War Preparation, Warfare, and the Welfare State in Austria

Author(s):  
Herbert Obinger

This chapter shows that war preparation and particularly the two world wars have left a strong and lasting imprint on the Austrian welfare state. First, war and war preparation are important factors for understanding the timing of programme adoption. Second, the economic and social repercussions of war strongly affected the public–private mix and financing mode of the welfare state. Third, welfare provision to the victims of wars had a strong impact on the social spending/GDP ratio that only gradually petered out. Fourth, social provision for the victims of war was a harbinger of modern social policies as it informed innovations in (civilian) disability policies, active labour market policy, and long-term care. Finally, war drastically altered the political context in a way that has allowed the welfare state to flourish in the post-war period (via e.g. democratization, a changed distribution of power resources, corporatism and consensus democracy, and centralization of government).

Author(s):  
Stefan Svallfors

Attitudes toward social spending, collective financing, and public organization, willingness to pay taxes, suspicion about welfare abuse, and trust in the task performance of the welfare state show a large degree of stability in Sweden, and where change is registered, it tends to go in the direction of increasing support. More people state their willingness to pay higher taxes for welfare policy purposes; more people want collective financing of welfare policies; and fewer people perceive extensive welfare abuse. Class patterns change so that the salaried and the self-employed become more similar to workers in their attitudes. Hence, no attitudinal corrosive effects from increased marketization of the Swedish welfare state can be detected on public support for welfare policies.


2021 ◽  
pp. 095269512110344
Author(s):  
David Garland

This article traces the emergence of the term welfare state in British political discourse and describes competing efforts to define its meaning. It presents a genealogy of the concept's emergence and its subsequent integration into various political scripts, tracing the struggles that sought to name, define, and narrate what welfare state would be taken to mean. It shows that the concept emerged only after the core programmes to which it referred had already been enacted into law and that the referents and meaning of the concept were never generally agreed upon – not even at the moment of its formation in the late 1940s. During the 1950s, the welfare state concept was being framed in three distinct senses: (a) the welfare state as a set of social security programmes; (b) the welfare state as a socio-economic system; and (c) the welfare state as a new kind of state. Each of these usages was deployed by opposing political actors – though with different scope, meaning, value, and implication. The article argues that the welfare state concept did not operate as a representation reflecting a separate, already-constituted reality. Rather, the use of the concept in the political and economic arguments of the period – and in later disputes about the nature of the Labour government's post-war achievements – was always thoroughly rhetorical and constitutive, its users aiming to shape the transformations and outcomes that they claimed merely to describe.


2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zachary Parolin ◽  
Linus Siöland

Debate around a universal basic income (UBI) tends to focus on the economic and social implications of the policy proposal. Less clear, however, are the factors influencing support for a UBI. Using the 2016 European Social Survey, we investigate how trade union membership and left political ideology (central to power resources theory) and attitudes towards immigrants’ access to welfare benefits (central to welfare state chauvinism) affect individual support for a UBI. We also investigate how country-level differences in levels of social spending moderate individual-level UBI support. Results from multi-level models suggest that a broader coalition of UBI supporters can generally be found in countries where social spending is low. Specifically, we find that welfare state chauvinism is more likely to be associated with negative attitudes towards a UBI in countries with high levels of spending, but has only a weak association with UBI support in low-spending countries. Similarly, political ideology is more consequential in explaining UBI support in countries with higher levels of spending. These tensions form a demand–capacity paradox: the countries which are presumably least equipped to implement a UBI see the most broad-based support for the policy.


2000 ◽  
Vol 45 ◽  
pp. 105-120
Author(s):  
Melanie Phillips

Once upon a time, there was a consensus in this country that the welfare state was the jewel in the crown of the post-war settlement. It was a national badge of moral worth. It was held to embody certain virtues that people told themselves were the hallmark of a civilised society: altruism, equity, dignity, fellowship. It defined Britain as a co-operative exercise which bound us together into a cohesive society. Or so we told ourselves.


2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
HUGH BOCHEL ◽  
ANDREW DEFTY

The post-war ‘consensus’ on welfare was based largely in the perceived agreement of leading politicians of Conservative and Labour parties on the role of the mixed economy and the welfare state. However, from the late 1970s economic and demographic pressures and ideological challenges, particularly from the New Right, led to cuts in spending on welfare, increased private involvement and an emphasis on more individualistic and selectivist approaches to provision. Recently some scholars have begun to discuss the emergence of a ‘new liberal consensus’ around welfare provision. Drawing upon interviews with 10 per cent of the House of Commons, this article examines the extent to which a new political consensus upon welfare can be identified. In addition to analysing responses to questions on welfare issues, it considers the extent to which MPs themselves believe there to be some degree of consensus in approaches to welfare. It also considers whether any consensus exists merely in the political language used in relation to welfare issues, or whether there is a more substantive convergence.


Author(s):  
Celia Lessa Kerstenetzky ◽  
Graciele Pereira Guedes

Abstract Has the welfare state undergone significant retrenchment in the aftermath of the 2007–08 crackdown? In the literature, two contrasting views can be found. Some commentators argue that expansions that would otherwise be observed during crises have been suffocated due to the imperative of austerity. Other more optimistic assessments see social investment policies as having been experimented with in various places, alongside widespread retrenchment. In this paper, using an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) database for 35 countries, we check these assessments by examining aggregate figures, such as the evolution—over the 2007–13 period—of social spending and its composition, the participation of social spending in public expenditure, the tax burden and tax composition and welfare state effectiveness. We document expansion in the OECD area alongside stable performance. However, important challenges persist.


1989 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 505-526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodney Lowe

ABSTRACTBetween 1955–7 welfare expenditure in Britain came under serious attack. The main protagonist was the Treasury and its chosen implement a five-year review of the social services, to be presided over by a ministerial Social Services Committee. The attack rebounded, for the Committee provided the opportunity for the consolidation of the defence of welfare expenditure and for a frontal attack on Treasury assumptions. This neglected episode in Conservative government social policy places in historical context the early defeat of monetarism (with Thorneycroft's resignation in 1958) and provides the background to the establishment of the Plowden Committee and of the Public Expenditure Survey Committee. It also raises questions about the degree of post-war consensus and the failure to make the constructive development of the welfare state an objective of ‘conviction’ politics.


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