, e a lógica da pesquisa científica, que ainda, pelo menos em visão popular, parece se basear na posse de informações objetivas e na descoberta de leis de regulação da natureza. Será feita uma breve contextualização das aquisições teóricas sobre o sentido da ciência positiva dos últimos séculos, procurando extrair daí as indicações de uma estreita dependência dessa em relação às escolhas humanas, em virtude de sua metodologia dialética.   Palavras-Chave: Ciência positiva. Filosofia da ciência. Dialética. Ética.      Abstract: The article is an essay on how scientific activity could be influenced by an ethics proposal aimed at overcoming inequalities. The question underlying this study discusses the possible contrast between ethics, which seems to be entirely linked to human freedom and choice processes, and the logic of scientific research, which still, at least in a popular view, seems to be based on possession of objective information and discovery of regulatory laws of nature. Will be presented a brief background of theoretical acquisitions on the meaning of positive science of the last centuries, looking to extract the indications of a close dependence of this in relation to human choices, because your dialectic methodology.  Keywords: Positive Science. Philosophy of Science. Dialectic. Ethics. REFERÊNCIASARISTÓTELES, Tópicos. In: _______. Órganon. 2.ed. São Paulo: EDIPRO, 2010, p. 347-543.BLONDEL, M. L’Action (1893): essai d’une critique de la vie et d’une science de la pratique, Paris: Quadrige, 1993.CARNAP, R. A superação da metafísica por meio da análise lógica da linguagem. In: Cognitio, São Paulo, v. 10, n. 2, jul./dez. 2009, p. 293-309.DESCARTES, R. Discurso do Método. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2001.DILTHEY, W. Introdução às ciências humanas. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2010.FANNING, P. A. Isaac Newton e a transmutação da alquimia: uma visão alternativa da revolução científica. Balneário Camboriú (SC): Livraria Danúbio, 2016.GALILEI, G. Edizione Nazionale delle Opere di Galileo Galilei. Antonio Favaro (ed.) Florença: Barbéra, 1928-38, 19 Vols.HESSE, Mary. Revolutions and Reconstruction in Philosophy of Science. Brighton, 1980.HUME, D. Investigações sobre o entendimento humano. In: BERKELEY, G.; HUME, D. Tratado sobre os princípios do conhecimento humano; Três diálogos entre Hilas e Filonous em oposição aos Céticos e Ateus; Investigação sobre o entendimento humano; Ensaios morais, políticos e literários. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1978.KUHN, T. La strututtura delle rivoluzioni scientifiche. Torino: [s.n], 1978.LEVINAS, E. Totalité et Infini. [sl]: The Hague, 1971.MACINTYRE, A. Dopo la virtù: Saggio di teoria morale. Milano: Feltrino, 1988.NEIMAN, S. O mal no pensamento moderno: uma história alternativa da filosofia. Rio de Janeiro: DIFEL, 2003.NIETZSCHE, F. Assim falou Zaratustra. 2.ed., Petrópolis: Vozes, 2008.ORTEGA Y GASSET, J. O que é Filosofia? Campinas: Vide Editorial, 2016.PAGANI, S.M.; Luciani, A. (org.) Os Documentos do Processo de Galileu Galilei. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1994.PLATÃO. Teeteto. Tradução de Edson Bini, Bauru/SP: EDIPRO, 2007.POPPER. K. A lógica da descoberta científica. São Paulo: Cultrix, 2001.WHITE, M. O grande livro das coisas horríveis: a crônica definitiva da história das 100 piores atrocidades. Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 2013. 

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