It’s the Mix That Matters

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. A. W. Rhodes
Keyword(s):  
Public Management ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Public Management ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Game Playing ◽  
Power Dependence ◽  
Institutional Complexity ◽  
New Public ◽  
Self Organizing

After explaining the idea of the differentiated polity, the chapter discusses the characteristics of governance with examples; institutional complexity, power-dependence, game playing, self-organizing, and steering. It argues that the shift to governance requires the new language of diplomacy, not marketization. Governments must choose between markets and networks and bureaucracy. It is the mix that matters. Networks are pervasive. Government is picking up the skills of indirect management, but slowly. This chapter aims to hasten that process by providing a language for exploring and managing the mix of governing structures in the differentiated polity. The new public management, whether in the guise of managerialism or institutional economics, is no longer the challenge confronting government. The challenge is diplomacy in governance. The Afterword expands on the ideas of governing structures, unintended consequences, and metagovernance.

The New Governance

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. A. W. Rhodes
Keyword(s):  
Public Management ◽  
New Public Management ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Democratic Accountability ◽  
British Government ◽  
New Governance ◽  
New Public ◽  
Cybernetic System ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Self Organizing

The chapter reviews the several definitions of governance: the minimal state; corporate governance; the new public management, ‘good’ governance; a socio-cybernetic system. It then stipulates a definition of governance as self-organizing, inter-organizational networks. It argues there is a trend from government to governance in British government because of the hollowing-out pressures and the tools for intergovernmental management are integral to effective steering. Policy networks are already widespread. This trend is not widely recognized and has important implications not only for the practice of British government but also for democratic accountability. Governance as self-organizing networks is a challenge to governability because the networks can become autonomous and resist central guidance. They are set fair to become the prime example of governing without government.

scholarly journals The Challenges of Linking Pay and Promotion: Repeated Reforms of the European Commission Staff Appraisal Process

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carolyn Ban
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Public Management ◽  
New Public Management ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Management Culture ◽  
Appraisal Process ◽  
Administrative Reforms ◽  
Staff Appraisal ◽  
New Public ◽  
The Status

In response to the 1999 crisis caused by the mass resignation of the European Commission, the Commission introduced a series of administrative reforms based in large part on New Public Management models.  A centerpiece of those reforms was a new staff appraisal process linking numeric ratings with promotions, which was designed explicitly to change the management culture of the Commission.  Of all parts of the reform, this was by far the most controversial.  This paper traces the long arc of reform, as the original reform was replaced with a second version that was even more rigid and complex, leading to a third reform, in 2012, which returned the Commission in large part to the status quo ante, abandoning numeric ratings and the formal link to promotions.  I analyze the reasons for the reforms and the problems and unintended consequences of each.  In conclusion, I link this saga of repeated reforms to the broader literature on the effectiveness of attempts to change organizational culture through formal structural reforms.

Accountability and Responsibility

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Gregory
Keyword(s):  
Public Management ◽  
New Public Management ◽  
Political Process ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Moral Choice ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
New Public ◽  
The Will ◽  
Democratic Systems ◽  
And Control

Accountability and responsibility are related ideas that are central to political, constitutional, and institutional arrangements in Western liberal democracies. However, political elites in non-democratic systems are generally not held accountable by citizens through such arrangements, and accountability is primarily a means of securing the compliance of state functionaries to the will of these elites. In liberal democracies the terms “accountability” and “responsibility” are often used in common discourse as if they were synonyms, but they are not. The former is a concept that embodies a number of different types, with a common theme of answerability by an accountor to an accountee, usually—but not necessarily—in a hierarchical relationship designed to ensure compliance and control. Responsibility, on the other hand, speaks of the associated but different domain of individual moral choice, where often conflicting duties of obligation are experienced by those in official positions. Beginning in the 1980s, the so-called new public management movement, which brought major changes to many Western systems of public administration, sought to enhance the accountability of public bureaucrats, especially their answerability to their elected political superiors. The effects have been mixed and uncertain, often with unintended consequences, such as the reinforcement of risk aversion and blame shifting and gaming behavior. The quest for accountability is inherently a political process, in which “holding to account” may often depend much less on any forensic determination of specific culpability and much more on evidential and political disputation, where the search for the “truth” is highly—and increasingly—contestable.

The New Governance: Governing without Government

1996 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 652-667 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. A. W. Rhodes
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Service Delivery ◽  
Public Management ◽  
New Public Management ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Interorganizational Networks ◽  
British Government ◽  
New Governance ◽  
New Public ◽  
Self Organizing

The term ‘governance’ is popular but imprecise. It has at least six uses, referring to: the minimal state; corporate governance: the new public management; ‘good governance’; socio-cybernetic systems: and self-organizing networks. I stipulate that governance refers to ‘self-organizing, interorganizational networks' and argue these networks complement markets and hierarchies as governing structures for authoritatively allocating resources and exercising control and co-ordination. I defend this definition, arguing that it throws new light on recent changes in British government, most notably: hollowing out the state, the new public management, and intergovernmental management. 1 conclude that networks are now a pervasive feature of service delivery in Britain; that such networks are characterized by trust and mutual adjustment and undermine management reforms rooted in competition; and that they are a challenge to governability because they become autonomous and resist central guidance.

The development and use of performance measures in New Zealand tertiary education institutions

2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-218
Author(s):  
Anil Kumar Narayan
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Performance Measurement ◽  
Performance Measures ◽  
Public Management ◽  
New Public Management ◽  
Tertiary Education ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Academic Quality ◽  
New Public ◽  
Government Reforms

This article provides a 30-year history of the development, use and impact of performance measures on tertiary education institutions in New Zealand. The study reveals that performance measurement emerged from the new public management initiatives and the multiple logics of government reforms to help address efficiency and accountability concerns of the tertiary education sector. The performance measurement culture became central to shaping and reshaping the character of educational politics, government policies and the management of educational outcomes. Performance measurement also created a web of unintended consequences with its own tensions, cynicism and complications. Enacted by the market logic and complemented by the business logic to maximise profits, performance measures compromised academic quality and caused rivalry with the norms of the academic profession. The study recommends that the distorting effects of performance measurement requires profound rethinking and careful management to ensure that it accomplishes what it is intended to accomplish.

Good governance, institutions and performance of public private partnerships

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (7) ◽  
pp. 566-582 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed Ismail Sabry
Keyword(s):  
Public Management ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Public Management ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Public Private Partnerships ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Regulatory Quality ◽  
New Public ◽  
Governance Institutions ◽  
Bureaucratic Efficiency

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore theoretically and empirically which institutional factors (including good governance ones) help public-private partnerships (PPP) in providing better infrastructural services, which would then in their turn lead to attracting more private investment for the whole economy. Design/methodology/approach – On the theoretical level, while a focus is put on discussing the institutions that should be responsible for PPP success, reconciliation is being attempted between institutional economics from one side and the new public management and networks management perspectives from the other. Empirically, OLS multivariate panel regressions test the suggestions of the theoretical discussion with emphasis on interaction terms between PPP and the studied institutions. Findings – Evidence is found that good governance institutions, and specifically good regulatory quality, bureaucratic efficiency and independence, help PPP in performing well as evident from their positive effect on investment growth. Research limitations/implications – The limitations of this paper are mainly empirical. Further results with great policy implications could have been obtained if better proxies were developed for a number of variables. Certainly this is the case for the proxies used for cronyism and public-private dialogues (PPD). Practical implications – Tackling bureaucratic efficiency and independence and higher regulatory quality should be a top priority if the great positive externalities resulting from PPP in infrastructure are to be realized. Originality/value – The novelty of this research is attributed to constructing a proxy for PPP, as well as testing empirically the effect of the interactions of PPP with other institutional variables on the performance of infrastructural services (as evident from attracting more investment). The synthesis between the literature on PPP, new public management, networks, good governance, and institutional economics is another aspect of this work. The obtained results suggest important policy recommendations, and, the author hopes to, add to the literature on PPP.

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