scholarly journals Support for a universal basic income: A demand–capacity paradox?

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zachary Parolin ◽  
Linus Siöland

Debate around a universal basic income (UBI) tends to focus on the economic and social implications of the policy proposal. Less clear, however, are the factors influencing support for a UBI. Using the 2016 European Social Survey, we investigate how trade union membership and left political ideology (central to power resources theory) and attitudes towards immigrants’ access to welfare benefits (central to welfare state chauvinism) affect individual support for a UBI. We also investigate how country-level differences in levels of social spending moderate individual-level UBI support. Results from multi-level models suggest that a broader coalition of UBI supporters can generally be found in countries where social spending is low. Specifically, we find that welfare state chauvinism is more likely to be associated with negative attitudes towards a UBI in countries with high levels of spending, but has only a weak association with UBI support in low-spending countries. Similarly, political ideology is more consequential in explaining UBI support in countries with higher levels of spending. These tensions form a demand–capacity paradox: the countries which are presumably least equipped to implement a UBI see the most broad-based support for the policy.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zachary Parolin ◽  
Linus Siöland

Debate around a universal basic income (UBI) tends to focus on the economic and social implications of the policy proposal. Less clear, however, are the factors influencing support for a UBI. Using the 2016 European Social Survey, we investigate how trade union membership and left political ideology (central to power resources theory) and attitudes towards immigrants’ access to welfare benefits (central to welfare state chauvinism) affect individual support for a UBI. We also investigate how country-level differences in levels of social spending moderate individual-level UBI support. Results from multi-level models suggest that a broader coalition of UBI supporters can generally be found in countries where social spending is low. Specifically, we find that welfare state chauvinism is more likely to be associated with negative attitudes towards a UBI in countries with high levels of spending, but has only a weak association with UBI support in low-spending countries. Similarly, political ideology is more consequential in explaining UBI support in countries with higher levels of spending. These tensions form a demand–capacity paradox: the countries which are presumably least equipped to implement a UBI see the most broad-based support for the policy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (Supplement_4) ◽  
Author(s):  
I Backhaus ◽  
S Kino ◽  
G La Torre ◽  
I Kawachi

Abstract Background Individuals who hew to a conservative political ideology have been previously reported to have better self-rated health compared to liberals. No studies have examined whether the correlation between right-wing ideology and health also holds for populism, a brand of politics that is gaining momentum throughout the world. We tested whether the association still holds for right-wing populists. Methods We analysed data from 24617 respondents nested within 18 European countries included in the 2016 European Social Survey. Multilevel analyses were conducted to assess the relationship between political ideology and self-rated health, adjusting for other individual covariates (happiness and social capital) and country-level characteristics (democracy type). Results Individuals who voted for right-wing populist parties were 43% more likely to report fair/poor health compared to traditional conservatives (OR = 1.43, 95% confidence interval 1.23 to 1.67). The association was attenuated after controlling for individual-level variables, including happiness and access to social capital (OR = 1.21, confidence interval 1.03 to 1.42). Higher levels of social capital (informal networks, OR = 0.40, 95% confidence interval 0.29 to 0.56; trust, OR = 0.82, 95% confidence interval 0.74 to 0.92) and happiness (OR = 0.18, 95% confidence interval 0.15 to 0.22) were protectively correlated with fair/poor self-rated health. Conclusions Individuals voting for right-wing populist parties report worse health compared to conservatives. It remains unclear whether ideology is just a marker for health-related practices, or whether the values and beliefs associated with a particular brand of ideology leads to worse health. Key messages There is a significant association between voting for right-wing populist parties and self-rated poor health. Social capital was protectively correlated with self-rated health calling for renewed attention on the effects of social capital on political ideology and health.


2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Vlandas

Abstract This article analyses individual level support for a Basic Income Guarantee (BIG) using the European Social Survey. At the country level, support is highest in South and Central Eastern Europe, but variation does not otherwise seem to follow established differences between varieties of capitalisms or welfare state regimes. At the individual level, findings are broadly in line with the expectations of the political economy literature. Left-leaning individuals facing high labour market risk and/or on low incomes are more supportive of a BIG, whereas current union members are less likely to support a BIG, consistent with the insider-outsider literature. However, when controlling for confounding variables, union membership is not statistically significant, suggesting that it is not membership per se, but the characteristics of unionised workers that make them less supportive. In many countries, a coalition between centrist and left-leaning individuals therefore seems most promising, but its political feasibility depends on whether enough union members are favourable to a BIG and on the level of opposition from high income and/or conservative parts of the electorate.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
MARIUS R. BUSEMEYER ◽  
ALEXANDER H. J. SAHM

Abstract Rapid technological change – the digitalization and automation of work – is challenging contemporary welfare states. Most of the existing research, however, focuses on its effect on labor market outcomes, such as employment or wage levels. In contrast, this paper studies the implications of technological change for welfare state attitudes and preferences. Compared to previous work on this topic, this paper adopts a much broader perspective regarding different kinds of social policy. Using data from the European Social Survey, we find that individual automation risk is positively associated with support for redistribution, but negatively with support for social investment policies (partly depending on the specific measure of automation risk that is used), while there is no statistically significant association with support for basic income. We also find a moderating effect of the overall size of the welfare state on the micro-level association between risk and preferences.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 949 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grzegorz Zasuwa

Product boycotts represent an important form of sustainable consumption, as withholding purchasing can restrain firms from damaging the natural environment or breaking social rules. However, our understanding of consumer participation in these protests is limited. Most previous studies have focused on the psychological and economic determinants of product boycotting. Drawing on social capital literature, this study builds a framework that explains how individual- and contextual-level social capital affects consumer participation in boycotts of products. A multilevel logistic regression analysis of 29 country representative samples derived from the European Social Survey (N = 54221) shows that at the individual level product boycotting is associated with a person’s social ties, whereas at the country level, generalized trust and social networks positively affect consumer decisions to take part in these protests. These results suggest that to better understand differences among countries in consumer activism, it is necessary to consider the role of social capital as an important predictor of product boycotting.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 404 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adeline Otto ◽  
Dimitri Gugushvili

In the face of accelerating global warming and attendant natural disasters, it is clear that governments all over the world eventually have to take measures to mitigate the most adverse consequences of climate change. However, the costs of these measures are likely to force governments to reconsider some of their tax and spending priorities, of which social spending is the largest expenditure item in developed welfare states. Unless carried out in a way that is considered as fair by most citizens, such trade-off is likely to add a new, ecological dimension to the existing social cleavages in people’s preferences for public provision. Whether or not the possible tensions between the two sets of policies have already resulted in the emergence of a new, eco-social divide in Europe is an open question. In this paper, we hypothesise that there are four distinct attitude groups in relation to welfare and climate change policies, and that the probability of belonging to any of these groups is influenced by individuals’ socioeconomic and ideological characteristics, as well as the country context in which they live. We test our hypotheses using data from the eighth round of the European Social Survey conducted in 2016/17 in multinomial regression models. Results suggest that across Europe people are considerably divided in their support of public welfare and climate policies, but that support for both dimensions is highest in the Nordic countries. At the micro level, we find political ideology and trust in public institutions to be the most important drivers of a newly emerging eco-social divide.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 54-66
Author(s):  
Mykola Izha ◽  
Olena Knyazeva ◽  
Tetyana Pakhomova

The article presents the results of studying the formation of institutional trust, which will help to clarify and, at the same time, raise questions regarding the determination of the level of trust in state and political institutions in Ukraine and in modern European countries. In the context of the study, the tasks were considered to identify the factors that influence the formation of citizens’ trust in political institutions, namely: the effectiveness of the activities of political institutions; personal experience of interaction of citizens with representatives of authorities; the level of trust in the state as a whole, which can be transferred to individual state institutions. Analyzing the data from the Rounds (waves) 1-9 of the European Social Survey (ESS) in 2002-2018, the level of confidence in Ukraine’s political and public institutions and in the other European countries is compared. The analysis makes it possible to determine the factors that are present at the supra-individual level (at the country level) and which can influence the public policy of the state. The results of the study can be used to suggest possible measures to increase public confidence in major public institutions.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell

How does an authoritarian past shape voters’ left-right orientation? Recent studies investigate “anti-dictator bias” in political ideology, where citizens in a former right-wing (left-wing) dictatorship may display a leftist (rightist) bias in their ideological self-identification. In this paper, I provide evidence for a “pro-dictator bias” where citizens hold ideological positions corresponding to those of the dictator depending on their experiences during and after transition. In countries with negotiated transitions and stronger former ruling parties, these successors could continue mobilizing the popular base of the former dictatorship with inherited advantages from the past and by invoking nostalgia through consistent reference to previous authoritarian achievements. I test this hypothesis with variables measuring successor party strength and the type of regime transition by combining individual-level survey data and country-level data. The findings emphasize the role of post-transition features in shaping alternative legacies on voter attitudes in former authoritarian societies.


Author(s):  
Herbert Obinger

This chapter shows that war preparation and particularly the two world wars have left a strong and lasting imprint on the Austrian welfare state. First, war and war preparation are important factors for understanding the timing of programme adoption. Second, the economic and social repercussions of war strongly affected the public–private mix and financing mode of the welfare state. Third, welfare provision to the victims of wars had a strong impact on the social spending/GDP ratio that only gradually petered out. Fourth, social provision for the victims of war was a harbinger of modern social policies as it informed innovations in (civilian) disability policies, active labour market policy, and long-term care. Finally, war drastically altered the political context in a way that has allowed the welfare state to flourish in the post-war period (via e.g. democratization, a changed distribution of power resources, corporatism and consensus democracy, and centralization of government).


Author(s):  
Trevor Diehl ◽  
Brigitte Huber ◽  
Homero Gil de Zúñiga ◽  
James Liu

Abstract This study explores the individual- and country-level factors that influence how getting news from social media relates to people’s beliefs about anthropogenic climate change. Concepts of psychological distance and motivated reasoning are tested using multilevel analysis with survey data in 20 countries (N = 18,785). Results suggest that using social media for news is associated with a decrease in climate skepticism across the sample. However, social context at the individual-level (conservative political ideology and low trust in science) and at the macro-level (high gross domestic product and individualism) moderate the effect, and therefore reduce social media’s potential to inform the public about climate change. This study contributes to conversations about the ability of emerging media to address science issues, particularly in developing countries.


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