Failure to Accelerate

Author(s):  
Peter Scott

From an international perspective, the inter-war car industry was a British success story. Britain ranked only second to the United States as the world’s leading producer of, and market for, automobiles, owing to a relatively strong domestic market by European standards. However, while consumers’ expenditure was high, it was not deep—car ownership per capita in 1938 being around a third of US levels. This chapter examines why the British automobile sector failed to take off into mass market diffusion. A number of important factors are highlighted, including lower British wages relative to the United States; punitive vehicle and petrol taxation; and the high unit production costs incurred in serving a market too small to justify Fordist mass production. However, a more fundamental reason was the low priority given to car ownership in a relatively small, densely populated, and highly urbanized island nation with well-developed public transport networks.

Author(s):  
Emma L. Rearick ◽  
Gregory L. Newmark

Automobile use is recognized as affecting public health, environmental sustainability, land use, and household expense. Car use is closely tied to car ownership rates. Most car ownership research focuses on urban areas; however, 97% of the United States’ land area and a fifth of its population remains rural. Factors that affect car ownership in these communities may be different than in more urbanized areas. This research focuses on the 2,285 counties in the continental United States that are defined as entirely rural by the guidelines established in the Agricultural Act of 2014. These counties were grouped by five multi-state regions using U.S. Census Bureau definitions. Their percentage changes in car ownership, as well as other demographic variables, over a quarter century were calculated using data from the 1990 Decennial Census and the 2014 5-Year American Community Survey. A multiple regression model was estimated for each grouping to identify counties with lower-than-expected changes in car ownership. For each grouping, one of these outlying counties was selected and matched with another county whose changes in car ownership were within expected ranges given demographic developments. Local professionals were then interviewed to identify policies possibly responsible for the difference in car ownership trends between the matched-pair counties. The interviews suggested that, contrary to expectation, transportation policies had no discernable effect on rural car ownership, but land use polices and, more often, cultural factors linked to changing populations were associated with reduced rural car ownership.


2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerry L. Holechek

Increasing world human population, declining reserves of cheaply extracted fossil fuels, scarcity of supplies of fresh water and climatic instability will put tremendous pressure on world rangelands as the 21st century progresses. It is expected that the human population of the world will increase by 40% by 2050 but fossil fuel and reserves of fresh water will be drastically reduced. Avoiding food shortages and famine could be a major world challenge within the next 10 years. Under these conditions, major changes in policies relating to economic growth and use of natural resources seem essential. Stabilisation of the human population, development of clean and renewable energy, enhanced supplies of water and its quality, increased livestock production, and changed land-use policies, that minimise agricultural land losses to development and fragmentation, will all be needed to avoid declining living conditions at the global level. The health and productivity of rangelands will need to receive much more emphasis as they are a primary source of vital ecosystem services and products essential to human life. Changes in tax policies by developed, affluent countries, such as the United States, Australia and Canada, are needed that emphasise saving and conservation as opposed to excessive material consumption and land development. Extreme levels of debt and chronic deficits in trade by the United States and European Union countries need to be moderated to avoid a devastating collision of debt, depletion of natural resources, and environmental degradation. Over the next 10 years, livestock producers of the rangelands will benefit from a major increase in demand and prices for meat. Rapidly increasing demand for meat in China and other Asian countries is driving this trend. Rangeland managers, however, will also likely encounter greater climatic, financial, biological and political risks. Higher interest rates, higher production costs and higher annual variability in forage resources are major challenges that will confront rangeland managers in the years ahead. Under these conditions, a low risk approach to livestock production from rangelands is recommended that involves conservative stocking, use of highly adapted livestock, and application of behavioural knowledge of livestock to efficiently use forage resources.


Author(s):  
David Vogel

This chapter explores several alternative explanations for the divergence in transatlantic risk regulation, and discusses the policy shifts that have taken place on both sides of the Atlantic since around 1990. The United States and the fifteen member states of the EU are affluent democracies with sophisticated public bureaucracies, substantial scientific capacities, and strong civic cultures. Their regulatory officials have access to much of the same scientific expertise and there is extensive communication among policy makers, scientists, business managers, nongovernment organizations, and citizens. The chapter shows how divergent risk regulations between the United States and the EU add to the costs of transatlantic commerce and also raise the costs of international trade as some countries adopt European standards and others adopt American ones.


Author(s):  
Steven Sass

Occupational pensions are today a major ‘second tier’ in Anglo-Saxon retirement income systems, providing benefits to a significant portion of the elderly population atop the basic ‘first tier’ benefits provided by the state. In the United States, for example, employer plans provide one-fifth of the income of the elderly — one-quarter if earnings from work are excluded — half the amount provided by public plans. By the end of the 1930s, employer pension plans had become standard in governments and mature big businesses throughout the industrial world. They had become critical tools for strengthening, then severing, relationships with workers. Britain took a different tack to strengthening employer plans. It primarily leveraged the contracting-out provisions in the State Earnings-related Pension Scheme (SERPS), introduced in 1978.


Author(s):  
Douglas A. Irwin

This chapter sets out basic facts about international trade and the U.S. economy. It describes how world trade has expanded rapidly in the recent decades and explains how the development provides the context in which to consider trade policy. The chapter discusses the reasons for the increase in trade and how trade has changed with the fragmentation of production and the increase in trade of intermediate goods. It talks about the state of public opinion on the question of globalization. It also analyzes protectionist policies that directly harm employment in domestic industries by raising production costs in addition to forcing consumers to pay higher price for the products they buy.


Author(s):  
Peter Baldwin

The U.S. Economy does Differ from Europe’s: a less regulated labor market, but also an economy that is more hemmed in than might be expected. By European standards, America has hardish-working people, a state that collects fewer tax dollars, and workers who are paid well even if their holidays are short. In social policy, the contrasts are more moderate. Europeans commonly believe that the United States simply has no social policy—no social security, no unemployment benefits, no state pensions, and no assistance for the poor. As Jean-François Revel, the political philosopher and académicien, summed up French criticism, the United States shows “not the slightest bit of social solidarity.” Will Hutton similarly assures us that “The structures that support ordinary peoples’ lives—free health care, quality education, guarantees of reasonable living standards in old age, sickness or unemployment, housing for the disadvantaged— that Europeans take for granted are conspicuous by their absence.” And, in fact, the United States is the only developed nation, unless one counts South Africa, without some form of national health insurance, which is to say a system of requiring all its citizens to be insured in one way or another. This lack of universal health insurance is the one fact that every would-be comparativist working across the Atlantic knows, and the first one to be hoisted as the battle is engaged. One of the first attempts to quantify and rank health care performance, by the World Health Organization in 2000, gave the American system its due. Overall, it came in below any of our comparison countries, three notches under Denmark. In various specific aspects of health policy, it did better. For disability adjusted life expectancy, it came in above Ireland, Denmark, and Portugal; on the responsiveness of the health system, it ranked first; on a composite measure of various indicators summed up as “overall health system attainment,” it ranked above seven Western European countries. Even on the measure of “fairness of financial contribution to health systems,” where we might have expected an abysmal rating, the United States squeaked in above Portugal. That is, of course, damning with faint praise, especially given that in this particular aspect of the ranking—a well-meaning but other-worldly attempt by international bureaucrats to rake the entire globe over the teeth of one comb—Colombia came in first, outpacing its close rivals, Luxembourg and Belgium, while Libya beat out Sweden.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 820-840 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang He ◽  
Fengqi You

Using detailed techno-economic-environmental models, we investigate the environmental impacts and production costs of the mega-scale shale gas-to-olefins projects in the U.S.


2002 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 154-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ballard Campbell

Thanks to Richard Jensen, Kriste Lindenmeyer, Alan Lessoff and William G. Shade for helpful comments on this essay.Comparative perspectives on the United States have received increased attention in recent years, stimulated apparently by the rise in world history's popularity. David Thelen's sponsorship of transnational history as a subject of three special issues of the Journal of American History no doubt has contributed to the trend. The reprinting of C. Vann Woodward's The Comparative Approach to American History in 1997, the publication of George Fredrickson's essays on comparative history, and the report of the La Pietra Project reflect recent efforts to put United States history in an international perspective. While comparative history hardly has gained equal footing with nationally-centered studies, enough work on the Gilded Age and Progressive Era has appeared over the last decade and a half to warrant an assessment. This essay takes note of scholarship on economics, business, politics and governance that has examined the United States within an international context during the 1870s–1914 era. My objective is to discern trends in the literature and suggest opportunities for future research rather than to provide a comprehensive bibliographical survey.


2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (5) ◽  
pp. 103-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
David E Nye

Awareness of global warming has been widespread for two decades, yet the American political system has been slow to respond. This essay examines, first, political explanations for policy failure, focusing at the federal level and outlining both short-term partisan and structural explanations for the stalemate. The second section surveys previous energy regimes and the transitions between them, and policy failure is explained by the logic of Thomas Hughes’s ‘technological momentum’. The third section moves to an international perspective, using the Kaya Identity and its distinction between energy intensity and carbon intensity to understand in policy terms ‘technological fixes’ vs. low-carbon alternatives. The final section reframes US energy policy failure and asks: (1) Why, between 1980 and 1999, was America’s actual performance in slowing CO2emissions better than its politics would seem capable of delivering? (2) How and why has the United States since c. 2007 managed to reduce per capita CO2emissions?


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