A Normative Framework for Promoting Compliance
This chapter completes the proposed normative framework for cross-border insolvency. It considers the problem of compliance with a cross-border insolvency system by countries and implementing institutions. The previous chapters have shown how the choice and use of certain international legal sources, such as customary international law (CIL), can strengthen the system, close gaps, and address biases that may otherwise impede the choices of optimal solutions. Yet, notwithstanding the pervasiveness and behavioural force of CIL, the observance of the norms is not guaranteed. Written instruments, even if precise and comprehensive, and designed effectively, do not assure compliance either. Even where so-called soft law is in fact hard in important ways, countries might still underperform. This chapter suggests how compliance can be induced, and discusses which measures can be more, or less effective in that regard, including in view of decision-making constraints.